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Abstract 
 
 
For several historical and political reasons, the decision-making processes and institutional 
structures of environmental governance has been greatly impacted by the North-South 
dimension, which creates enormous challenges for Southern states when they try to present 
their concerns to global forums. These challenges have many dimensions, such as political, 
economic, social, and legal.  This thesis recognises the “poverty of influence” that has 
become endemic as a result of the lack of resources, expertise, research facilities, 
technology and other practical deficiencies that exist in the negotiating procedures and 
which have hampered the South’s participation in global environmental governance. Such 
participatory inequalities between North and South have seriously hampered the 
application of equity, fairness and justice – principles that are considered to be vital 
ingredients in any balanced governing system.   
 
This thesis proposes the utilisation of the diverse capacity of transnational NGO networks 
to enable the Southern voice to be effectively heard in global decision-making processes, 
and it questions the traditional legal structures that currently allow for NGO involvement 
by determining the need for wider opportunities to be considered, thereby enabling them to 
express their concerns. The thesis includes a Case Study that examines from a North-South 
perspective the different capacities of NGOs to influence global forests negotiations. 
Consequently, it is hoped that the thesis will contribute towards a greater understanding of 
the benefits that might accrue from the utilisation of transnational networks to voice 
hitherto unheard global forest issues.  
 
This thesis, which is timely, in that 2011 was the International Year of Forests, argues that 
transnational NGO networks could help mitigate the inequalities suffered by the South 
caused by the historic North-South divide. However, it also stresses the importance 
attached to transnational NGO networks incorporating measurable values of legitimacy and 
accountability when they represent the South at global governance forums.  
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Introduction 
 
On 7th March 2011, the Chairman of the Group of 77 (G77) published a statement at the 
Second Preparatory Committee meeting prior to the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in 20121 in which he expressed the hope of finding 
common ground for progress. Paragraph 9 states: 
In order for the benefits of applying "green economy" as a concept to outweigh the risks, it 
should be firmly rooted under the paradigm of sustainable development, respecting the 
policy space of each country to define their own paths towards sustainability in their 
economy and society, in accordance with their own circumstances and priorities. Social 
inclusion and decent jobs, trade related concerns, transition costs and impacts and avoiding 
"green protectionism" should be seriously considered and addressed so as to ensure a 
meaningful outcome at the 2012 UNCSD for developing countries and be able to generate a 
common vision to guide our future
2
 
Paragraph 11 states further: 
The discussions on new and emerging challenges should focus on preventing new crises, 
achieving sustainable development, eradicating poverty and addressing inequalities. It should 
also be based on the principles enshrined in paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, including the sovereign right of countries to exploit their 
                                                 
1 Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Ambassador Jorge Arguello, Permanent 
representative of Argentina to the United Nations, Chairman of the Group of 77, at the second preparatory 
committee meeting of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (New York, 7 March 2011). The 
document is available on http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=110307g (last accessed on 
15.03.2011)  
2 Ibid.  
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own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies and that 
States have common but differentiated responsibilities […]
3 
The above quotations reflect the premise that underlines this thesis, which is that Southern 
concerns have been consistently marginalised in international environmental decision 
making processes4 as a result of the South’s material weakness and inability to exert 
significant influence in the Northern dominated global system. As a consequence of a long 
historical process, several political, economic, military, social and cultural differences have 
emerged between North and South,5 creating a ‘North-South dimension’, to global 
environmental governance. North represents the industrialised developed countries and the 
South represents developing third world countries. The thesis argues that differences 
between the two groups play a crucial role in global governance, where the global 
decision-making is happening.  The South is critical of the imposition of Northern 
priorities over immediate concerns of the South that happens as a result of several reasons 
including the dominance of western science and research, handicap negotiating skills, lack 
of expertise, resources and technology.6 From the perspective of the South, many 
environmental negotiations led by the North are unfair and inequitable. 
Mitigating these diverse views by finding common ground between them in global 
environmental governance has become a great challenge. This thesis will argue that, to 
meet the different environmental priorities of North and South, the structural and 
normative approaches adopted for global environmental decision making should be 
founded on principles of equity, fairness and justice.  Equity needs to be derived, not only 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Wiliams M. (1993), Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: the role of the environmental agenda, Third 
World Quarterly, Volume 14, Number 1, pp:7-29 at p.9 
5 The definition of the North and the South for the purpose of this thesis will be analysed in pp:15-18 in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis 
6
 Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice:  A North-South dimension, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
p.2 
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from the equal distribution of resources, but also from the North accepting sufficient 
representation and according equal weight to the South at global decision-making forums 
in such ways that are fairly reflected in their outcomes. 
Forty years on from Stockholm7, the North-South dimension in global environmental 
governance has not significantly changed, despite the various efforts that have been 
attempted by the Southern countries. The South has not yet succeeded in establishing 
equal, fair and justice grounds with the North in global environmental decision-making 
forums.  Evidence for this assertion is the contrast between the G77 statement about the 
2012-UNCSD noted above and the developing countries’ position, as explained in the 
1971 Founex Report on Environment and Development, which recognised the difference 
between the Northern and Southern points of view:  
In advanced countries, it is appropriate to view development as a cause of environmental 
problems. Badly planned and unregulated development can have a similar result in 
developing countries as well. But, for the greater part, developing countries must view the 
relationship between development and environment in a different perspective. In their 
context, development becomes essentially a cure for their major environmental problems.8 
The group of Southern intellectuals who contributed to the creation of the Founex Report 
point to the contradictory positions adopted by the North and the South in terms of their 
environmental priorities.  Put simply, regarding environment and development, the North 
believed that development was a cause of global environmental threats and the South 
argued that development was a means of addressing Southern environmental problems. It 
is telling that, therefore, that, forty years after the Founex Report, G77 reiterated similar 
                                                 
7 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was the first UN Conference on environmental 
issues. It was held in Stockholm, Sweden in 5-16th June 1972 
8http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Earth%20Summit%202012new/Publications%20and%20R
eports/founex%20report%201972.pdf (last accessed on 15.03.2011) 
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Southern concerns in regard to environmental governance.9 Although this system has 
developed many other positive aspects of environmental governance, this thesis will argue 
that it has largely failed to address the North-South dimension. 
The South has yet to make a powerful enough impact on decision-making processes in 
inter-states forums for several political, economic and social reasons. Consequently, this 
thesis will argue that the Southern states need to “borrow power” from other sources in 
order to present their case more proficiently.10 Such external sources of power, therefore, 
should be capable of voicing the South’s burning issues, such as capacity building, an 
equal availability of resources, technology, expertise, knowledge and research, together 
with other practical solutions to problems relating to its equitable participation in global 
negotiations. This thesis will explore the contribution NGOs might make towards 
mitigating the deficits in North-South participation in international law-making processes 
and governance, and highlight their potential for voicing Southern concerns more 
effectively at the international level. To reinforce this argument, the thesis will emphasise 
the effective use of transnational NGO networks in order to bring Southern environmental 
concerns to the global decision-making tables; it will also stress the importance of ensuring 
the legitimacy and accountability of NGOs that support the Southern case.  
This thesis is concerned firstly with the historical division of North and South, with 
particular regard to the many aspects of global environmental governance by which the 
South has for so long been marginalised.  Secondly, it explores the ways that transnational 
                                                 
9 Statement on Behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Ambassador Jorge Arguello, Permanent 
representative of Argentina to the United Nations, Chairman of the Group of 77, at the second preparatory 
committee meeting of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (New York, 7 March 2011). The 
document is available on http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=110307g (last accessed on 
15.03.2011)  
10 Betzold C. (2010), ‘Borrowing Power’ to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate 
Change Regime, 1990-1997 online published in  http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1603_1456.pdf 
(last accessed on 08.03.2011) 
5 
 
NGO networks can be utilised to voice Southern environmental concerns.  In order to 
analyse these two elements, Chapter 1 illustrates the global political dimensions of North-
South differences, which have been shaped by a sequence of historical events originating 
during the colonial period and extending up to the present. Chapter 2 focuses on 
environmental governance by examining the creation and operations of the different 
environmental institutions and instruments. This chapter also illustrates the failure of inter-
state governance processes to do justice to Southern environmental concerns and it will 
advocate a multidimensional approach for governance. Chapter 3 analyses NGOs as a 
phenomenon that has rapidly changed the traditional understanding of the international 
law-making and governance process. However, it also highlights certain limitations on the 
participation of NGOs in the creation and structure of international law, and it stresses the 
need to enhance the opportunities for their continued participation.  Chapter 4 presents a 
case study on global forest negotiations, illustrating the arguments presented in the first 
three chapters with reference to ongoing international law-making processes with regard to 
forests. The first part of Chapter 4 analyses the relevance of the North-South dimension in 
global forest negotiations, and the second part examines the participation of NGOs in those 
negotiations, with a particular emphasis on the special strengths they bring to the table in 
order to represent Southern forest concerns. Chapter 5 then argues that a transnational 
network structure would provide an effective framework within which to utilise the diverse 
capacities of NGOs in voicing Southern environmental concerns. The thesis, however, 
strongly emphasises the importance of ensuring legitimacy and accountability in the way 
they voice those concerns.  
The findings of this thesis are based primarily on a critical analysis of the literature, and 
the methodology embraces an interdisciplinary approach to international law and 
international relations in order to establish a broader and more contemporary application of 
6 
 
traditional international legal formats. The thesis presents several arguments that are based 
on analysis of United Nations (UN), other international institutions’ and NGOs’ documents 
and publications.  The analysis of inter-state governance processes and structures is based 
on primary documents, which includes UN General Assembly resolutions, conventions, 
declarations, governing council regulations, published on the subject of internal decision-
making procedures and policies. In order to review the capacity of NGOs to represent the 
Southern cause, this thesis will utilise secondary sources produced by, and on, these 
organisations.  Also, an extensive selection of up-to-date online sources, published on 
various intergovernmental organisations and transnational NGO websites, have been 
integral to this research.  
By adopting these methodologies, this thesis argues that transnational NGO networks 
would strengthen Southern environmental voices in global environmental forums. The 
overall of this exercise, therefore, is to further the founding principles of equity, fairness 
and justice. 
7 
 
1. Global Governance in Worlds Apart 
 
 “[…] a dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a 
small republic is no less a sovereign state than 
the most powerful kingdom.”11  
E.de Vatel 
 
Introduction 
 
The complex nature of the global governance system often acts in contradiction to the idea 
expressed in the above statement – all states are equal. Several instances illustrate the 
doubts expressed by developing countries regarding the equality of all states in global 
governance.  For example, why, in 1965, did developing countries stress the importance of 
the “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty”12 and, in 1970, of the 
“Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”?13  These 
initiatives, which had been intended to ensure the principles of sovereign equality and non-
                                                 
11 Cassese A. quotes E de Vatel (1758) in Cassese A. (1986), International Law in a Divided World, Oxford 
University Press, p.130, also quoted in Anand R.P.  (1986), Sovereign Equality of States in International 
Law, Collected Courses/Recueil des Cours, Volume 197, p.53, Anand R.P., (2003) Family of Civilised States 
and Japan: A Story of Humiliation, Assimilation, Defiance and Confrontation, Journal of the History of 
International Law, Volume 5, Number 1, pp:1-76 at p.1-2   
12G.A. Res. 2131(XX), U.N. GAOR 20th Sess. Supp. No.14 at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (December 21, 1965) 
13G.A.Res. 2625(XXV), U.N. GAOR 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8028 (October 24, 1970)  Anghie A. (2005), 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge Studies in International and 
Comparative Law Series, Number 37, Anghie A. and Chimni B.S. (2003), Third World Approaches to 
International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, Chinese Journal of International Law,, 
Volume 2, Number 1, pp.77- 103 at p. 82   
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intervention, had been taken because of the excessive influence that had been exercised by 
developed countries over developing countries during the colonial past.14    
 
Even today, Southern leaders make statements from time to time in order to remind the 
world that every state should be treated equally, regardless of its political, military or 
economic power. For example, at the 65th meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) on 23rd of September 2010, the president of Sri Lanka emphasised the 
importance of the United Nations’ (UN) commitment to safeguard equality of all countries 
of the world: 
 
 “[The fact that the] UN is now in its sixty-fifth year serves to underline the durability of this 
organization.  It is an important mechanism in ensuring co-operation between states and a 
forum for discussions between sovereign nations.  We must never under-estimate the 
importance of this organization based as it is on the principle of equal treatment for countries 
big and small”15.  
 
This statement shows the desire of developing countries to ensure equal and fair treatment 
by global forums. Consequently, even today there is a need to reiterate the principle of 
equal treatment for all sovereign nations from time to time to show the value of 
maintaining sovereign equality. Apart from obvious geographical, political, economic, 
cultural and social differences, states are diverse in many ways that have created power 
politics that have ultimately resulted in the creation of various divisions in global 
                                                 
14Anghie A. and Chimni B.S. (2003), Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 2, Number 1,  pp.77- 103 
at p. 82   
15 http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2010/09/sri-lanka-general-debate-65th-session.html, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/65/meetings/generaldebate/View/SpeechView/tabid/85/smid/411/ArticleID/91/refta
b/224/t/Sri-Lanka/Default.aspx (last accessed on 23.03.2011) 
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governance.  The key intention of this chapter is to explore the North-South differences in 
global governance. 
 
Global decision-making forums often deal with the unequal positions between the 
developed industrialised countries (which will be called, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
North) and the developing countries (which will be called the South). However, when the 
institutional and structural basis of the contemporary international legal and political 
system was established in the 1940s, the creators of the present system did not consider 
North-South complexities to be a key consideration.  Consequently, the South was not 
significantly represented in the establishment of post-World War Two governance 
structures.16 A number of factors caused this omission: (i) many Southern states were still 
under European colonial control, therefore they could not participate as sovereign nations; 
(ii) those Southern countries that had gained their independence were newcomers on the 
global scene and were still under the political and legal influence of their former colonial 
powers; (iii) the Southern countries’ decision-making experiences was minimal; and (iv) 
the North was planning significant post-war economic and political reconstruction, hence, 
the priorities of its leaders had been to influence global governance structures and 
institutions to the greatest possible extent in their own favour.17  For all these reasons the 
current governing structures did not reflect Southern aspirations at the initial 
developmental stage.  Since then, even though the South has made several attempts to 
voice its concerns, both individually and collectively, at the decision-making forums, a 
number of concerns are yet to be resolved.   
   
                                                 
16Anand R.P. (1987), Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and The Developing countries, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp: 34-35 
17Anghie A. (1999), Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 40, Number 1, pp: 1-71.  
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This chapter outlines the political, historical and international legal background against 
which the North-South debate about international law and global governance has been 
framed. The broad aim of this chapter will be to analyse the effects on the North-South 
dimension of the international system of governance of a chain of global landmark 
events.18 It will start with the colonisation of Africa, Asia and South America, known 
today as the ‘Third World’ or the ‘Global South’, which has played a major role in 
dividing the world into ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’.19 The colonisation process established a 
wide political, economic, military and social gap between developing and developed 
worlds. The era following World War Two, which saw the escalation of the decolonisation 
process, marked an important turning point in the international system in every aspect and 
inspired critical debate about the North-South dimension.20 The central theme of this 
chapter, therefore, will be the many institutional changes in international law, global 
politics and economy that took place during this period, since they are still dominant in 
contemporary political discourse.  
 
The chapter will then move on to analyse the collaborative efforts of the South in its 
attempts to address economic and political differences between the North and South. It 
explores how, during the first decade after the establishment of global institutions, the 
Southern countries raised their collective voice to express concern about the economic and 
political perspectives of governance to a global audience through UNGA. It will then 
describe the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Group of 77 (G77), 
                                                 
18 Charles A. J. (1983), The North-South Dialogue A Brief History, Frances Pinter (Publishes), London., 
Adams  N.A. (1993), Worlds Apart: The North South divide and the International System, Zed Books Ltd., 
London., Lambe J. (edited) (1967), Rich World and Poor World, Arrow Books Ltd., London 
19 Cassese A. (1986), International Law in a Divided World, Oxford University Press. Rajagopal B. (2003), 
International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World resistance, Cambridge 
University Press., Fieldhouse D.K. (1999), The West and the Third World: Trade, Colonialism, Dependence 
and Development, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., UK. 
20 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press, p. 50 
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which represents this collective voice, and how they signalled that they were not simply “a 
raggedy bunch of poorer countries, but a collective of countries that consider themselves to 
have been disempowered, marginalized and disenfranchised by the international system”.21 
The chapter will also show how a different phase in the North-South debate was entered by 
these collective groups challenging the established economic structures, beginning with the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), which was to change the face of global governance. 
 
In summary, therefore, this Chapter will present a historical analysis of the North-South 
Dimension in the context of global governance and how the South challenged the 
formation and operation of the global governance system where it failed to adopt its 
founding principles of equity, fairness and justice.  
 
Global Governance: Not Global Government  
 
Until the beginning of the new global governance discourse in the mid 1990s, the 
governance literature focused only on governance systems within national and 
international organizations, mainly within the UN.  With the changes introduced following 
the globalisation process the international discourse on governance began to take a new 
phase of developments. During the early 1990s international relations literature challenged 
the traditional discourse on global governance, which had only focussed on national and 
international ‘formal’ governing systems, by widening the discussion into other spheres, 
                                                 
21 Najam A. (2005), Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: from contestation to 
participation to engagement, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, Number 3, pp. 303-321 at 
p.305 
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such as international business corporations, NGOs and individuals; consequently, the 
whole debate on global governance took a new path.22   
 
To understand what “governance” means requires a broader analysis of the international 
governing system, which involves a variety of activities, such as policy-making, goal-
framing, directives, regulatory ideas, and a variety of state and non-state actors.23 Rosenau 
views governance as “systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from family to the 
international organization”.24 Many scholars recognise global governance in terms of the 
government system that operates within a state, while some believe it is a further extension 
of governments in the global context.25 Others, however, argue that global governance is 
not controlled by any form of state-centric authority, rather it is a decentralised system that 
involves an array of actors who engage in a multilateral process.26    
 
In 1995 the Commission of Global Governance defined “governance” as: 
 
[…] the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their 
common affairs.  It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests 
may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken.  It includes formal […] as well 
                                                 
22 Rosenau J.N. (1990), Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf 
23 Duffy R. (2005), Global Environmental Governance and the Challenge of Shadow States: The Impact of 
Illicit Sapphire Mining in Madagascar, Development and Change, Volume 36, Number 5, pp: 825-843 at pp: 
826-829 
24 Rosenau J. N. (1992), Governance without Government: Order and change in world politics. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge and New York     
25 Duffy R. (2005), Global Environmental Governance and the Challenge of Shadow States: The Impact of 
Illicit Sapphire Mining in Madagascar, Development and Change, Volume 36, Number 5, pp: 825-843 at p. 
827 
26 Karns M.P. and Mingst K.A. (2004), International Organizations: the politics and process of global 
governance, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 4, Finkelstein L.S.,(1995). What is Global Governance? Global 
Governance, Volume 1, Number 3, pp: 367-372, Duffy R. (2005), Global Environmental Governance and the 
Challenge of Shadow States: The impact of illicit sapphire mining in Madagascar, Development and Change, 
Volume 36, Number 5, pp: 825-843 at p. 827, Diehl p. (edited) (2001), The Politics of Global Governance: 
International Organizations in a Changing World, Lynne Rienner  
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as informal arrangements that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their 
interest.27  
 
It is clear that global governance engages with both state-centric (national) and multilateral 
(multilateral) governance systems. For the purpose of understanding “global governance”, 
therefore, the following section will consider the special features of both systems.   
 
The functions of national governments, which consist of various levels of authority, such 
as monarchies, elected governments, administrations and government servants, are carried 
out by specifically assigned authorities. In global governance, however, decision-making 
processes are primarily shared among states and international organizations, together with 
NGOs, business corporations and individuals, which have more recently entered the arena. 
Consequently, governance is not only carried out by hierarchically formal actors, but by a 
variety of other, less hierarchical, actors.  Rosenau argues that “in an ever more 
interdependent world it seems [to be a] mistake to adhere to a narrow definition in which 
only formal institutions at the national and international levels are considered relevant to 
the governance.”28 
 
In order to address the governing issues, many national systems operate under written 
documents, which specify the rules of governance; for instance, articles in constitutions 
direct law and order within a specific territory called the ‘state’29, hence governments, 
officials and the public are all guided by the state’s governing principles. As Antonio 
                                                 
27 Karns and Mingst refer Commission on Global Governance in Karns M.P. and Mingst K.A. (2004), 
International Organizations: the politics and process of global governance, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 4 
28 Rosenau J.N. (1995), Governance in the Twenty-first Century,  Global Governance, Volume 1,  Issue 1, 
pp.13-43 at p.13 
29 In some countries the constitution is unwritten. For example: the United Kingdom.  The system of 
governing in this instance is greatly shaped according to the traditional customs and precedent.  
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Cassese declares, ‘Principles are the pinnacle of the legal system and are intended to serve 
as basic guidelines for [the] life of the whole community; besides imposing general duties 
and obligations, they also set the policy lines and the basic goals of state agencies.’30  
Directed by such documents, the power hierarchy of the national governing system is clear 
and visible. By contrast, in the global governance system, the position is vastly complex 
and unclear, because the global system does not revolve around a central authority of 
power31, it is based on the collaboration and cooperation mainly of states and many other 
parties who seek to address issues at the global level.32 Finkelstein, in support of this idea, 
states that ‘global governance is governing, without sovereign authority [and] relationships 
that transcend national frontiers.’33    
 
However, an overview of global governance clearly emphasises that modern governance is 
a set of ideas, policies and programmes that aim to govern a multilateral global society.  A 
contemporary definition, which is in line with the arguments of this thesis, is established 
by Duffy:  
 
[…] global governance is defined as a set of neoliberal ideas that have been translated into 
similarly neoliberal programmes and policies.  These policies aim to govern people, 
resources and activities through complex networks of actors, rather than through a single 
source of power and authority, such as [the] state.34   
 
                                                 
30 Cassese A. (1986), International Law in a Divided World, Oxford University Press, p.126 
31Rosenau J.N. (1995), Governance in the Twenty-first Century,  Global Governance, Volume 1,  Issue 1, 
pp.13-43 
32 Gordenker L. and Weiss T.G. (1996), Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and 
Dimensions, NGOs, The UN, & Global Governance, edited by  Weiss T.G. and Leon Gordenker L., Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, p.14 
33
 Finkelstein L.S., (1995), What is Global Governance? Global Governance, Volume 1, Number 3, pp: 367-
372 
34 , Duffy R. (2005), Global Environmental Governance and the Challenge of Shadow States: The impact of 
illicit sapphire mining in Madagascar, Development and Change, Volume 36, Number 5, pp: 825-843 at p. 
827 
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The definition of global governance, therefore, involves a discussion about modern 
approaches of multi-dimensional governance mechanisms.  It is increasing moving away 
from sole state-centred approaches of governance.  Next, this chapter will argue that the 
policies and programmes of global governance need to be applied equitably, fairly and 
justly in order to mitigate the differences in governance between North and South.35 It will 
then explore a series of world events that have made vital contributions to the debate, a 
careful consideration of which will result in a better analysis of the present global 
institutions and their approaches towards North-South dimension.  The following section 
will examine the use of the terms “North” and “South” and it will establish the stand of this 
thesis in regard to the North-South dimension. 
 
What is the North and what is the South? 
 
The World is divided into various groupings based on political, economic, social and 
geographic factors that scholars describe by using various different terms, which 
sometimes lead to ambiguities. Also, because many of these terms are not strictly 
definable, they often overlap.  For example the meanings of terms such as ‘East’ and 
‘West’ depend on their context.  In political science, ‘East’ and ‘West’ could mean 
communism and capitalism – i.e. ‘left’ and ‘right’ – in cultural studies they could mean 
something entirely different – i.e. ‘Asian’ and ‘European’ – however, in certain countries, 
‘eastern’ and ‘western’ cultural perspectives can overlap with the political science 
understanding of  ‘communism’ and ‘capitalism’.    
 
                                                 
35 Equity, fairness and justice principles in relation to the North-South dimension will be analysed later in this 
Chapter before the conclusion. 
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During the cold war period the world was divided into three groups – the ‘First World’, the 
‘Second World’ and the ‘Third World’ – a terminology that was used to describe, 
respectively, ‘developed’ (or ‘capitalist’) countries, ‘communist’ countries and 
‘developing’ countries.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which signalled the end of 
the so called ‘Second World,’ two major groupings remained – the ‘Third World’ and the 
‘First World’ – however, since then, the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ have become the popular 
terminology in the political sense.36   
 
Again, these terms can be conceived in different ways since they are more often used to 
indicate the geographical positioning of countries. However, many scholars argue that 
using the term ‘South’, in its geographical sense, is problematic,37 since some countries, 
such as Australia and New Zealand, which are in the south geographically, are not 
‘developing’ countries.  However, even though it is correct to say that most countries 
situated in the geographical south fall into the political category of the ‘South’, the term 
does mean more than simply its geographical definition. Anand, for instance, identifies the 
South as not just a geographical indication of Africa, Asia and Latin America, but as a 
‘common experiences of people in these countries as a result of historically determined 
social and economic conditions resulting from their colonial and imperial past.’38 
 
The terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ are, therefore, commonly used by academics, politicians 
and administrators to indicate rich, developed countries and poor, developing countries 
                                                 
36 Marian Miller refers French economist and demographer Alfred Suavy as being the first to use the term 
Third World to describe developing countries in an article published in 1952 in Miller M. (1995), The Third 
World in Global Environmental Politics, Open University Press (Buckingham), p.47 
37Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice: A North-South Dimension, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
p.1 Calvert P. and Calvert S. (1999), The South, The North and the Environment, Pinter: A Cassell Imprint, 
P.5-.9, Miller M. (1995), The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, Open University Press, p.19 
38 Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice:  A North-South dimension, Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd., P.1 
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respectively. The Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), estimated countries on socio-economic and political levels of 
development. In 2010 the countries were divided by the HDI into four main groups: (i) 
very high human development; (ii) high human development; (iii) medium human 
development; and (iv) low human development.39 According to the political understanding 
of the terms described above, group (i) applies to the North and groups (ii), (iii) and (iv) to 
the South.  
 
In general, in comparison to the North, the South lacks economic growth; however, not 
only is it pushed to the periphery as a result of economic instability, it also suffers from 
other obstacles, such as a lack of effective representation in global decision-making.  Even 
though few countries such as China, India and Brazil have been able to make a 
considerable effect in the international economic system, in general the developing states 
are still behind the progressive developmental standards at the global level.  Referring to 
the report of the South Commission in 1990, Najam states that the term ‘South’, used in a 
political context, emphasised not only economic poverty but also a ‘poverty of influence’. 
40   
 
This thesis recognizes the identity of the North and the South in a broader political, social, 
cultural and economic context. By its use of the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’, this thesis 
accepts Najam’s definition below, which offers a more nuanced and thoughtful cross-
section of the South:  
 
                                                 
39 UN Human Development Report 2007/2008 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics (last visited on 04.04.2011) 
40 Najam A. (2005), Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to 
Participation to Engagement, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, pp: 303-321 at p.305 
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The self-definition of the South has always been a definition of exclusion: these are countries 
that believe that they have been ‘bypassed’ and view themselves as existing ‘on the 
periphery.’ Viewed as such, the South is not simply a raggedy bunch of poorer countries, it is 
a collective of countries that consider themselves to have been disempowered, marginalized 
and disenfranchised by the international system.  In the context of our defining framework, 
then, ‘Southness’ stems not just from a sense that the international system is ineffective in 
responding to Southern concerns, it grows out of the belief that the system is less than 
legitimate in terms of its commitments to Southern interests.41  
 
This broad definition of ‘South’ and ‘North’ will be used throughout this thesis.  The 
North, as a consequence of its long-standing political influence in the world, has more 
political power and resources to influence global governance than the South has. The  
North-South dimension, as this chapter will show, has been fashioned by a series of 
historical, political and economic factors. However, Najam’s broad definition includes a 
sense of equality, justice and fairness  – concepts that underlie this thesis  – together with 
an understanding of such issues as recognition, capacity, distribution and participation in 
the international system. It is by way of this broad perspective that the North-South 
dimension in the context of global governance will be analysed. 
 
The North-South Dimension 
 
The elements of the North-South dimension have been developed over a significant period 
of time as part of the development of the international system. This chapter is mainly 
concerned with two stages of the historical evolution – (a) the beginning stage, which 
started with the colonization, by several European countries, of certain states situated south 
                                                 
41 Ibid.   
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of the equator; and (b) the stage that followed the Second World War, which signalled the 
end of colonization and the establishment of global institutions.  The chapter will not 
explore the evaluation of the North-South dimension as it extends to more contemporary 
issues, or, especially, environmental issues, since these themes will be dealt with in the 
following chapter. Here, the main focus will be on how the North-South dimension has 
been differently determined, historically, socially, politically, culturally and economically, 
within the countries of the South, and how those factors continue to influence their 
participation in global governance.  This account, therefore, begins in these countries’ 
colonial pasts.42  
 
Creating the North and the South dimensions in the context of 
Colonialism 
 
Signs of the division between the imperial North and colonized South became apparent 
with the European expansion during the fifteenth century. During this ‘Age of Empires’, 
many critical events took place within the colonial territories that ultimately divided the 
world into the two divisions, recognised now in the international system as the ‘North’ and 
the ‘South.43   As Marian Miller states, “the South has been shaped by colonialism and 
imperialism” experiences which have left the South with distinctively different socio-
economic characteristics from the North.44 
 
                                                 
42 Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice:  A North-South dimension, Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd., p.1, Miller M. (1995), The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, Buckingham: Open 
University Press, P.19  
43 Anghie A. (2005), Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law Series, Number 37, Anghie A. (1999), Finding the Peripheries: 
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth – Century International Law, Harvard International Law 
Journal, Volume 40, No. 1, pp:1-71 
44 Miller M. (1995), The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press, 
P.19  
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Europeans took control of the other parts of the world in three different ways: (i) the 
occupation of vacant territory where no other state claimed authority, otherwise known as 
the terra nullius doctrine, which established the legitimate right to occupy a land through 
‘discovery’45; (ii) occupation by way of treaty between the colonial state and the local 
leaders46, by which method many Asian and African states were brought under the 
European authority47; and (iii) by war. Casper however, refers to Twiss’s reduction of 
these categories to two – ‘primitive’ acquisitions, via discovery and settlement, and 
‘derivative’ acquisitions, via treaty or war.48   
 
Colonization is recognized as a major factor that has had a significant impact upon the 
partitioning the world into the ‘powerful’ and the ‘powerless’.49  Clive Ponting, quoting 
Letwein, the first German Governor, illustrates the nature of power dominance created in 
the context of colonialism: “Colonization is always inhumane.  It must ultimately amount 
to an encroachment on the rights of the original inhabitants in favour of the intruders.”50  
He states further that the outcomes of colonialism were invisible, but that they heavily 
influenced every aspect of the international system:  
 
                                                 
45 Casper S. (2008),’Our Passion for Legality’: international law and imperialism in late nineteenth- century 
Britain, Review of International Studies, Volume 34, pp:403-423 at p.409 
46 In Ceylon (as it was known then.  Today known as Sri Lanka after became a republic in 1972) the British 
government took over the power under the historical Kandyan Agreement between the local officers and the 
British government representatives in 02nd March 1815.  This agreement was valid in its full terms until 04th 
February 1948; the day Sri Lanka became independent.    
47 More treaties as such are mentioned in Cassese A. (1986), International Law in a Divided World, Oxford 
University Press. at p. 43., Anghie refers to Treaty of Nanking, Treaty of Peace, Freinshi and Commerce 
Between her majesty the queen of Greta Britain and Ireland and the Empire of China August 29, 1842. in 
Anghie A. (1999), Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth – Century 
International Law, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume. 40, Number 1, 
pp:1-71at p. 41  
48 Casper S. (2008),’Our Passion for Legality’: international law and imperialism in late nineteenth- century 
Britain, Review of International Studies, Volume 34, pp:403-423 at pp.408-415 refers to Travers Twiss,  
49Miller M. (1995), The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press, 
P.19 
50 Ponting C. (1991), A Green History of the World: The Environment and the Collapse of Great 
Civilizations, Penguin Books Ltd., p.138 
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 ‘The Europeans also brought with them an innate sense of superiority, tinged with a strong 
degree of racism.  Although some Europeans initiated some steps towards improving the life 
of the natives through medical and educational programmes, many undermined the local 
culture by forcing them to adopt European ways.’51  
 
Throughout the colonisation process attempts were made to carve the western thoughts and 
civilization patterns into the so-called uncivilized peoples in the colonies. Anghie states 
that by 1914 virtually all the states in Asia, Africa and the Pacific became colonies under 
the authority of western nations, and that ultimately “these major European nations forced 
all these non-European peoples into a system of law that was fundamentally European and 
derived from European thoughts and experience”.52 Anghie suggests that international law 
became a key tool for European colonial powers by way of, treaty, recognition, 
colonization, and special treaty – called a ‘protectorate agreement’.53   
 
Another consequence of the colonial process that influenced the North-South dimension 
was an imbalance in political and social development. The historical process of taking 
political and economic control over a large part of the world’s natural and human resources 
enabled the colonizing nations to firmly establish their positions in the international 
system. Thus the colonized Third World was forced to pay the price for First World 
achievements by continued poverty, lack of resources, lack of technology, lack of 
knowledge and, lack of recognition, and, most importantly, lack of power to influence the 
international system. It is within this broad context that the North-South dimension should 
be recognized today. During the colonial era six major factors can be recognised that have 
led to the North-South dimension. 
                                                 
51  Ibid. 
52 Anghie A. (1999), Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth – Century 
International Law, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 40, No. 1, pp:1-71, p.2. 
53 Ibid, p.36 
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Economic Empowerment 
Before European expansion through colonisation, although different countries encountered 
similar problems in agriculture and trade, interactions between them was minimal due to 
the lack transportation and technology. With the development of industries and maritime 
technology, European states began to explore new world beyond their territories. The first 
concern of colonial nations, therefore, was strongly related to economic empowerment and 
the exploitation of their colonies’ natural resources, where their immediate goal was to 
enrich their individual economies. Then, as these countries became more powerful, they 
created new patterns of development, from agricultural to the industrial, which led to the 
colonies becoming the main source of supply of raw materials and crops for the European 
market.54   
 
The European Industrial Revolution 
The European industrial revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries impacted powerfully on 
decision-making patterns in the colonies. As Anand states, the needs and demands of the 
colonial powers were largely responsible for the creation of their empires in Asia and 
Africa, leading to the critical situation whereby decision-making powers regarding 
economy and trade were denied to the local populace.55  Thereafter factories and plantation 
were developed, completely changing the way colonised countries had survived prior to 
their surrender; thus, most colonial economies were transformed into European-dependent 
systems.56   
 
                                                 
54 Ponting C. (1991), A Green History of the World: The Environment and the Collapse of Great 
Civilizations, Penguin Books Ltd. 
55 Anand R.P. (1987), Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and The Developing countries, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.18 
56 Ibid, p.25 
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Changes in Agricultural Practices   
A particular example of how changes in agricultural practices affected a colonial country is 
Sri Lanka. When the British took power in 1796, the economy had been based on 
subsistence agriculture, which meant that the main source of agriculture was rice and grain.  
However, under the British, the main focus of Sri Lankan agriculture changed from 
consumption to commercial production and trade, when coffee, tea and other commercial 
cultivation was introduced. Ultimately this rapidly cost Sri Lankan land, human resources 
and life styles, changes that have continued to this day, in that the export of tea is a key 
earner of foreign income.57  
 
Such wholesale transformations of agricultural sectors in the colonies created a 
dependency culture that continues to the present day, since, even after independence, 
developing countries have found it difficult to move ahead with their own agricultural 
systems, because such a large amount of their foreign income is based on supplying the 
European market. Consequently, the commercial agricultural system was developed at the 
expense of the South’s subsistence system.  In this context, therefore, the agricultural 
patterns that emerged from the colonization process are further factors in the current 
North-South dimension of the international system.58  
 
Trade and Commerce 
One of the key incentives for colonization was for colonial countries to enter other 
territories for trading and commercial purposes, a major part of which was managed by 
private companies, such as the British and Dutch East India Companies, which were vested 
                                                 
57 Mazumdar, S. (1981), Sri Lanka:  Problems of an Export Economy in the Post Colonial Period,  South 
Asian Bulletin, Volume 1, Number 2, p.59, http://www.lankalibrary.com/geo/British/history4.htm (last 
accessed 14.04.2011) 
58 Anand R.P. (1987), Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and The Developing countries, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.18 
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with a great deal of power. As Anghie explains, “Company charters granted them not 
merely the right to trade in particular areas, but also the right to make peace and war with 
natives and the power to coin money.”59 The operation of international trade within these 
the territories, being beyond local control, meant that the general population of the colonies 
suffered from the absence of their own political and legal authority. The consequences of 
becoming a colony, therefore, meant that native laws were no longer valid regarding trade 
and control of their own natural resources. 
 
The introduction of European based administrative and legal systems 
Another manifestation of the North-South divide was the introduction of European based 
administrative systems in colonised states.60  It is important to note that, up to the point of 
colonisation, some states already had civilised systems of governance, but as a result of 
colonisation, these native systems did not develop further.61  Also, by familiarising the 
locals to a European system of governance the rulers’ task was made easier, since they 
could rule in a system familiar to them.62 The impact of this transference of powers is still 
visible in most former colonies.63 In some instances, though, formal government was 
                                                 
59 Anghie A. (1999), Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth – Century 
International Law, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 40, No. 1, pp:1-71, p.36 
 
60 Leitan Tressie G.R.  (1996), Development of Sri Lanka’s Administrative System-The Colonial Impact, Sri 
Lanka Journal of International Law, Volume 8, p.107, Vijaya Samaraweera (1973), “The development of the 
Administrative System” in History of Ceylon, Volume III (University of Ceylon,) 
61 Cassese A. (1986), International Law in a Divided World, Oxford University Press., p. 39 referred UN 
document A/C.6/SR.1036.  This refers to the question made by the Sri Lankan (then Ceylon) representative 
at the UN discussion on the issue of succession of States in respect of treaties in 1968.  Cassese quotes the 
question as follows: “The term ‘new’ could not properly be applied in the case of an ancient State which was 
subjugated and exploited for three or four centuries and then gained political independence in the twentieth 
century.  In his delegation’s view, the so-called ‘new’ State should rather be termed the ‘original’ State.  His 
delegation was concerned that the principles finally states should have a sound historical and economic basis.  
Not only the pre-independence phase of a country’s past but also the period of independence prior to colonial 
rule might perhaps be relevant in determining the principles applicable in respect of State succession. ”  
62 Liston Y. (1999-2000), The Transformation of Buddhism During British Colonialism, Journal of Law. & 
Religion, Volume 14, Number 1,p.189-210 
63 Leitan Tressie G.R.  (1996), Development of Sri Lanka’s Administrative System-The Colonial Impact, Sri 
Lanka Journal of International Law, Volume 8, p.107, the author concludes the article suggesting that the 
impact of colonial system is still reflecting in Sri Lankan political and administrative system.  For instance in 
Sri Lanka the British rulers introduced Ceylon Civil Service during the colonial era and later independent 
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totally alien, and these countries did not become states until after colonization.64  In such 
cases, rules were centralised to form administrative structures that were bound by 
European based legal formalities.65  
 
In general, the introduction of western style administrations, foreign to the native societies, 
completely changed the existing structures of governance, resulting in the implantation of 
Northern power structures in the political systems of their Southern colonies.     
 
Religious and Cultural incursions 
The impact of the colonial powers on colonies was not only confined to structures of 
governance.  Religious and cultural changes played major roles in transforming the lives of 
the people living in the colonies.  This process, which took place parallel to the 
introduction of a Christian/European education system, ultimately led to the growth of 
confusingly different cultural and religious identities within the various native 
communities. The whole structural and procedural changes within the administrative and 
education system established a Euro-based social and political structure within the colonial 
parts of the world.   
 
As can be seen from the above, the whole structure of governance in the South has been 
designed according to European political and legal principles that have gradually changed 
the native governance system of those countries most affected by colonial regimes. Anghie 
observes this transformation thus:  
                                                                                                                                                    
Ceylon abolished it and established Ceylon Administrative Service, now known as Sri Lanka Administrative 
Service. Even though the Sri Lankan administrative service is now known by a different title most of the 
functions are still being done according to the European administrative theories and functions introduced by 
the British rulers in some decades ago.  
64 Lange M.K. (2004), British Colonial Legacies and Political Development, World Development Issue, 
Volume 6,  pp.905-922 at p. 910 
65 Ibid. 
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[the] sovereignty doctrine is understood as a stable and comprehensive set of ideas that was 
formulated in Europe and that extended inexorably and imperiously with empire into 
darkest Africa, the inscrutable Orient, and the far reaches of the Pacific, acquiring the 
control over these territories and peoples and transforming them into European 
possession.66 
 
The colonial era in world history highlights the power division between the developed and 
the developing world. The North-South debate is framed on the basis of the various 
differences created during the colonial times. The argument in this chapter, therefore, is 
that colonialism forged the world community into two main groups – colonial and 
colonising countries – which developed into the South and the North.67    
 
The next stage in the evolution of the North-South dimension was the emergence of newly 
independent nations as a result of the decolonisation process following the end of Second 
World War in 1945 and the establishment of new global institutions – two events that were 
to have a most important impact on the North-South dimension. The section below 
explores how the global institutions reflected the North-South dimension, and argues that 
the South remained at the periphery of global decision-making as a result of being denied 
active participation in their formation and operations.  In support of this claim, it also 
highlights how the South gathered collectively as G77 and Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) to question the existing governing provisions in order to focus on ensuring the 
principles of equity, fairness and justice in the process of global governance.  
                                                 
66 Anghie A. (1999), Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth – Century 
International Law, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 40, No. 1, pp:1-71 at p. 6 
67 Anghie A. (2005), Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law Series, Number 37 
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The Establishment of the New Global Institutions 
 
There are two main categories of new global institutions: the first category includes the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank)68, which was 
created to tackle post-war reconstruction and development through productive investment; 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), created to promote a stable and open 
international monetary system.69   The second category, the UN, ran parallel with the first, 
was established as a separate political institution designed to prevent another World War, 
establish fundamental human rights, maintain international law and promote social 
progress.70 These primary institutions provide a comprehensive background against which 
to discuss the North-South dimension.   
 
Creation of the global financial institutions in the context of the North-
South dimension 
 
The financial institutions, which were created under the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 
mainly for the purpose of maintaining a stable world economic and financial system,71 
required each institution to be responsible for different tasks. However, as Anghie states, 
“although united in achieving these general goals, the two institutions (the IMF and the 
World Bank) were constituted to perform distinctive but complementary functions.”72 As 
                                                 
68 Articles of Agreement for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec.27, 1945,60 
Stat.1440 T.I.A.S No.1502, 2 U.N.T.S 134, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36602~theSit
ePK:29708,00.html (last accessed on 11.10.2010) 
69 Articles of Agreement for International Monetary Fund, Dec.27, 1945,60 Stat.1401, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36602~theSit
ePK:29708,00.html (last accessed on 11.10.2010) 
70 Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, T.I.A.S No.1501, 2 U.N.T.S 39 
71http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36602~theS
itePK:29708,00.html (last accessed on 11.10.2010), Anghie A. (2004), International Financial Institutions in 
The Politics of International Law edited by Chris Reus-Smit, Cambridge University Press, p. 219 
72Ibid. 
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Anghie further notes: “[T]he international financial institutions exercise enormous power 
over the working of international financial system as reflected in the fact [that] half of the 
world’s population and two–thirds of its governments are bound by the policies they 
describe.”73  The formation and operation of global financial institutions are, therefore, 
important in terms of the significant role they play in the context of the North-South 
dimension. 
 
The Bretton Woods global financial institutions have controlled the financial policies of 
developing countries over many decades. They have also been influential in other areas of 
policy-making in the South since the 1970s, 74 from the lowest level of government to the 
highest, such as in the areas of protecting the rights of children, women, the environment 
and indigenous people.75 Consequently, under the World Bank poverty alleviation and 
reconstruction policy, Southern countries have had to open up their internal policy making 
forums for advice and guidance, and also to accept “conditionalities”, considered by the 
Bank to be essential in order to achieve the developmental tasks.76     
 
The Northern countries, on the other hand, approach the Bretton Woods institutions in a 
different manner; ever since their establishment, they have strived to gain authority over 
them and, by default, over the global financial markets. As a consequence, therefore, 
                                                 
73 Ibid. p. 217 
74 Duffy R. (2006), NGOs and Governance States: The Impact of Transnational Environmental Management 
Networks in Madagascar, Environmental Politics, Volume 15, Number 5, pp: 731-749   
75 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press, p.96 
76World Bank (1996) Staff Appraisal Report: India.  Eco-development Project.  Report No. 14914-IN, 
August 3, Rozaleen Duffy discusses the impact made by global financial institutions on developing countries 
through various conditionalities agreed under credit agreements.  Duffy R. (2006), NGOs and Governance 
States: The Impact of Transnational Environmental Management Networks in Madagascar, Environmental 
Politics, Volume 15, Number 5, pp: 731-749, Randeria S. (2003), Glocalization of Law: Environmental 
Justice, World Bank, NGOs and the Cunning State in India, Current Sociology, Volume 51, Number 3-4, pp: 
307-330   
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governance of these institutions has always been held by the North’s representatives.77  For 
example, throughout its history, the President of the World Bank has been a US citizen, 
and both the Managing Director and the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF have 
been European; also, the developed countries make the largest contributions to funds.78 On 
both these grounds, therefore, the North dominates the principal decision-making bodies of 
these crucial institutions, thereby exemplifying the contrasting positions of North and 
South.  
 
The original objectives of the World Bank shed light on the North-South dimension.79 In 
its Charter, and in the Agreement that set up the IMF, development was not the creators’ 
primary concern. Article 1 of the IMF Agreement explains its objectives in six sub-articles, 
none of which is about poverty eradication or development assistance.80 Rather, the 
language focused on monetary cooperation, international trade stability and economic 
policy; whereas, Article 1 of the World Bank Charter describes its purposes as the 
“reconstruction and development of territories destroyed by the war and less developed 
countries”.81  The scope of the World Bank, therefore, does not include the principles of 
promoting equitable development status for the South. As Rajagopal stated in 2003, “[T]he 
World Bank Articles of Agreement […] do not refer to poverty, equity, or the environment 
                                                 
77 Traditionally, the president of the World Bank is appointed by the United States.  One could argue that the 
fact that US is the largest shareholder of the World Bank fund legitimises this tradition.  The Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund is appointed by its European governors. Perez D. The Process 
for Selecting and Appointing the Managing Director and First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, 
Background Paper of the International Evaluation Office of the IMF, BP/07/01, p.5. Available online:  
http://www.ieo-imf.org/pub/background/pdf/BP071.pdf (last accessed on 14.04.2011) 
78 Peretz, D. (2008), The Process for Selecting and Appointing the Managing Director and First Deputy 
Managing Director of the IMF, Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF,  BP/07/01 Available online:  
http://www.ieo-imf.org/pub/background/pdf/BP071.pdf   (last accessed on 14.04.2011) 
79 Blanco S.and Carrasco E. (1999), The Functions of the IMF and the World Bank, Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Volume 9, pp: 67-92 at p.72-73. 
80 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa01.htm (last accessed on 14.10.2010)  
81 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049563~pagePK:4391
2~menuPK:58863~piPK:36602,00.html#I1 (last accessed on 14.10.2010) 
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[…]”.82  Some developing countries, including Mexico, proposed to add the language of 
development into the World Bank Charter; however, the majority of countries did not 
accept it.83  
 
A few years after the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions, the global political 
atmosphere changed dramatically as a result of the conflict between capitalism and 
communism. What became known as the “Cold War Era” had a considerable impact on the 
underlying principles of the World Bank. During the1950s, Rajagopal states, “the World 
Bank moved from its ‘reconstruction’ phase to its ‘development’ phase” with the 
establishment, on the initiative of the US, of the International Development Agency (IDA) 
in 1961 to provide development funds to less developed countries.84  This constituted a 
change of focus in the financial institutions to include development issues.85  The 
operations of the IDA during the Cold War, therefore, accentuated the power of the 
Northern countries to make decisions regarding the distribution of World Bank funds. 
Furthermore, the US, through its ownership of the largest share of World Bank and IMF 
funds, actually used this as a Cold War strategy to make several loans to “friendly 
                                                 
82 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press, p.96 
83 Although developing countries failed in influencing the development concerns into the World Bank’s 
Charter, they succeeded in entering equitable consideration to projects alike.  Article III, Section 1(a) of the 
Charter states, the Bank’s facilities would be used with “equitable consideration to project for development 
and projects for reconstruction alike.” Blanco S.and Carrasco E. (1999), The Functions of the IMF and the 
World Bank, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Volume 9, pp: 67-92  at p.72-73. 
84 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press, p. 100-.111 Rajagopal, taking a different approach to the 
conventional view of the Bretton Woods institutions, further explores the financial institutions as, “The Cold 
War reinforced this historically crucial link between security and development, and had a major impact on 
the evolution and expansion of BWIs, especially the World Bank. Looked at this way, these international 
institutions are neither simply benevolent vehicles for ‘development (what ever it means), nor ineluctably 
exploitative mechanisms of global capitalism, but, rather, a terrain on which multiple ideological and other 
forces intersected, thus producing the expansion and reproduction of these very institutions’” 
85 Lewis J., Webb R. and Kapur D. (edi.) (1997), The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Washington DC: 
The Brookings Institution, Chapters 4 and 17 
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regimes”.86 For instance, Lewis et al explain that several Latin American states were 
awarded loans after the Cuban revolution; hence the World Bank granted more funds to the 
countries that enjoyed close security links with the US than to those favouring communist 
states.87 As a consequence of these changes, the South, because it was at the receiving end 
of the funding process, found itself in a vulnerable position under the powerful US-led 
North, and it was beyond its control to affect the decision-making of the IDA, or any other 
World Bank project. 
 
The Bretton Woods institutions operate with a weighted voting system whereby the 
number of votes a member has is decided by the level of its contributions and, ever since 
they were established, the US has supplied one-third of their finances.88 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that, because the US, together with the other developed countries, own the 
majority of shares, they receive the greatest number of votes.89  Consequently, because 
these major institutions use the economic status of their members as their primary 
operational bases, the North-South division has mainly been created as a result of the 
differences in economic power of the Bretton Woods member states.  
 
The World Bank and the IMF, therefore, demonstrate perfectly the North-South dimension 
in the global financial and economic system, where the differences in power to impact on 
their governance is wide ranging, including such issues as the composition of the executive 
                                                 
86 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press, p. 111 
87 Lewis J. et al (edi.) (1997), The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution, p. 162 
88 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. XII, § 5, 60 Stat. 1401, 
1418-19, Gianaris referees Senate Report No. 459, 79th Congress 1st Session (1945) at 13-15 in Gianaris 
W.N. (1990/1991), Weighted Voting in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Volume 14, pp:910- 945 at p. 916 
89 At the starting of the Bretton Woods the US had thirty three percent of votes in IMF and thirty five percent 
of votes in the World Bank.  United Kingdom had sixteen percent of votes in IMF and fifteen percent of 
votes in the World Bank. 
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board, producing agendas, operating policies, governing procedures by way of a weighted 
voting system, and creating rules and regulations relating to project funding in developing 
countries. By contrast, the UN itself provides a somewhat different political approach to 
the North-South dimension, where the South has used the UNGA as a stage to present its 
concerns to the global community.   
 
The creation of the United Nations in the context of the North-South 
Dimension 
 
The United Nations, which was established by Charter in 1945, has been a central focus for 
international relations.  It also provides a forum to debate a wide variety of political issues, 
from basic human rights to nuclear movements and global security.90  Therefore an 
analysis of its role in relation to the North-South dimension brings into the discussion 
crucial political, international relations and legal concerns. 
 
Although, at present, developing countries use the UN as the main forum to voice their 
concerns, at the outset of the institution the South’s presence was insignificant, since the 
contribution to its establishment made by developing countries was minimal. This was for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, at the same time as the new global institutions were emerging, 
they were over-occupied with the rebuilding of their nations after centuries of colonization. 
Therefore, their new governments had a huge number of internal issues to resolve, and 
consequently, they paid little attention to political issues beyond their boundaries. 
Secondly, they were treated by the developed nations as inexperienced newly-civilised 
                                                 
90 The UN is considered as the mostly utilised forum by developing countries.  Payslian points out that the 
South “viewed the UN as a mechanism to counter the political and economic power possessed by the 
industrial countries and their giant multinational corporations (MNCs) and to address grievances concerning 
underdevelopment and the global misdistribution of political and economic resources.” In Payslian S.(1996), 
The United Nations and the Developing Countries in the 1990s, University of Detroit Mercy Law Review, 
Volume 73, Number 3, pp: 525-549 at p. 525 
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members of the international community. Finally, due to their lack of experience in 
international politics, their presence was of lesser significance than the more powerful 
Northern countries.91   
 
There were only 13 African and Asian members among the original UN members in 1945. 
Gradually, though, after the mid 1950s, newly independent nations rapidly swelled the 
numbers. The following figures show the difference between membership in 1945 and 
1991.   
Geographical Distribution of UN Membership:92  
1945 1991 
Western Europe   8 (16%)    20 (12%) 
Eastern Europe   6 (12%)   13 (8%) 
Americas    22 (43%)   35 (21%) 
Africa     4 (8%)    51 (31%) 
Asia     9 (17%)    38 (23%) 
Australia & Pacific   2 (4%)    9 (5%) 
According to the latest reports on the regional basis of UN membership as of 2010 is stated 
below.93 
                                                 
91
 Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice:  a north-south dimension, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
pp: 5 -9 
92 Source: Peter R. Baehr & Leon Gordenker, The United Nations in the 1990s 44 (St. Matin’s Press 1991) 
cited by Simon Payslian in Payslian S.(1996), The United Nations and the Developing Countries in the 
1990s, University of Detroit Mercy Law Review, Volume 73, Number 3, pp: 525-549 at p. 525 
93 http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/gmun/shared/documents/GA_regionalgrps_Web.pdf (last accessed on 
04.04.2011) 
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Africa      53(28%) 
Asia     53(28%) 
Eastern Europe   23(12%) 
Latin America and Caribbean  33(17%) 
Western Europe   28(15%) 
 
The increase of the Southern states in the UN is clearly explained by these figures.  In 1945 
the Southern participation was extremely low within the UN in comparison to African, 
Asian and South American membership in 2010.  After becoming UN members the former 
colonial countries showed great desire to increase their political influence in the global 
institutions.  This tendency is clearly reflected in the framework of the UN, mainly within 
the General Assembly, where several development programmes assisted the South to 
rebuild their states, as Adams describes: 
 
 Thus the United Nations soon began to shift, in the economic fields, from its original 
preoccupation with the problems of economic stability and full employment to those of the 
development of the less developed countries, and by the middle of the 1950s the latter 
problems had already become the main focus of attention.
94  
 
During the period after the Second World War, the South built up their collective strength 
as one group to overcome global political and economic inequalities. The New 
International Economic debate, the Group of 77 (G77) and UNCTAD (explained below) 
are forums that operate within the UN. 95 
                                                 
94 Adams N.A. (1993), Worlds Apart: The North-South Divide and the International System, Zed Books Ltd. 
London, p.54  
95 Payslian S.(1996), The United Nations and the Developing Countries in the 1990s, University of Detroit 
Mercy Law Review, Volume 73, Number 3, pp: 525-549 at p. 527  
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The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
 
UNCTAD was established in 1964 in order to narrow the development gap between North 
and South. It was a permanent intergovernmental body of the UN that deals with trade, 
economic and development issues.  UNCTAD, whose functions are carried out by a 
permanent body – the Trade and Development Agency – is a perfect example to use in 
order to discuss the role of the UN in the North-South dimension, because it provides a 
stage for the collective South to discuss their national and global concerns. Established as a 
permanent agency of the General Assembly under the Resolution of 1955 (XIX) it 
consisted of four groups of states:  Group A – Africa, Asia and Yugoslavia; Group B – all 
developed countries; Group C  – Latin American countries; and Group D – the socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe.96  As at 2010, its membership consisted of 193 member 
states.97  
 
UNCTAD’s aims   
 
UNCTAD’s primary aim was to bring greater justice and equality to the international 
economic and trade relations. Ever since achieving independence, developing countries 
have struggled with the economic and trade system, which was mainly dominated by the 
developed world. In his analysis of the nature of the existing economic process Anand 
states, “[T]he fundamental problems remain the same: inequality in the terms of trade; 
stabilization of forces and markets for primary commodities; access to the markets of the 
                                                 
96 100 member states in group A, 31 member states in group B, 33 member states in group C, 24 member 
states in group D. with the 5 state members those not included any list of the UNCTAD, there are 193 
members in UNTAD today.  There were 123 member states were presented at the first meeting of the 
UNCTAD in 1964, GA Resolution 1955 (XIX) of 30 December 1964. 
97 Appeared as the membership of the UNTAD and the Trade and Development Board by 20th March 2008 in 
TD/B/Info.21, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1929&lang=1 (last accessed on 
10.10.2010) 
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developed countries; and a generalized system of preference.”98 Likewise, in the 
international economic system, developing countries were unevenly positioned in 
comparison to the developed world, since their structures were affected by the colonial 
legacy.  Their ultimate economic objectives, therefore, were to follow Northern market 
policies.     
 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
 
In a revolutionary attempt by the South to implement more favourable grounds in 
international economic and trade system, a battle ensued between Northern economic 
powers and Southern voting powers.  In order to win the battle, the developing countries 
chose UNGA as the forum to plead their demands, since the one country-one vote system 
was in their favour. As a consequence of that crucial fact, the UN has a special position in 
the North-South debate, and it was in this institution that the South placed its trust in order 
to promote new norms99.  In this way, the developing countries took the global 
development debate into a new direction with the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO). 
 
At the sixth special session of UNGA on 1st May 1974, the developing countries, with the 
greater confidence they had gained from winning stronger voting powers, adopted two 
resolutions for the further enhancement of equity, justice and fairness in the international 
                                                 
98 Anand R.P. (1987), Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and The Developing countries, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.110.  In p. 111 Anand further mentions what developing countries requested 
was “to take steps to index the prices of the products exported by developing countries to tie them to the 
prices of the manufactured and capital goods they must import.  In other words, they as for some correlation 
between the prices of raw materials and those of manufactured goods. ” for further readings: Weston B.H. 
(1981) , The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned 
Wealth, American Journal of International Law, Volume 74, p. 437,  Sombre E. De.  (1998), Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, The American Political Science Review, Volume 92, 
p.984  
99 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press, p.82 
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economic and trade system.100  The first – GA Resolution 3201-2(S-VI): ‘Declaration on 
the Establishment of the New International Economic Order’ stated that “the present 
economic order is in direct conflict with current developments in international political and 
economic relations.”101 The second – GA Resolution 3202 (S-VI): ‘Programme of Action 
on the Establishment of New International Economic Order’, made a practical reality of the 
declaration that “economic co-operation and understanding among all states, particularly 
between developed and developing countries, [should be] based on the principle of dignity 
and sovereign equality.”102 
 
The NIEO was an important landmark in the history of the North-South dimension because 
it challenged the western exploitative economic structures that had operated during the 
postcolonial period.103 However, different writers interpret NIEO from different 
perspectives. For some writers it is a failure.104 Diehl interprets it as a “loose collection of 
often vaguely defined ideas and proposals on how international economics might be altered 
to mere third world needs”105, while  Rajagopal suggests it as a “moment of radical change 
to international law”.106 Some writers, such as Sauvant and Hasenpflug, believe that NIEO 
                                                 
100 As this was the first UNGA devoted to development Rajagopal identifies the Sixth Special Session as  
“marked the radical moment in the emerging NIEO engagement” Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law 
from Below: development, social movements, and Third World resistance, Cambridge University Press, p.79 
101 UN General Assembly Resolution 3201(S-VI): Declaration on the Establishment of New International 
Economic Order,.. Anand R.P (1987), Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and The Developing 
countries, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.112 
102 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI): Programme of Action on the Establishment of 
New International Economic Order, R.P. Anand, Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and The 
Developing countries, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.112 
103 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press 
104 Diehl P.F. (2001), The politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in  
Independent World, Diehl P.F. (edi.), 2nd Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers (London), p. 259-260, Diehl 
interprets NIEO as a “loose collection of often vaguely defined ideas and proposals on how the international 
economic might be altered to mere third world needs.” 
105 Ibid. 
106 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press, p.73 
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was supported by the socialist wing, “at least rhetorically”107, while others explains it as an 
effort by the developing world to produce an alternative to the “US capitalism and Soviet 
command model”.108  
 
Considering the negative political environment following Second World War and the 
decolonisation process, the NIEO stands out as a model developed by the newly inspired 
independent nations with the intention of creating a more equitable, just and fair system of 
global economics. Although it was not a total success, it was an achievement as the first 
collective effort by the South to inform the world about their dissatisfaction with the 
existing economic structures. As Najam notes:  
 
Indeed, the call from the South in the 1970s for a ‘New International Economic Order’ was 
not just a desire to make the international system more ‘effective’ it was very explicitly a call 
to make it more legitimate by redressing what they considered the imbalance ‘voice’ in the 
international system.109 
 
The South’s plea for a more legitimate economic order reflected the need to ensure 
principles of equality, fairness and justice. There will be an analysis of the successes and 
failures of the NIEO later.  
                                                 
107 Sauvant K. P. and Hasenpflug  H. (1977), The New International Economic Order: Confrontation 
between North and South, Westview Press(Colorado), p.63 
108 Rajagopal B. (2003), International Law from Below: development, social movements, and Third World 
resistance, Cambridge University Press, p.73 
109 Najam A. (2005), Developing Countries and Global environmental Governance: From Contestation to 
Participation to Engagement, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, pp. 303 – 321 at 305 
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Background of the creation of NIEO 
 
During the post Second World War period, a clear division was beginning to be visible 
between the rich, industrial world and the poor, developing world. Ever since achieving 
independence, the once colonized nations had been struggling for a more equitable global 
economic system, since they had realised that mere political independence would not make 
them equals until they had established stable economic grounds.  The economic systems of 
the colonised states, which had been designed for the purposes of their colonial 
governments, remained intact when they were returned to local control. However, at that 
time many of them were suffering numerous political catastrophes, since the prevalence of 
acute poverty, chronic unemployment and endemic under-nourishment, prevented them 
from reaching any kind of development.110  
 
The newly independent states comprehended that it was not possible to achieve economic 
development unless they demand a change in the system, consequently they sought 
international support to narrow the North-South economic gap. This meant that they had to 
build a new relationship with the North, not on the grounds of colonialism but on more 
justifiable, equitable and globally accepted grounds.111 Rajagopal expresses this as “[...] the 
relationship between the West and the Third World would be governed not by colonialism, 
but by a new discipline called development which replaced the colonizer-colonized 
relationship with the developed-underdeveloped one”112, a situation he further described as 
                                                 
110 Sauvant K. P. and Hasenpflug  H. (1977), The New International Economic Order: Confrontation 
between North and South, Westview Press(Colorado), p.3 
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a “humanitarian urge to uplift the newly independent states”.  This process, however, was 
largely dependent on Northern scientific and technological power.113.  
 
Subsequently, when the South included its own developmental concerns in global forums 
by flocking together through Group 77 and UNCTAD in order to alter the existing 
economic system, the political debate took a new turn.114 As Sauvant observed in 1977, 
before the Third World (the South) started to bring the issue of economic development to 
the global agenda, it was considered to be ‘low politics’ and that the dialogue on economic 
development was an issue ‘left to the economics, financial, and planning ministries’, which 
was a reaction based on the different points of views of the developed and developing 
countries. 115  However, at the time, the developed countries were more enthusiastic about 
other issues than economic development on the grounds that it was no longer a primary 
concern for the developed world, from the Southern standpoint, economic development 
and poverty alleviation happened to be the most important issues.116 
 
Rajagopal indicates three sources of impetus that inspired the demand for NIEO:  “…the 
lessening of western aid; the disappointment with political independence in the Third 
World; and the success of OPEC as a primary commodity cartel”.117 He understood NIEO 
to be attempt  a radical challenge to international law because this was the first time, after 
                                                 
113 Ibid. 
114 The Group of 77 remains as the main body of developing country group within the UN system. The name 
reflects the number of the original members, which has grown up to 130 members by today. For further 
reading on G77: Kasa S. Gullberg A. and Heggelund G. (2008) , The Group of 77 in the International 
Climate Negotiations: Recent Developments and Future Directions, International Environmental 
Agreements, Volume 8, 113-127 Kasa et al states, that G77 is not a policymaking body, rather it coordinates 
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be on p.35 of this chapter. 
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41 
 
centuries of colonial oppression, that developing countries confronted Northern domination 
of the international system. 118  In the meantime, tension was building between North and 
South as a result of the conflicts of interest regarding international trade, economic and 
financial matters. As Dias explains, “the previous experience of both sides in relation to 
colonialism had impacted upon this tension”, and, referring to the developed states, he 
continues: “These few countries appropriated to themselves the material resources of the 
rest of the world in an aggressive pursuit of their policy of imperialism, capitalism, and 
neo-colonialism”.119 As a consequence, therefore, the developing countries demanded 
structural changes in the global economic system.  
 
UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVIII) on ‘Permanent sovereignty over natural resources’, which 
was accepted at the fourteenth session on December 1962, signalled the beginning of the 
NIEO discussions, whereby the South, given the post-war/post-colonial atmosphere, 
expressed its preference for international economic and trade policies that would allow 
national regulation over its natural resources; the ultimate aim being to reduce Northern 
interference to a minimum.120  To this end, on many occasions during the 1960s, the South 
stressed the necessity of independence in choosing its own development streams.  In the 
General Assembly, and in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks, their 
representatives “appealed to the economic rights and duties of states, and held that every 
government had a right to choose an economic development plan compatible with its 
cultural context, and that all the nations should support such plans”.121 In the midst of the 
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NIEO debate, however, oil prices increased, creating a crisis in the global economic and 
trade system and this was a significant event in the North-South dimension and the South’s 
demand for new global economic policies.  
 
The Oil Crisis in the context of NIEO 
 
Other significant turning points were emerging during the late 1960s, such as the conflict 
of interests between the oil producing developing countries and the developed countries 
where the multinational oil corporations were based.  The industrial and economic 
foundation of the world is hugely dependent on oil, which makes it one of the most 
important commodities in world trade, therefore it is significant that, during this period the 
industry was totally dominated by seven major companies, which had the power to 
produce, transport, refine and market it worldwide.122 Some scholars point out that these 
multinational companies were more powerful than some of the oil producing developing 
countries in terms of their political, expertise and financial capacities.123 Although the oil 
trade was dominated by these Northern companies, oil has always been a precious natural 
resource that is mostly owned by developing countries.124 Consequently, the oil crisis of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s provides a suitable backdrop against which the North-South 
dimension can be viewed.  
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In 1973, frustration with the dominant oil companies pushed the Southern oil-producing 
states to organize collectively as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), which has contributed to the North-South in two major ways.  Firstly, it set an 
example to the non-oil producing Southern countries by asserting authority over its own 
resources. Secondly, by achieving power over the production and trading of oil, it showed 
that a collection of countries with similar interests could become the main decision-making 
body in spite of the powerful Northern bloc.  Thirdly, OPEC has become a role model for 
other developing countries that are major exporters of raw materials.125  
 
Although the South was also a victim of the oil crisis, it was not equally well equipped to 
face the situation as were some of the developed countries; nevertheless, it appreciated the 
political message behind the whole campaign.126  On the other hand, though, OPEC was a 
sign to the North of the risk of being almost entirely dependent on imported raw materials, 
since, by this time, oil was their largest imported commodity.127 Adams states that, since 
production costs had been very low in the oil producing, developing countries, and since 
the developed consuming countries had the decision-making power over oil, they had been 
treating it as it were a ‘free good’128 a powerful position that was soon challenged by 
OPEC.  Consequently, this revolution in the world oil market caused a shock to world 
trade and Northern economies and OPEC further inspired the South with its demand for a 
‘New International Economic Order’.  
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The Southern Spirit in NIEO 
 
The South used UNGA as the forum to take the NIEO agenda further into the documents.  
Two resolutions were adopted in 1974 by the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly – the “ Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order” and the “Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order”.129 The objectives outlined in these documents were 
elaborated later in “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States” and further 
strengthened in the resolution on “Development and International Economic Co-operation” 
adopted by the UN Seventh Special Session in 1975.130 The NIEO demands can broadly be 
classified into the following three categories: firstly, general rules and principles for 
guiding international economic relations, secondly, suggestions for creating new 
international institutions or making changes in the current institutions, and finally, specific 
demands for special actions at the national level favourable to developing countries.131 
Looking from a different angle, Kreinin and Finger point to four major objectives of 
NIEO:  firstly, increasing less developed countries’ control over their economic destinies, 
secondly, accelerating the less developed countries’ growth rates, thirdly, tripling the share 
of global industrial production conducted in the less development countries by the year 
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2000, and finally, narrowing the gap in per capita income between the developed and 
developing countries.132  
 
All the above demands show the dissatisfaction of the South with the prevailing economic 
relations dominated by the North.  Murphy describes this as “the difference between the 
power to influence economic decisions in the centre and in the periphery of the world 
economy”.133  According to Prebisch people in the centre, i.e. the North are more 
influential to most global economic decisions than are the people at the periphery, i.e. the 
South. In this sense, he says, NIEO was an intensive attempt to obtain the power to 
influence global economic decisions from the periphery.134  
 
The “Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States” in 1975 reflects the burning desire 
of the South to create a more equitable ground in economic and trade relationship.135 
Murphy stresses that, under the Charter, members agreed that “the equal rights and duties 
of states made it incumbent upon all states to aid the economic development of every other 
state along the path chosen by its government”.136 Chapter 1 of the Charter, under the 
fundamentals of international economic relations, stated the South’s view that economic 
relations should be based on equality, justice and fairness; other principles, such as peace, 
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self-determination, non-intervention, and human rights, were also integrated as 
fundamental.137 Such inclusions demonstrated clearly that the South was not content with 
the existing economic system, that it was fearful of being dominated once again and it 
wanted to enjoy and protect its rights of absolute sovereignty.   
 
In a broader sense, NIEO reflected radical ideas, since the major theme running through 
the whole process was a demand by the South for change in the North-South dimension by 
twisting the political architecture of international economic structures. In 1974, the Sixth 
Special Session of UNGA adopted two seminal resolutions devoted to NIEO – the 
“Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order”138 and the 
“Programme of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO”.139 In 1984 Robert Mortimer 
observed that the Sixth Special Session represented a clash between the voting power of 
the new Third World majority and US economic power.’140 In UNGA the South has the 
majority of members, therefore, the one-state-one-vote voting system favours the South, 
whereas the US led North holds the larger share of UN funds, consequently, the decision 
making process exacerbates the differences found in the North-South dimension.   
 
The NIEO debate, therefore, marked a very significant shift in North-South discourse.  As 
was indicated at the beginning of the NIEO discussion, some scholars were of the opinion 
that NIEO was a failure. For instance, Thomas Franck, in declaring that the NIEO agenda 
was far from the reality, by arguing that there was no genuine consensus to it from all 
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parties and that it lacked the basic requirement to be accepted in international law.141 
Rohlik was of the view that its goals were hard to achieve when he stated that “The true 
goal is [that] economic development [should be] in a state of tight interdependence, 
requiring close cooperation and ‘friendly relations’ on a global scale, which [is] hardly 
imaginable in the current world”.  142 
 
Although the NIEO threw up various practical difficulties, it nevertheless heralded an 
important era in the North-South dimension.  If the creation of OPEC and UNCTAD are 
taken into account as being a part of the same process, it can be regarded as a progressive 
attempt by the South to influence the international system. Some authors argue that, 
although NIEO failed to make amendments in the international trade policies. As Roddick 
states:   
 
Although unsuccessful in changing the terms of trade, it generated two radically new 
institutional departures: the creation of the ‘Group of 77 and China’ as a united negotiating 
front covering all southern countries, and the establishment of UNCTAD, the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development, seen in northern and initially, southern eyes as a 
rival to the northern dominated General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.143 
 
Roddick sees this contribution as a challenge to the Northern efforts in re-establishment 
international trade and financial policies. Consequently, the NIEO debate contributed to 
the global governance discourse, not only in terms of its original purpose, whereby the 
South did not completely achieved its goals of establishing its position in economics and 
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trade, but it created the necessary atmosphere and momentum for presenting a united front 
for global governance in the future.  In this respect, two organizations have contributed 
throughout the process – the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and the G77 – which will be 
analysed in terms of the capacity of the South to exert itself on the North-South dimension. 
 
NAM and G77: “Common Third World United Front”
144
 
 
In the current international system the North-South dimension influences decision- making 
in many areas, such as trade, security, environment and human rights.  At present, the 
South realises the importance of presenting Southern concerns collectively, rather than 
individually, primarily because it is considered to be the only way to combat its 
marginalisation by the North in the decision-making forums.145 To this end, the South is 
often represented collectively at the global level either by G77 or NAM, which some 
scholars recognize to be key advocates on global matters.146 Because it is important to 
analyse the role of G77 and NAM in a global governance context, this chapter will now 
present a general overview of the international law and global governance aspects of the 
North-South dimension.  
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There were two main reasons for the formation of a common Southern world united front.  
Firstly, the political and military pressure coming from Northern countries and their 
collective fronts, and, secondly, the financial and economic pressures coming from global 
financial institutions.147  Hence, NAM was established as a third force alongside the “East 
and West” fronts during the Cold War period, while the key idea behind G77 was to 
achieve equality and justice in global economic forums.  
 
NAM originated in 1961 at the first non-aligned summit in Belgrade, however, its 
influence has declined in comparison to its original standing for two major reasons:  firstly, 
the end of the Cold War meant that its principle mandate had to be changed; and, secondly, 
the heterogeneity of its membership has made the organization highly complicated.148 For 
instance, internal conflicts arising with the Iran/Iraq War, where, because both states were 
members, it was impossible for them to maintain the organisation’s agenda.149  However, 
Williams states that although the political influence of NAM has decreased to a certain 
extent it still contributes to the dialogue on issues such as sovereign equality and 
independence, decolonization, anti-racism, economic and development policies.150  
 
The landmark event for the origin of G77 was UNCTAD in 1964, where the North refused 
to support for the South’s request for a new international trade organization.  The title 
‘G77’ represents the number of states subscribed to the “Declaration of Developing 
Countries” issued at the end of UNCTAD. Even though membership has now increased to 
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131, the name was retained for both symbolic and practical reasons – practical, because to 
alter the name with every change in numbers cannot be done.151 However, since China 
joined the group, it is now known as G77 and China.152  
 
Because G77’s mandate had been based on achieving economic and developmental 
equality to all developing states, from the outset, because the North was not treating the 
South as equals, it demanded changes in international economic structures.153 Therefore, 
the original member states issued a joint declaration (Article 10 of the Joint Declaration): 
 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development marks the beginning of a new 
era in the evolution of international co-operation in the field of trade and development. Such 
co-operation must serve as a decisive instrument for ending the division of the world into 
areas of affluence and intolerable poverty. This task is the outstanding challenge of our 
times. The injustice and neglect of centuries need to be redressed. The developing countries 
are united in their resolve to continue to quest for such redress and look to the entire 
international community for understanding and support in this endeavour.
154 
 
The above Article describes the North-South issues that provided the motivation for the 
demands for equality and justice in international trade and development.  It also states that 
the South will act collectively in order to overcome the economic barriers in the global 
system that divides the world.   
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During its first decade, the G77 put the IMF, the World Bank and the General Agreement 
of Trade and Tariff (GATT) – the key global financial and trade institutions –  under 
pressure to amend their financial and trade policies to address global poverty issues. This 
pressure resulted in some of its claims being successfully addressed.  One such instance 
being the IMF and the World Bank’s adoption of its Development Committee in 1974 
while another, in 1965, was when GATT adopted its Part IV of the GATT, which allowed 
the South to depart from the rule of reciprocity.155 
 
After the first few years of its establishment, NAM had to gradually adjust its original 
theme of standing as a third front to the East and West bipolarity during the Cold war.  At 
the fifth NAM meeting in Colombo in August, 1976 in its political declaration it declared 
that there was an integral connection between politics and economics, and that it would 
adopt a new approach by engaging globally in both economic and political matters. 
However, it stated that, although it would attend to economic issues, the importance of the 
political concerns that it had always stood for should never be underestimated.156 Thus 
NAM was transformed into a multi-issue organisation; however, since end of the cold war, 
its significance as a decisive political actor has been diminished. Later, it amended its 
mandate to include the economic concerns of the South, although it has not been re-
established in as dominant a place in global governance as the G77, which, since its 
formation as the representative of most of the South’s economic and political concerns, has 
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come to be known as the “central economic bargaining arm of the Third World 
coalition”.157   
 
There are challenges to the unity of these groups, however, that need to be addressed,  and 
one such is the South’s growing diversity, since both institutions represent a wide variety 
of social, cultural and religious interests across Asia, Africa and Latin America and this is 
very difficult when agreeing a common stand on any matter.158 Consequently, maintaining 
a united front is an important task in terms of the both groups’ sustainability. Another 
challenge is the differentiation between their members, since diversity among the countries 
of the South in terms of their economic stability is increasingly getting wider; for instance, 
there are three distinct groupings:  the least developed countries, the developing countries 
and the emerging world powers. The emerging world powers, together with OPEC 
countries, known as BRICS (Brazil, India, China and South Africa), of course, have much 
higher levels of political influence and economic growth than the other Southern members, 
and this sometimes  creates inter-group power politics when it comes to prioritising 
Southern concerns at a global level.  
 
These political, economic and geographical challenges have created differences between 
members on many occasions; for instance, the groups were fractured on a geographical 
basis in negotiations on desertification when the African countries emphasised that they 
should have priority within the UN Convention to Combat Desertification over the non-
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African members, who held different opinions.159 Also, in Climate Change negotiations, 
the position of the South often splits between oil-producing OPEC countries and the 
members of the “Alliance of Small Island States” (AOSIS).160  Of course, AOSIS members 
are at high risk of sea-level rise, while the OPEC members are concerned about the threat 
to their economies of climate change policies.  In order to represent the South at global 
level, therefore, the collective sub-groups must overcome their differences.  Optimistically, 
Najam expresses that “[…]these differences [are] neither deep nor lasting.  Indeed, they 
have been exceptions to an otherwise remarkable sense of collectivity.  This is a weak unit, 
but a resilient collectivity”.161   
 
The sequence of historical events, discussed above, proves that throughout the global 
political history the South has experienced many unfair circumstances as a result of the 
North-South division.  The common point of debate, however, centres on the absence of 
equity and justice in the formation and operation of the major global institutions.  The final 
section of this chapter, therefore, will analyse the principles of equity, fairness and justice 
in relation to the various governance issues addressed in the preceding sections of this 
chapter.  It will emphasise that, in order to ensure these principles in global governance 
processes and procedures, it is vital to attempt to mitigate North-South inequalities.  
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The importance of maintaining equity, fairness and justice in 
mitigating North-South inequalities in governance 
 
This chapter has raised the argument about whether the global governance system 
guarantees both developed and developing states equal enjoyment based on principles of 
equity, fairness and justice.  Its central argument has been that the global governance 
system cannot be considered to be a complete system of governance until it creates 
adequate mechanisms to ensure those principles in its decision making processes and 
procedures.  Writing about the completeness of a legal system, Vaughan Lowe states, 
“[Only] when the elements of a legal system can be combined to build up a normative 
structure adequate for the needs of the society to which it applies, we may think of the 
legal system as being complete”.162  Any governance system would not be complete unless 
its subjects can enjoy both equal participation in decision-making and the fruits that the 
system generates.  
 
Such an argument raises a critical question about the present global governance system, 
which is whether it has truly been able to provide adequate mechanisms and normative 
structures in order to safeguard the fundamental ideologies of equity, fairness and justice in 
practice. This thesis does not consider that an equal vote-casting system equates to equal 
participation, since equal representation in the decision making process, as well as the 
outcome of a particular decision, should reflect every party’s interest in the subject in 
question.  
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In this respect the interlinked concepts of justice, fairness and equity contribute to enrich 
the argument of inequality of North and South parties at global decision making forums. 
Justice, fairness and equity concepts are integral to any normative and procedural aspects 
of environmental decision making forum. Anand further emphasises the linkage between 
these three concepts in terms of environmental decision making process at the global level: 
   
I contend that procedural aspects of international policy-making are closely related to justice 
issues.  How decisions are made and what voting procedures and decision-making structures 
are adopted to formulate international environmental policies are questions that are crucial to 
a “just, fair and equitable” treaty, policy or law at the international level.163 
   
The concept of justice involves discussion of two main areas:  procedural justice and 
distributive justice. Distributive justice is about addressing the inequitable social, economic 
and political burdens faced by certain groups of people, which often result from the 
different levels of their development.164 For example, in the climate change debate, the 
level of social, economic and political burden to comply with the international obligations 
is largely dependent on each party’s development capacity.165 The degree to which 
different states experience the effects of climate change or are able to carry out their 
obligations, depends on their level of development.  Procedural justice is about addressing 
inequitable participation in the decision–making process as a result of different levels of 
development of different parties. For example, among some of the procedural injustices in 
the climate debate are the inability to conduct scientific research up to the level that of a 
developed country, and the inability to send the climate experts to the negotiation table due 
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to lack of resources.  Such procedural injustices prevent Southern states from participating 
as effectively as their Northern counterparts in the climate debate.   
 
The concept of fairness involves considering on what grounds the rules of governance are 
formulated. Referring to Franck, Anand explains fairness is judged by two criteria.  Firstly, 
fairness is decided by how rules distribute costs and benefits among its participants, and 
secondly, the process by which the rules are made and applied.166 
 
Concepts of equity are closely linked to the concepts of justice and fairness. Equitable 
decision making processes lead to laws and policies which distribute costs and benefits 
evenly among everybody affected by the decision making.  In the climate debate, the 
effects of the climate change are not evenly distributed among each state of the world.   
The ability to face the challenges created by climate change is also different according to 
the economic and political strength of each state.167  
 
 
As has been explained in the discussions about the North-South dimension in this chapter, 
principles of equity, fairness and justice should be considered in the wider context of equal 
recognition, capacities, distribution and participation of both North and South.168 If the 
final outcome of either a convention, a declaration or of any other regulation, does not 
represent the interests of every party concerned, then the whole system of governance will 
be destabilised. 
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168 This issue is discussed further in Chapter 2, p.85. 
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The heart of the argument of this thesis, therefore, is that the global governance agenda and 
global decision making process should represent the concerns of both North and South 
equally. The North-South debate regarding environmental negotiations provides many 
instances where decision-making powers have not been enjoyed equally by the world 
community. For instance, in the climate change debate, the South criticises the priority-
setting that has given less importance to the South’s concerns than to the North’s.169  The 
inequalities in science and research between the South and the North are a prime reason for 
the North’s dominance of the priorities agenda in climate change negotiations, and this has 
created unfairness at the highest level of climate negotiations.170  As a consequence of 
these failures – and others described earlier in this chapter – to meet the primary principles 
of global governance, the South has voiced the need for “new orders” to be incorporated 
into global governance structures.171  
 
The fundamental ideologies of equality, justice and fairness should be interwoven in any 
system of governance that determines equal treatment to all its subjects; these concepts 
have been developed in line with the justice theory of Rawls, whose “A Theory of Justice” 
equates justice with fairness, which, he argues, should be the social contract at the base of 
a well-ordered society.172 Rawls’s ideas on distributional justice also depend on a fair 
                                                 
169 Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice: A North-South Dimension, Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd. 
170 Ruchi Anand recognises this less important position of the South at the climate governance as “the 
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allocation of resources among diverse members of the society.173 Many scholars later 
argued that defining justice solely on distributional principles is only a normative approach 
to the concept, therefore, they have focused on addressing the process by identifying 
individual and social recognition as being key elements for attaining justice, since 
recognition, capabilities, distribution and participation are important points in any 
discussion about justice.174   
 
Anand places justice issues into two categories: procedural justice and distributive justice. 
Procedural justice, which is the process adopted by the decision-making authority, assures 
the right to self-determination, equal participation, representation, respect and justice for 
all people regardless of their social, economic and political status.175 As Ebbesson explains, 
“the procedural element of justice is evident in the ways the global agreements are 
negotiated and debated”, he further states that in order to achieve procedural justice it is 
necessary that all states can participate equally in the decision making process of 
international agreements.176 Distributive justice, on the other hand, looks at the outcome of 
the decisions made, which includes all matters relating to inequitable distribution.177  In 
terms of environmental harm, distributive justice means the distribution of costs and 
measures for avoiding predicted harm.178 A good example of this was the interpretation of 
justice by both North and South during the several environmental negotiations leading to 
the “Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer” (Montreal Protocol), 
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which acknowledged differentiated states’ obligations to combat the depletion of ozone 
layer based on the principles of justice.179   
 
The concept of equality and justice in relation to rich and poor countries has failed to 
promote equality because it fails to narrow the gap between North and South,180 because, as 
Shelton states, the injustices of the past have proved disadvantageous to the South, 
especially in the area of trade.181 In the 1960s and ‘70s the concerns for equality and justice 
in global trading governance, Shelton goes on to say, “led newly independent and 
economically disadvantaged states to join in efforts to construct a ‘New International 
Economic Order’, which would reconstruct international economic arrangements to 
achieve equitable distributions of global wealth.”182  She further explains that Article 29 of 
the “Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States”, adopted by UNGA in 1974, 
states that the “seabed and its resources” are the common heritage of mankind, 
consequently provisions ought to be established to ensure that the natural global resources 
be equally shared by all states, with particular attention being given to the specific needs of 
developing countries.   
 
The differences between the developing and the developed world are critical features in the 
debate about global governance.  The assumption that ‘all states are equal’ becomes 
                                                 
179  Mickelson K. (2009), Competing Narratives of Justice in North-South environmental relations: the case 
of ozone layer depletion in Law in Environmental law and justice in context, edited by Ebbesson J. and 
Okowa P., Cambridge University Press, pp:297-315 at pp:311-315 
180 Shelton D. (2009), Describing the elephant: international justice and environmental law in Environmental 
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182 Shelton D. (2009), Describing the Elephant: international justice and environmental law in Environmental 
law and justice in context, edited by Ebbesson J. and Okowa P., Cambridge University Press, pp:55-75 at 
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dubious in light of the political and economic power gaps between North and South. For 
example, as Cassese points out, Article 27.3 of the UN Charter grants veto powers only to 
the permanent members of the Security Council, even though Article 2.1 proclaims 
sovereign equality for all members’.183 Such power in the Security Council, therefore, 
explains the power politics currently underlying the global governance system that has 
created a major imbalance between North and South.  Some authors argue that, given that 
only five states among nearly two hundred hold veto power in the Security Council the 
assertion that ‘all states are equal’ is clearly untrue.184 Antonio Cassese’s view is that ‘the 
sovereign equality of all members of the United Nations, as a general guideline, is 
weakened by the veto power that has been specifically laid-down as a legal exception’.185  
 
North-South debate explains many instances that these fundamental ideologies are not 
equally enjoyed by the world community. In the climate change debate the  South criticises 
the priority setting of the Northern agenda that gives less importance to Southern 
immediate concerns over Northern climate concerns.186 Inequality of the adequacy of 
science and research base between the South and the North is a main reason for this 
dominant authority in priority setting in climate change negotiations.187 This situation has 
created unfair position for the South at the highest level of climate negotiations.188 Unless 
the governing process and procedures follow equality, justice and fairness principles the 
international system remains imbalanced and incomplete. 
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Conclusion 
 
The North-South dimension has played a key role in global decision-making processes and 
procedures during every period of the creation of the international governance system.  A 
series of historical events have contributed to the North-South dimension that have affected 
how decisions have been made, on what principles they have been taken, how votes are 
recorded and who sits on the highest decision-making bodies. Southern countries have 
resisted, and continue to resist, the global solutions presented with Northern agendas. The 
primary Southern demand is the genuine equality of states in political, economic, and 
social decision-making, which would ensure their right to be involved in global decision-
making forums as equal partners to the North, thereby achieving the universal principles of 
equality, justice and fairness. As Najam states, “[…] ‘Southness’ stems not just from a 
sense that the international system is ineffective in responding to Southern concerns, it 
grows out of the belief that the system is less than legitimate in terms of its commitment to 
Southern interests”.189 
 
In conclusion, I quote Agarwal and Narain: “How can we visualize any kind of global 
management in a world so divided between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the 
powerless, which does not have a basic element of justice and equity?” 190 The argument of 
this thesis is that this absence creates so many divisions between North and South that it 
has ultimately led to a serious imbalance in the system of global governance. This chapter 
has discussed the origination of the concept of the North-South dimension in context of 
global governance and how this has played a crucial role in the political, economic and 
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social areas of the international system. It has explored how this concept takes on 
difference shapes, depending on changes to the overall global atmosphere at different times 
but notes however, that the actual problems that have been created as a result appear never 
to change.  This thesis will show that, although they have been built into the structure of 
the global institutions, the principles of equality, justice and fairness, by their very absence 
have been very closely connected with divisions in the North-South dimension throughout 
the evolution of this divided system of world governance.  
 
This chapter has described a number of instances where the South has attempted to change 
the inequalities and injustices in economic and trading policies of global governance. 
However, the South no longer limits its voice merely to economic demands. The next 
chapter will discuss a different aspect of the North-South dimension – global 
environmental issues – which have transformed the dimension from a purely economic 
debate into the much wider territory of sustainable development and environmental 
protection. In this context, the South has taken the North-South dimension into a wider 
perspective.  The chapter will, therefore, explore the various dimensions of global 
governance and whether, and how far, the environmental governing mechanisms have been 
successful in terms of narrowing the North-South divide.  
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2. Environmental Governance in Worlds Apart 
 
“The world needs a new vision that can galvanize 
people everywhere to achieve higher levels of co-
operation in areas of common concern and 
shared destiny.” 191 
Chapter One, Our Global Neighbourhood 
 
Introduction 
 
Given the rapid proliferation of global environmental laws, institutions and instruments, it 
is instructive to consider whether these initiatives better incorporate the Southern 
perspective/principles of equity that are so important to the North-South dimension.  As it 
was argued in Chapter 1, much of the foundational international law and political practice 
fails to recognise the Southern perspective.  In a global environmental governance context, 
there have been a few success stories, such as global negotiations on ozone depletion, 
which impressively compromised both Northern and Southern positions. However, many 
other global environmental negotiations have highlighted the conflict of interests between 
North and South. This has hampered the development of effective global environmental 
regimes, the ongoing disputes regarding climate change and forests negotiations being 
good examples.  
 
                                                 
191 Chapter one of the Report of the Commission on Global Governance published by Oxford University 
Press in 1995. http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/global-neighbourhood/index.htm (last accessed on 03.11.2010) 
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This chapter is underpinned by the argument, developed in the last chapter, that the lack of 
adequate decision making frameworks based on the historical, political and economic 
differences between North and South undermines many governance efforts involving 
environmental issues. The North-South dimension explains the reasons for glaring 
disparities in global environmental governance.  The primary end-goals of Southern 
agendas, which are based on economic growth, poverty reduction, and industrial 
transformation192, tend to focus more on immediate environmental necessities, such as safe 
drinking water, population growth and desertification. 193 By contrast, the North has passed 
the stage where policy making is guided primarily by such developmental considerations.  
Consequently, the developed countries tend to engage over wider global issues, as 
Bodansky explains:  
 
In part, economic development may help explain the growth of environmental awareness.  
As societies grow richer, they can afford to focus not just on the provision of basic human 
necessities, such as food and housing, but also “luxury goods,” such as a cleaner 
environment.
194 
 
This regional conflict in terms of environmental priorities is often debated at international 
negotiations, and is a contemporary illustration of the North-South dimension. This chapter 
argues that very often Southern environmental concerns are marginalised in global 
decision making fora by the environmental priorities that have been set by the North.  
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The first section of this chapter examines the historical evolution of global environmental 
governance, and why it has become an issue for international concern by discussing 
contemporary environmental problems. It will emphasise the importance of understanding 
the concept of the interdependence of humans and the environment in order to determine 
priorities in global decision making processes. This will be followed by an examination of 
the ‘transboundary’ nature of global environmental problems, which demand a system of 
governance that stretches beyond national boundaries in order to bridge North-South 
divisions.  
 
The chapter then explores the three general principles of international law that determine 
the construction of environmental governance. This analysis will understand how 
international environmental law and policy structures support the application of the equity, 
fairness and justice principles in decision making forums.  To this end, principles of state 
sovereignty, the right to development, and common, but differentiated, responsibilities, 
will be considered regarding the evaluation of existing environmental governance 
mechanisms and institutions in the context of the North-South dimension.  
 
This chapter finally offers an in-depth analysis of two environmental institutions that have 
become established in the global environmental governance field. Emphasis will be placed 
on understanding what options they need to take into account when looking at issues from 
a Southern environmental perspective.  The two institutions – the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) – will be 
examined in order to discover the ways by which traditional governing systems continue to 
place more emphasis on those environmental priorities that are put forward by the North. 
These institutions have been selected because they are primarily based within the UN and 
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the World Bank – the two principal global governance organisations. This chapter, 
therefore, examines these institutions’ structures, decision-making processes, procedures 
and voting methods.  
 
In its conclusion, this chapter argues that the existing architecture of global environmental 
decision making must be improved if it wishes to achieve a more effective global 
governance system that equally reflects the needs of both North and South.  This chapter 
will conclude that  global environmental institutions and mechanisms need to be enriched 
by the application of the three abiding principles of international law – equity, fairness and 
justice – so that the concerns of both North and South are represented equally at the 
decision making table.  
 
The Evolution of Global Environmental Governance  
 
Only a few decades ago international environmental problems were not widely debated, 
neither had they acquired a global focus. According to some scholars the notion of global 
environmental governance would have been a strange idea at the beginning of the last 
century.195 In 1945 when the UN was established, its Charter did not even mention 
environmental protection196, let alone establish a specialised agency for environmental 
protection. Indeed, no major policy maker considered environmental matters to be a 
potentially critical problem until pollution and depletion started to become visible in many 
parts of the world.  Using the earth’s scarce resources for human developmental ends 
together with the over-use of industrial processes has disrupted the harmony of the world’s 
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natural cycle. In 1962, the ever popular Rachel Carson, writing against the misuse of 
chemical pesticides in ‘Silent Spring’, opened the eyes and minds of the global community 
by her warning about the environmental threats to ‘mother nature’197, by identifying 
environmental pollution as “[the] reckless and irresponsible poisoning of the world that 
man shares with all other creatures …”198  Similar landmarks in  environmental literature 
are Stewert Udall’s ‘Quiet Crisis’ (1963), Jean Dorst’s ‘Before Nature Dies’ (1965) and 
Rolf Edberg’s ‘On the Shred of a Cloud’ (1966)199, all of which warned about deteriorating 
environmental conditions and their harmful effects on  humankind.  
 
By the beginning of the 1960s, social movements had become actively involved in 
environmental concerns and the protection of the environment became a major concern in 
developed countries200 since, particularly in the US and Europe, people were beginning to 
experience the dreadful consequences of ‘un-bridled industrialization’. Bodansky 
characterises the “general upsurge of interest in the environment” during the 1960s as 
“environmental revolution”.201 He argues that the environmental movement took such 
issues beyond mere conservation policies to a much broader plane that included other 
relevant areas, such as economic growth, pollution, and technology and population.202  
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Ivanova argues that these social movements were able to pressure the global political 
agenda with environmental concerns.203   
 
By the early 1970s the global community was beginning to realise the problematic 
consequences of intensive industrialisation. In 1972 Ward and Dubos presented a report at a 
conference about the care and maintenance of the planet, which described the global 
environmental problem as a conflict between man’s natural inheritance and man-made 
creations.204 In it they wrote:  
 
Man inhabits two worlds.  One is the natural world of plants and animals, of soils and airs 
and waters which preceded him by billions of years and of which he is a part.  The other is 
the world of social institutions and artefacts he builds for himself, using his science and his 
dreams to fashion an environment obedient to human purpose and direction […] His 
condition is to live aspiringly, and uncertainly where the ‘biosphere’ of living things and the 
’technosphere’ of his inventions interact.
205 
 
Following their report, in 1972, the United Nations Conference on Human Environment 
(UNCHE) was held in Stockholm with the theme of ‘the human environment’. This 
Conference had several important outcomes, such as the establishment of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United National Declaration on Human 
Environment (Stockholm Declaration). The UNCHE is recognised as having been the first 
global attempt to gather all state parties together to achieve better environmental standards 
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in the world.206 Thereafter, environmental concerns became a centre of international 
attention, reaching their prime in 1992 with the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio, which emphasised the importance of 
sustainable development. Post-Rio marked a significant period in the global environmental 
debate where many initiatives were pursued. This included a number of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) being adopted, numbers of environmental NGOs 
increased, world-wide multilateral environmental projects were initiated and global policy 
makers considered environmental issues very seriously.207 Ten years after, the next UN 
environmental conference, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 
(UNCSD) - the World Summit on Sustainable Development – took place in Johannesburg 
in 2002.  UNCSD further stressed the importance of implementing sustainable 
development goals agreed at UNCED in 1992.   
 
In today’s context some of the major environmental problems, such as climate change, bio-
diversity and ozone depletion, are considered as serious as global security.208  The current 
global environmental governance system, which involves various processes, procedures, 
institutions and international treaties, determines how decisions are taken in the light of 
managing resources and interests, how conflicts are resolved and how the different actors 
arrive at agreement.  
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The world’s states are so diverse, but the environmental problems they carry are even more 
so.  As Chapter 1 outlined, the world is divided into North and South according to 
economic, political and social criteria.  The South is rich in natural resources and bio-
diversity, whereas the North wields the most financial, military and political power.  In 
addition, Northern dominance in scientific and expertise in environmental research 
contributes heavily to regional inequalities in global environmental governance.209  For 
example, in climate negotiations the lack of Southern participation is highlighted not only 
in the process but also in the composition of the expertise groups. Consequently, there is an 
enormous disparity in North-South participation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) whose working groups are almost completely composed of American and 
European scientists.210 These knowledge and technological barriers prevent Southern 
participation in these global efforts211, as Gordon explains, because although the science is 
often viewed as an impartial element, nothing prevents scientists from being influenced by 
their cultural background.212  Therefore, even if sub-consciously, scientists may be led to 
conclusions that place more emphasis on climate change issues of North America and 
Europe, due to their cultural views and biases.213 In effect, during the early phase of the 
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climate change discussions, the whole debate about climate change was dominated by the 
North, despite the South being far more vulnerable to climate change. One of the many 
critics, Anand, states that  “[the] dominance of western science and research, [the] 
imposition of the western agenda and priority setting according to the Northern concerns 
[is the] unfair conditionality attached to aid and technology transfers”.214 Consequently, 
decisions made regarding the world’s natural resources display the uneven power relations 
between the environmentally-rich South and the politically and economically-rich North. 
This chapter, therefore, demonstrates that the global environmental governance framework 
needs to maintain a balance in this most contentious area.   
 
The above sketch of the historical evolution of environmental governance provides the 
context for understanding the existing environmental laws and political frameworks. The 
next section analyses how the North-South political global debate has shifted from the 
economic paradigm that had previously been the dominant focus, to issues concerning the 
environment. 
 
From Brandt to Brundtland
215
: Shifting the Paradigm of the 
North-South Dimension 
 
Many decades of individual and collective attempts to determine an international economic 
order by establishing equality for the South, led, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to a 
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series of highly influential developmental studies – the Brandt Commission Reports – 
which emphasised the importance of improving the economic and trading standards of the 
South.216 Soon afterwards, however, due to numerous predictions of environmental threats 
being made by scientists and environmentalists, those responsible for global governance 
began to face up to the world’s environmental challenges by creating a different form of 
agenda.217 Since then, environmental concerns have constituted an important part of the 
global governance discourse, which inevitably influenced the North-South paradigm. Until 
this shift occurred, Southern countries had primarily mobilized the necessary funds from 
developed countries in order to facilitate equal participation in international trade and other 
related areas.  
 
Then, in 1987, with the publication of ‘Our Common Future’218, the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, otherwise known as the Brundtland Commission219, a 
different focus was introduced to the international development debate. This led to the 
transformation of the North-South paradigm from a purely developmental concern, to a 
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research group published an alarming report that proved the losses in the ozone layer over Antarctica, which 
was a strong indication for environmental catastrophe on ozone depletion which causes threat to global 
warming and human health. (NASA 1986,15) Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice: A 
North-South Dimension, Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
218 The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development on  8th of June 1987, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/SMK/Vedlegg/Taler%20og%20artikler%20av%20tidligere%20statsminist
re/Gro%20Harlem%20Brundtland/1987/Presentation_of_Our_Common_Future_to_UNEP.pdf (last accessed 
on 03.11.2010) 
219 The World Commission on Environment and Development was established by the General Assembly 
Resolution: A/Res/38/161on Process of Preparation of the Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and 
Beyond. http://www.un-documents.net/a38r161 (last accessed on 03.11.2010) 
73 
 
sustainable developmental concern; thus progress was made towards a more equitable, fair 
and just model of North-South governance.220 As Agenda 21 specifically mentions: 
 
[to a] governance that is transparent and democratic in nature, including the terms of 
decision-making and operations, by guaranteeing a balanced and equitable representation of 
the interests of developing countries and giving due weight to the funding efforts of donor 
countries.
221 
 
The North–South dimension of the environmental debate has highlighted several issues 
relating to the “equitable representation of the interests of developing countries”. For 
instance, as mentioned in Chapter 1, because post-colonial and post-war institutional 
approaches have created a North-South divide, global governance mechanisms have tended 
to favour the Northern view-point, consequently the decision making process penalises the 
South.   
 
In addition to the North-South dimension, the global environmental regime is complex for 
several other reasons. The nature of today’s environmental problems require a highly 
complex system of governance capable of satisfying both biocentric and anthropocentric 
concerns, while, at the same time, addressing transboundary environmental issues that have 
a global focus. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
220 Williams M. (1997), The Group of 77 and Global Environmental Politics, Global Environmental Change, 
Volume 7, Number 3, pp. 295-298  
221 Para.33.14, (A)(iii), Agenda 21, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_33.shtml (last 
accessed on 08.11.2010) 
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Understanding the Nature of Global Environmental Problems 
 
The transboundary nature of environmental issues has increasingly brought local 
environmental issues to the attention of global decision-makers.  Once local and national 
environmental concerns become international concerns, the debate is inevitably influenced 
by the North–Southern dimension. In facing ‘burning’ issues, such as poverty eradication 
and economic development,  Southern states stress the importance of utilising its natural 
resources in order to strive for improvements in economic development that will bring 
prosperity to the region. The North, though, will argue to the contrary, by stating that the 
South’s focus should be to aim for better regulations and laws in order to protect the 
environment. The North also argues that the focus of the South should be to preserve their 
region’s natural resources for the benefit of future generations, i.e. inter-generational 
equity, whereas the South stresses the equitable sharing of natural resources among the 
present generation, i.e. inter-generational equity.  
 
The following section examines how the arguments of Northern and Southern states in 
decision making forums are based either on prioritizing human development or 
environmental and nature protection.  
 
Anthropocentrism and Biocentrism  
Environmental problems can be seen from either an anthropocentric or a biocentric point 
of view.222 Anthropocentrism focuses on the human aspects of problems while 
                                                 
222 Spash C.L. and. Simpson I.A. (1993) Protecting Sites of Special Scientific Interest, Journal of 
Environmental Management, Volume 39, pp.213-227, Gillespie A. (1997), International Environmental Law, 
Policy and Ethics, Oxford University 
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biocentricism focuses purely on their environmental aspects.223 Biocentricism is about 
protection and preservation of flora and fauna for the purpose of maintaining biological 
diversity and ecosystems224, which means that humans are just one species amongst many, 
which makes them no more important than any other.225 Therefore the process and 
procedures relating to environmental governance have to balance environmental concerns 
on the one hand against human concerns on the other.  Many international instruments 
recognising the importance of maintain a balance between anthropocentrism focuses and 
biocentricism. Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights recognizes a human right for everyone to enjoy the highest level of physical and 
mental health and for them to benefit from improvements in environmental hygiene in 
order for them to realise the right226, while Principle 11 of the Stockholm Declaration, 
1972, acknowledges the necessity to develop a system of environmental law and policy 
that does not devalue human developmental concerns of the South:  
 
[…] the environmental policies of all states should enhance [and] not adversely affect the 
present and future development potential of developing countries, nor should they hamper 
the attainment of better living conditions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken by 
states and international organizations with a view to reaching agreement on meeting the 
                                                 
223 Birnie P., Boyle A. (2002), International Law and Environment, 2nd edition, Oxford University press, 
pp.5-6, 257 
224 Guha R. (1994), Forestry Debate and Draft Forest Act: Who Wins, Who Looses? Economic and Political 
Weekly, Volume 29, Number 34, p. 2192 
225 Rai J. et al (2009), Universalism and Ethical Values for the Environment, Ethics of Energy Technologies 
in Asia and Pacific Project, UNESCO, P. 10, 
http://www.unescobkk.org/fileadmin/user_upload/shs/Energyethics/EETAPWG1rpt.pdf (last accessed on 
17.02.2011) 
226 Birnie P., Boyle A. (2002), International Law and Environment, 2nd edition, Oxford University press, 
p.257,  General Assembly resolution 2200(XXI) of 16th December 1966. The document can be found: 
http://www.un-documents.net/icescr.htm (last accessed on 16.11.2010) 
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possible national and international economic consequences resulting from the application of 
environmental measures.
227 
 
Principle 11 states that the South often struggles with international environmental policies 
because human and development-centred economic policies are sometimes limited and 
restricted by nature-centred environmental policies.228   
 
Flores and Clark, in their descriptive analysis of how anthropocentrism and biocentrism 
affect environmental governance, state that they can both be central to the biodiversity 
conservation debate.229 They further note that in terms of specifying criteria for allocation 
of resources, anthropocentrists believe that decisions should be made to maximise the 
value of total net benefits to humans, while biocentrists believe that decisions should be 
made in a context whereby all organisms, including humans, have equal standing.   
Consequently, Flores and Clark conclude that anthropocentrism stands for human social 
processes of the present while biocentrism stands for present and future process.230 
  
In the light of the above debate, there are differing concerns that characterise 
environmental problems – anthropocentrism and biocentrism – and that these are 
sometimes also reflected in the North-South dimension.  The seriousness of the effects of 
                                                 
227 Principle 11 of  the Stockholm Declaration 1972 The document can be found: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503 (last accessed 
on 29.11.2010) 
228Miller explains this situations drawing examples from Montreal negotiations on Ozone protection where 
Southern countries bargain some of the regulations and demand additional financial and technical resources 
from the North as a result of their industrial development process was affected by the Ozone protection 
criteria. Miller, M. (1995), The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, Open University Press, 
Buckingham 
229 Flores A. and Clark T.W. (2001),  Finding Common Ground in Biological Conservation: Beyond 
Anthropocentric Vs. Biocentric Controversy, in Species and Ecosystem Conservation: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach in Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Bulleting Series edited by Clark T.W. et al ,, 
Number 105, p. 241 
230 Ibid, p. 243 
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environmental problems on both human beings and the environment varies greatly 
depending on the political, economic and social situation of the country in question.231 For 
example, northern countries are better equipped with resources, political power and social 
structure to face both human and physical effects of the climate change problems than 
Southern countries, which are vulnerable mainly in two areas – they are the smallest 
contributors to the climate change problem and they are the least able to absorb its adverse 
effect.232 One study concludes that the “developing countries are twice [as] vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change than industrialized countries, and island states are 
three times more vulnerable”.233 Looking at the limitations of the South from a broader 
perspective than climate change, some authors stated that developing countries are 
vulnerable because their options for less carbon-intensive development are limited. Such 
limitations may compel the South to pay more attention to the effects of climate change on 
their human might focus development goals rather than on the potential environmental 
harm that it can cause.  Consequently, Southern participation in countering the possible 
effects of climate change focuses on anthropocentric values, whereas the North, in 
emphasising the potential for environmental devastation could be seen to often adopt a 
biocentric approach. 
 
                                                 
231 Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice: A North-south Dimension, Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd. In the analysis of three international environmental regimes, namely climate change, hazardous wastes, 
ozone regime, Anand illustrates the impact of North-South dimension in decision making process and 
procedures.  Developed countries and developing countries face environmental challenges differently 
depending on different power potentials. 
232 Timmons J.R. and Bradley P. C. (2007), A climate Injustice: global inequality, North-South politics and 
climate policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Anand R. (2004), International Environmental 
Justice: A North-South Dimension, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., p Ruth-1590 African nations have contributed 
very little to the global warming, with emissions of less than 8 percent of the world’s GHGs.  Gordon R. 
(2007), Climate Change and the Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequality, University of 
Colorado Law Review, Volume 78, pp:1559-1624 at p.1600   
233 Agarwal A., Narain S., and  Sharma A. (eds.), 1999,Green Politics New Delhi: Centre for Science and 
Environment, p. 16 
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The anthropocentric versus biocentric debate focuses on certain environment and human 
issues in the South that require greater attention in global decision making forums. The 
South includes most of the environmentally rich and bio-diverse tropical countries234 with 
extensive tropical forests and other vitally important environment features, whilst they 
carry the majority of the world’s population.235 Therefore any environmental problems that 
may cause negative effects to both the environment and human beings will affect the South 
extensively.  Also, some developing countries cannot even fulfil their populations’ basic 
needs, consequently they place more weight on the human effects than on the effects of 
nature. A situation epitomised in a speech at the United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment (UNCHE) in 1972 by the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, when 
she famously stated, “poverty is the biggest environmental threat to developing 
countries”.236 She further said: 
 
[…] we do not want to impoverish [the] environment any further, [but] we cannot forget the 
grim poverty of large numbers of people.  When they themselves feel deprived how can we 
urge the preservation of animals?  How can we speak to those who live […] in slums about 
keeping our oceans, rivers and the air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the 
source?  Environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty […].
237 
 
                                                 
234 Most of the tropical countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are in the South.  Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka, and many countries in Africa are considered as the richest areas in biodiversity. 
http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/Hotspots/hotspots_by_region/Pages/default.aspx (last accessed on 
29.11.2010) 
235 The World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database, United Nations Population 
Division.   http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=5 (last accessed on 29.11.2010) 
236 Indira Gandhi questioned at the UNCHE , “are not poverty and needs the greatest polluters” Quoted by 
Anand R.P.(1980), Development and Environment: The Case of the Developing Countries, Indian Journal of 
International Law, Volume 20, Number 1  at p. 10, Quoted by Ivanova M. (2007), Looking Forward by 
Looking Back: Learning from UNEP's History, in Global Environmental Governance: Perspectives on the 
Current Debate  edited by Swart L and Perry E., New York: Centre for UN Reform Education, p. 34  
237 Anand R.P. (1980), Development and Environment:  The Case of the Developing Countries, Indian 
Journal of International Law, Volume 20, Number 1, p. 10 
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Poverty itself contributes to global environmental degradation by excessive growth of 
population, use of underdeveloped technology in development, clearing of rainforest and 
many other non-environmentally-friendly life styles.238  In order to carry through its 
development strategies, the South depends largely on the natural environment.  Lacking 
alternative means to alleviate poverty the developmental needs of people in the South push 
them towards devastating environmental usage.239 
   
Recognising the interdependence of human beings and nature has been considered to be a 
move forward in environmental governance, particularly since the UN global conference 
on the human environment in 1972.  Literal interpretation of the main themes showed that 
the global governance system has been shifting of the themes of global environmental 
governance from environmental protection-centred human development to human 
development with a focus on environmental protection. UNCHE, therefore, had been 
inspired by a desire to protect the human environment.  However, in 1992, at the second 
global environmental conference –UNCED240 – the title had changed to ‘the conference on 
environment and development’.  Then, by 2002, the concept of sustainable development 
was further developed at the third global environmental conference – UNCSD241 – held in 
Johannesburg. Although the different titles and themes of these global conferences 
highlighted the developmental approach to environmental negotiations, as this chapter will 
                                                 
238 Adams N.A. (1993), Worlds Apart: The North-South Divide and the International System, Zed Books 
Ltd., London, p.203-204, Nassau explains the conflict of interest of developing and developed countries  on 
environmental matters referring to land-clearing and other forms of commercial exploitation of their tropical 
forests.  Northern approach towards the clearing of rain forest is banning or boycotting of trade in tropical 
timber and its products in developed countries. Nassau states, “… this being the act of self sacrifice that these 
poor countries should make in order to save the wider environment ‘for the common good of mankind ’, 
whole the rich countries continue their extravagant burning of fossil fuels and continue to overload the 
environment with their excessive consumption habits.” 
239 Ulrich B. (2006), Bridging the North/South Divide in International Environmental Law, ZaoRV, 
Max/Planck Institute, Volume 66, pp:259-296   
240 UNCED is similarly known as Rio Summit and Earth Summit. 
241 UNCSD is similarly known as World Summit on Sustainable development. 
80 
 
establish, it is highly debatable whether the actual governance system considers Southern 
environmental priorities to be equal to their Northern counterparts.   
 
Most of the environmental problems emanating from the South, such as unclean drinking 
water, land degradation, population growth, urbanization and energy deficiencies, are 
related to the human development process. The North, sometimes, places more weight on 
environmental protection, such as biodiversity, climate change and ozone depletion.  
Roberts and Parks explain it thus:  
 
       […] for more than thirty years the environmental issues of most concern to developing 
countries have been brushed aside and replaced with First World issues.  However, global 
common issues, such as ozone depletion, habitat loss, and climate change are much less 
pressing to more poor nations than providing safe drinking water, slowing soil erosion, 
treating sewage, slowing the spread of deserts, and reducing lung-and eye-burning air 
pollution.242     
 
However, this discussion will illustrate that in the global environmental decision making 
forums, the human centred Southern approach to environmental issues could be seen 
sometimes to drop to the bottom of the global environmental priority list in favour of the 
Northern environment protection approach. This emphasis on environmental and human 
centred priorities add a new dimension to global environmental governance, which requires 
legitimate process and procedures in order to address environment-human interaction in 
the context of the North-South debate. Birnie once stated, "The developing states 
characterized the environmental crises as a long-term developmental one, and the 
                                                 
242 Timmons R.J. and Bradley P.C. (2007), A climate Injustice: global inequality, North-South politics and 
climate policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, p. 6  
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(industrialized) states saw it as a more immediate technical problem."243  Therefore to a 
certain extent both anthropocentric and biocentric views represent yet another aspect of the 
North-South dimension that leads to environmental governance being biased towards the 
North.   
 
After coming to an understanding regarding how the North-South dimension impacts on 
the priorities of global environmental governance, the next section will introduce the other 
important element in current environmental matters – the transnational problem.  This 
analysis concerns territorial sovereignty over environmental issues and how aware global 
governance is of local and national priorities in terms of a particular Southern 
environmental issue once it has become a global problem. 
 
Environmental Problems Demand Global Focus 
 
Currently, environmental problem solving at both local and national level may not provide 
the complete solution because the impact of a problem often has a much wider impact; it is 
inevitable, therefore, that the problem will attract global attention. Explaining the evolution 
of an environmental problem from a local or national issue to a global issue, Leonard Good 
states: 
 
In [the] 1950’s and 1960’s the focus in Canada was on things like solid waste management, 
[…] algae growth in the great lakes… the problems were almost exclusively national in their 
origin and in their solution.  But things began to change […] in the 1970s we began to focus 
as well as on continental environmental problems […] the joint management of pollution of 
                                                 
243 Birnie P. (1993), The UN and the Environment, in United Nations, Divided World, Adam Roberts & 
Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2nd edition. p.367. 
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the Great Lakes […] as well as on the continental emission of SO2 from power plants which 
were generating acid rains […] In 1970 we and others began to focus on a truly important 
global environmental problems for the first time … the role of CFC’s in the destruction of 
the earth’s protective ozone layer […] climate change […] concerns about global losses in 
bio diversity […]
244  
 
Good illustrates the complexities of environmental problems as they progress to becoming 
global threats. Environmental pollution and other environmental concerns have gradually 
moved beyond national jurisdictions with the development of technology, industrialisation 
and human population growth. Recognition of environmental problems as a global 
challenge was acknowledged in an unofficial report, ‘Only One Earth’, commissioned by 
the Secretary-General of the UNCHE in 1972, which stated: “…nations have no choice but 
to follow the course of common policy and coordinated action.  In three vital, related areas 
this is now the undeniable case […] global atmosphere, the global oceans, and the global 
weather system”.245 In order to resolve such matters, therefore, there should be an effective 
global process of decision-making.   
 
Following on from Good’s illustration this section identifies three different ways by which 
environmental issues become global issues.246  In some cases, as in the 1972 report, 
environmental issues become global because of their impact on the earth.  The first 
category of global environmental damage is atmospheric pollution leading to ozone layer 
damage. Most global environmental issues involve the pollution of extra-territorial regions, 
                                                 
244   Leonard Good, CEO and Chairman of the GEF addressing the GLOBE international Assembly, Milan, 
Italy, December 10 2003.  Further information at 
http://www.gefweb.org/participants/Secretariat/secretariat.html (last accessed on 13.02.2011) 
245 Ward B and  Dubos R. (1972)., Only One Earth, The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet,  Andre 
Deutsch Ltd, p.294-295 
246 Bodansky D. (2010), The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, Harvard University Press, 
pp. 11-13  
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such as the high seas, the atmosphere, outer space and the ozone layer. The second 
category of environmental damage that mainly happens within state boundaries, but can 
have substantial global effects, is, for example, the deforestation of Southern tropical 
forests impact on biodiversity and climate change. The third category of environmental 
damage concerns transboundary resources, such as migratory birds, transnational rivers 
and border lakes247, whereby any act by a state that causes harm beyond its territorial 
boundary implies state responsibility for what happens.248   
 
Bodansky identifies the following three dimensions on how an environmental effect within a 
territory can become a matter of international concern: physical, economic, and 
psychological. 249 Physical spill-over is about the transboundary, or global, environmental 
pollution caused as a result of a leakage, contamination or dumping of harmful substances 
across a state boundary.  Economic spill-over is about a local environmental issue that 
becomes global because of its impact on other states. For example, Bodansky cites the 
threat to the African elephant resulting from the demand for ivory by consumers in East 
Asia, and to the deforestation of tropical forests in Southeast Asia to supply timber for 
export.250  Psychological spill-over explains how people add value to environmental 
concerns that may not specifically have economic or physical spill-overs upon other states. 
Bodansky refers to how the conservation of the panda becomes an international issue 
because it inspires a psychological response, i.e. “people in other countries value the panda 
and desire its continued existence.”251 All three dimensions of transboundary 
                                                 
247 Ibid. 
248 Trail Smelter Case (US, Canada), April 1938 and March 1941. 
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environmental concerns attest to the close interconnection of environmental resources, 
people and policies. 
 
Today, almost every environmental issue at national and local level has some sort of global 
relevancy. These issues do not necessarily have to originate as global concerns, as is 
mentioned in the “Only One Earth” report.  However, almost all environmental issues are 
treated as being of global concern, since they all are interconnected with one unit – the 
earth. Consequently, the most important decisions with regard to the environment are being 
taken mostly by international environmental institutions.252 As Sands states, “the challenge 
for international environmental law in the world of sovereign states is to reconcile the 
fundamental independence of each state with the inherent and fundamental 
interdependence of the environment”.253 The argument here is even if an environmental 
problem attracts global attention it does not necessarily mean that it should lose its local 
perspective. Southern states are disadvantaged with regard to having their local and 
national perspectives taken into account in a global context, hence, there is a risk of 
decision makers failing to grasp the local and national perspective of a certain 
environmental issue once it becomes a global concern. 
 
The challenge, therefore, is to address an environmental problem at a global level after 
having properly recognised it at a local level.  However, sometimes a global focus on an 
environmental concern turns attention away from problems integral to local developmental 
and social issues, an example being the conservation of a forest on which local people are 
                                                 
252 Birnie P.and Boyle A. (2002), International Law and Environment, 2nd edition, Oxford University press, 
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253 Sands P. (1999), Environmental Protection in the Twenty-first Century: Sustainable Development and 
International Law, in The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy edited by Norman J. V. and 
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dependent254, where such protection can sometimes destroy entire livelihoods.255 
Consequently, environmental policy making in many Southern states become subject to 
external influences as a result of their projects receiving global attention.  
 
Duffy cites the “biological corridor projects” to show how a global approach to local 
environmental issues sometimes distracts from local human development interests. In 
biological corridor projects, which aim to prevent the reduction of wildlife and biodiversity 
by human activities in protected areas, powerful global institutions define and frame 
national environmental policies that may restrict forest usage by local populations as well 
as dictating development priorities.256 In many such cases, projects in the South are funded 
by global institutions that have been set up to project conditionalities,257 which are guided 
by international biocentric environmental regulations. Randeria discusses one such 
instance whereby World Bank financed infrastructure and biodiversity projects in India 
resulted in the loss of environment and livelihoods of local populations,258 which 
highlights the dangers of setting project norms based on international environmental 
standards rather than setting national and local environmental norms.259 Often, therefore, 
global environmental policies are defined by the North biocentrically, whereas most 
Southern states favour anthropocentric policies.  
 
Due to their lack of resources and expertise, Southern states often fail to influence national 
environmental decision-making where issues have become global concerns, resulting in the 
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South having to deal with both the positive and the negative outcomes, including the 
consequences of any significant global impact on their decision-making powers regarding 
their own natural resources.   
 
The debate about solutions to environmental problems further demonstrates the different 
priorities of North and South regarding decision-making, which is the North’s biocentricity 
and the South’s anthropocentricity. The discussion has also highlighted another important 
issue – the transboundary environmental problem.  All these issues reflect that, unless 
Southern priorities are given equal, fair and just consideration, global environmental 
governance will not succeed.  
 
In order to narrow the gap between North and South it is imperative to establish the already 
available legal options called ‘general principles of international law’. The following 
section, therefore, will explore the mechanisms that should ensure that the principles of 
equity, fairness and justice are actually applied in global environmental governance.  
 
General Principles of International Law that specify the 
concepts of equity, fairness and justice in terms of the North-
South dimension 
 
As the previous section explains, the international environmental governance system 
should provide proper governing structures to balance both anthropocentric and biocentric 
approaches, since both are required to allow for equitable, fair and just decision-making. 
To this end, international environmental law has developed several general governance 
87 
 
principles, some of which have been incorporated into international instruments, while 
others have been created by customary international law.  
 
This chapter will elaborate on the following three general principles:260 state, the right to 
development and common, but differentiated, responsibilities.  Before analysing each of 
these principles, it is important to pay attention to the various opinions of scholars on their 
applicability, since they express great concern as to whether they are really capable of 
challenging the established international legal framework, which is primarily Northern 
based.261 For instance, Anand argues that the general principles of international law have 
been created to determine equity, fairness and justice fail to fulfil their purpose because in 
global negotiations  “[they] would be guided by principles of power politics with the 
industrialized North manipulating the international legal framework to forward their 
agenda in the name of justice”.262 Robert and Parks, who looked at the climate change 
negotiations from a justice and equality point of view, mentioned three issues, which they 
call ‘triple inequality’ that has led to injustice in climate change negotiations.263 They are 
unequal distribution of impacts, unequal responsibility for climate change and unequal 
costs for mitigation and adaptation   
 
Gupta places Northern countries’ perspective on climate change demands on two levels: 
the lowest is “problems with the organizational setting within which the rules and 
processes are adopted and projects selected,” and the highest is “problems with the 
ideological basis within which the organizations operate and influence the rules, norms, 
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processes and projects”.264 The principles of “equity, justice and fairness”, therefore, are, 
in reality, illusory in the context of North and South.  
 
 The following analysis of the three general principles listed at the beginning of this section 
will give some insight into the next section, which will examine the international 
environmental institutions in terms of how they apply equity, fairness and justice in the 
North-South dimension. 
 
State Sovereignty 
 
Traditionally, international law ensures the right of all states to the political determination 
over their own environments,265 which implies paramountcy of the concept of non-
intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another.  State sovereignty regarding 
natural resources dates back to the 19th century, when absolute territorial sovereignty was 
expressed in an opinion made by Judson Harmon, the Attorney General of the United 
States (The Harmon Doctrine of 1895)266:  
 
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation as 
against all others, within its own territory ... all exceptions, therefore, to the full and 
complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the 
nation itself. They can flow from no other source.
267 
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The emphasis here is placed on the supremacy of the state to take decisions with regard to 
its natural resources within the territorial boundaries where it belongs.268 The decision, 
which had been given on a dispute over the use of the Rio Grande between Mexico and the 
US, was based on whether international law could interfere with the actions of an upstream 
state that unfavourably altered the characteristics of the watercourse in the downstream 
state. According to the Harmon doctrine, no other authority beyond the national boundaries 
can interfere with the state’s decision over its natural resources. Therefore the Mexican 
complaint was dismissed on grounds of the absolute territorial sovereignty concept.269    
 
However, in 1941, the Trail Smelter Arbitration270 reshaped the idea of sole supremacy 
over the use of natural resources within territorial boundaries and developed the notion that 
sovereign states carry a responsibility for use of natural resources. An arbitration panel 
stated that no state could carry out any kind of usage of natural resources within its 
territorial boundary in a way that would cause environmental harm to other states beyond 
the territorial boundaries. Consequently, Canada had to compensate the USA for damages 
caused by a Canadian owned smelter company and Canada had to make an assurance that 
no further damages would be caused to the USA by its further operations. The Trail 
Smelter decision, which placed a responsibility on one state not to harm any other state, 
has become a part of the state sovereignty concept.  Therefore, no country can claim state 
sovereignty to the extent that its actions cause environmental threats to other states.  
Consequently, international law limits the infinite interpretation of the absolute state 
sovereignty concept established by Harmon.   
                                                 
268 United States Vs. Texas, 162 U.S., 16 S. Ct. 725, 40 L.Ed. 867 (1896), McCaffrey S.C. (1996), The 
Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buries, Not Praised, Natural Resources Journal, Volume 36.  
269 Mccaffeey S.C. (1996), The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried not Praised, Natural 
Resources Journal, Volume 36, p. 549 
270Trail Smelter Case (US, Canada), April 1938 and March 1941. 
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However, this does not imply that the right of a state to utilize its natural resources within 
its territorial boundaries is completely restricted.   Any state is entitled to take decisions 
about its natural resources as long as they do not put other states in danger. The Stockholm 
Declaration, which was the first global environmental declaration, identified the state as 
the key actor regarding environmental concerns. Principle 21 states:  
 
Local and national governments will bear the greatest burden for large-scale environmental 
policy and action within their jurisdictions …271  
 
It states further that: 
 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
272 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration was incorporated into Principle 2 of the 1992 
Rio Declaration, which says that states have the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources according to their own environmental and developmental policies.  It further says 
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 Chapter 7 of the Proclaims of the  Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, 
The document can be found: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 (last accessed on 
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that they also have a responsibility to ensure that no harm is caused to the environment of 
other states, or areas beyond their natural jurisdiction.273  
The South emphasises the state sovereignty principle regarding its natural resources in the 
event of a clash between national interests and international environmental policies.274 In 
many instances, international environmental standards that have been established with a 
biocentric focus often clash with the anthropocentric focus of the South. The international 
criteria limit a state’s ability to exercise absolute sovereign authority over its natural 
resources. The “permanent sovereignty and non-intervention over natural resources” 
principle was accepted in two UN declarations in 1965. The Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of 
Their Independence and Sovereignty275, and The Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With 
the Charter of the United Nations.276 Both Declarations emphasise equality among states 
based on state sovereignty, and that one state cannot exploit another state’s natural 
resources within its own territorial boundaries.277  Therefore the state sovereignty principle 
has been used mainly by Southern states to claim their sovereign rights with regard to the 
environment. 
In 1992 at UNCED the state sovereignty concept was used to express the Southern stand at 
global negotiations.  During the debate on whether the global forest convention should be a 
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http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 (last accessed on 
29.11.2010) 
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legally binding, or a non-legally binding document, the G77, in stressing the state 
sovereignty concept over the forests, expressed its strict opposition to a legally binding 
forest convention on the ground that it would threaten national sovereignty over their 
natural resources.278  The South wants to prevent any legal jurisdiction that would establish 
an authority beyond their states’ own territorial jurisdiction to determine national policies 
on forests.279 The sovereignty principle, therefore, was used by the South to establish 
equity and fairness during the forest debate.  Consequently, the South’s claim over natural 
resources is inextricably linked to its right to development, which will be analysed next.   
 
The right to development 
Another general principle of international law that determines equity, justice and fairness 
in the context of North-South dimension in global environmental governance is the right to 
development.  During the post-colonial era the main theme of the South’s demand was the 
rebuilding of their nations through economic development.  Because Southern states 
recognize environmental protection as a factor that impedes economic development, the 
top priority for Southern states, which they have voiced in many environmentally related 
instances, is the right to develop. Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development, 
                                                 
278 Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and 
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adopted by the General Assembly in December 1986280, therefore, recognized it as an 
inalienable human right.281 Also, Article 5 declared that states should take the necessary 
steps to eliminate all sorts of discrimination including “[…] colonialism, foreign 
domination and occupation, aggression, foreign interference and threats against national 
sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity […]”282 
The right to development was again highlighted in the 1992 Rio Declaration in Principle 2, 
by which states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental and developmental policies.  Furthermore, Article 5 of the 
Johannesburg Declaration in 2002 emphasise the importance of collective effort in 
achieving three pillars of sustainable development – economic development, social 
development and environmental protection.283 Anand states that: “The right to 
development is a manifestation of the desire of developing countries to achieve a more 
equitable international economic order through economic independence”.284   
The “right to development” debate clearly reflects North-South dimensions285, since they 
both recognise it as a right, based on what definition of “development” each adheres to.  
For the South “[the] right to development means [the] right to expand their economies 
rapidly, irrespective of environmental and social cost.”286  For the North, though, it is not 
merely a right, it is considered only as a “goal” or a “claim”.287 
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However, this right clearly gives wider impetus for the South in claiming environmental 
benefits for its states’ economic development. 
Common but differentiated responsibilities 
 
This principle explains that environmental issues and consequences are common to every 
state in the world; however, the responsibility for creating environmental problems is 
viewed differently. For instance, the responsibility for taking the necessary steps to 
overcome and prevent further damage to the environment is different on the basis of each 
state’s contribution to past and present pollution. The Brundtland Report of 1987 
acknowledged the importance of intra-generational equity, which incorporates the 
common, but differentiated, responsibilities principle288: “Even the narrow notion of 
physical sustainability implies a concern for social equity between generations, a concern 
that must logically be extended to equity within each generation.”289  
 
The “common but differentiated responsibilities principle” entails two important aspects of 
environmental governance. Firstly, the North should take the lead in implementing 
international environmental standards and policies for the reason that they are the main 
contributors of the global environmental crisis.290 The basis for this principle is that many 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) incorporate provisions to assign more 
commitments to the North in terms of implementation of certain environmental policies. 
The second paragraph of the Preamble of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) acknowledges the differentiated responsibility of the North 
                                                 
288 Hey E. (2003) , “Sustainable Development, Normative Development and the Legitimacy of Decision – 
Making,”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 3-54,  at p.9 
289 Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.43 
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and the South in creating global climate change issues.291 As paragraph 2 of UNFCCC 
states: 
 
 “[…] the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases 
has originated in developed countries […] per capita emissions in developing 
countries are still relatively low […]”292  
 
It is clear that the countries least responsible for the climate change problem have the least 
capacity to face the problem.293 Also, Northern countries are in a better position to facing 
up to the climate change problem than are poorer Southern countries, which means that the 
positions of each party are clearly different.294 Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the Montreal Protocol) provided another 
instance that acknowledges common, but differentiated, responsibilities, when it assigned 
different responsibilities to the North and to the South regarding the time periods allowed 
for them to reduce the emission of certain gases.295  
 
The second important aspect of this principle of environmental governance is the 
obligation to take necessary steps to provide new and additional financial and technical 
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resources to the South in order for its states to realise their development goals without 
causing further damage to the environment.296 Many MEAs have adopted provisions 
regarding the North’s commitment to transfer additional resources to the South to ensure it 
has the necessity support to maintain environmentally friendly development.297 
 
As the previous sections shows, the general principles of international law are applied to 
environmental instruments to ensure that the South receives equity, fairness and justice in 
the implementation of environmental standards in their territories. International 
environmental conventions and their provisions also specify the South’s need for 
additional support from the North. In spite of these legal safeguards, however, the North-
South disparity and the application of equity, fairness and justice have not yet been fully 
addressed in terms of Southern states’ participation in the decision-making process. This 
chapter, therefore, argues that the continuing differentiation between North and South 
poses many concerns for global environmental decision-makers.  
 
This thesis suggests that the main reason for Southern environmental concerns not being 
heard is that they have not been effectively represented at the global level because of an 
imbalance in participation, insufficient representation in decision-making process and 
procedures, the ineffective implementation of global environmental standards, and the lack 
of local scientific knowledge and research.298 It seems clear that what is required is more 
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297 Article 10 A of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer provides an obligation 
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equitable governance procedures and a better distribution of resources, which could be 
achieved by educating local scientists and creating research centres. Such innovations 
could be a progressive way to broaden Southern participation in the development of an 
equitable global environmental agenda.299 
 
Maria Ivonova identifies three closely connected core concerns that are either the causes or 
the consequences of the same environmental problem: the ecological effects of 
industrialization, the ecological effects of poverty and the political tension between 
developed and developing countries.300 The ecological effects of industrialisation were 
mainly experienced in the North where rapid development took place during the industrial 
revolution.  The ecological effects of poverty are mainly seen in the South, hence many 
Southern leaders claim that “poverty is the cause of all environmental pollution” – a slogan 
heard from time to time at global negotiations.  The political tension between North and 
South is of prime concern to the global environmental decision-makers; it is also the 
underlying theme of this thesis. Therefore, it is important to establish at what levels the 
environmental governance system has failed to recognize, and address, the key factors that 
have resulted in the North-South polarization of environmental policy making.   
 
This chapter continues with an analysis of the contradictions that have confounded 
environmental governance; it will also describe actual practice based on the provisions 
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made in UN environmental instruments. In the following section, therefore, two key 
international environmental institutions will be examined.   
  
The Institutional Approach  
 
This section will contain an analysis of the operations of the environmental institutions in 
the context of the North-South divide by exploring how the governing mechanisms deal 
with the complexities described in earlier sections. The analysis will be based on two of the 
most important institutions responsible for managing global environmental issue – the 
UNEP and GEF, which, operating under the UN and the World Bank respectively, play 
important roles in the interaction between North and South301.  
 
UNEP is generally regarded as a forum that leans towards the South, since, as Najam 
points out, its headquarters are situated in Nairobi, Kenya, which gives it legitimacy from a 
Southern perspective.302 However, the positioning of GEF within the mandate of the World 
Bank means that it focuses more on efficiency than legitimacy.303 Because of the weighted 
voting system304 the North has more control over the global financial institutions, 
consequently, the GEF’s mandate is mostly directed towards Northern priorities. However, 
as Andersen and Hey point out, since 1994 following its restructuring, a double majority 
voting system was introduced into the GEF council, thereby increasing Southern 
representation and resulting in more balanced participation for both developed and 
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developing countries.305  The study of UNEP and GEF in terms of global environmental 
governance certainly sheds light on the ramifications of the North-South dimension. The 
following sections, therefore, will present a critical assessment of the composition and 
decision making processes of UNEP and GEF as well as on their governance structures. 
 
UNEP and Its Role in Global Environmental Governance 
The emergence of a new environmental organization 
 
In the aftermath of UNCHE in 1972, several suggestions have been put forward regarding 
new environmental governing architecture due to increased concerns about the 
environmental risks to both human life and the natural world.  Some of these suggestions 
had already been operating under several UN specialised agencies, such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and the Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO)306 who, between them, had organized the ‘UN Scientific 
Conference on the conservation and Utilization of Resources (UNSCCUR)’, the first major 
international conference on the environment, held in the US in 1949.307  However, the 
array of different mandates and agendas on environmental issues has taken place within 
many different organizations, whose actions often resulted in overlapping or duplicated 
decisions, which ultimately created inefficient governance.308  
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In 1971, after the US National Academy of Sciences had recognized the necessity for 
establishing a system of governance that had much more of an environmental focus, the 
Committee for International Environmental Programmes was convened, which 
recommended: 
 
 “[A] new approach that goes beyond mere correction or adaptation of existing 
structures. It involves the creation of new, interrelated institutions designed to assure 
support from those societal resources – political, scientific, financial – whose 
cooperation is essential for effective management of global environmental 
problems.”
309  
 
Developing further the idea of a global environmental institution, the states at the 
UNCHE conference recognized an urgent need for an international environmental 
institution by emphasising that the implementation of such an institution should be 
within the framework of the UN.310   
 
The UNGA resolution adopted at the UNCHE conference stressed “an urgent need for 
intensified action, at national and international level to limit, and where possible, to 
eliminate the impairment of the human environment.”311 The UNCHE conference further 
affirmed that, even though the states would implement environmental protection policies 
and standards at the local and national levels, many of the responsibilities rely on 
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international cooperation since most of the environmental problems were global.  In 
addition opinions expressed at the conference were very much along the lines that 
environmental problems in developing countries are caused by under-development, while 
those in developed countries are caused mainly as a result of excessive industrialisation 
and developmental processes.  
 
Following the UNCHE Conference, a General Assembly Resolution was adopted 
establishing UNEP312, which ever since has acted as the hub for UN global environmental 
negotiations.313 Indeed, former Secretary-General Kofi Anan recognized UNEP as the 
“environment conscience of the United Nations”.314 However, some authors believe that 
the establishment of UNEP was designed to bypass the idea that the global environmental 
institution needs to be mandated by the industrially developed nations.315 Those who 
supported an environmental institution mandated by industrial countries mentioned that 
they have the capacity to ensure the effective functioning of environmental institution.316 
As Andersen and Hey point out, there are two main themes in the implementation and 
development of international environmental policy and law: (a) legitimacy, and (b) 
effectiveness. Legitimacy deals with the level of accountability of the decision-making 
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process and procedures, which are subject to the rule of law.317  Effectiveness deals mainly 
with the ability of the institution to solve the relevant problems.318  Those who argued for 
effectiveness stressed the need for additional powers to be accorded to the North in the 
decision-making process, due to its superior resources, technology and expertise and that it 
was its responsibility to establish a stable mechanism. Therefore, the South looked forward 
to a mandated UN institution, because it already wielded a significant amount of influence 
over it, hence it welcomed the Nairobi Declaration on the Role and Mandate of UNEP 
(1997), which stated that, as the principle UN environment body, it will play the leading 
role in the authority that sets the global agenda. The Nairobi Conference (1998) stated: 
 
It is they [the North] whose economies produce, in the main, the problem of pollution. It is 
they, again, who have the means to correct it. It is they, finally, who have the scientific and 
other resources to analyse the problem and to identify the most promising lines of solution. 
The devastation of the environment is primarily, though not exclusively, a function of 
advanced industrial and urban society. The correction of it is primarily a problem for the 
advanced nations.
319   
 
As it was mentioned in Chapter 1, the South understands the strength of the UN General 
Assembly with respect to the number of votes it controls, consequently it very much 
appreciated the implementation of UNEP, whose role in coordinating global environmental 
negotiations is regarded as today’s leading authority.320    
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The Governing Structure of UNEP 
 
UNEP, which consists of a Governing Council – its main organ – an Environment 
Secretariat and an Environment Fund, comprises of representatives from fifty-eight states.  
There are 58 seats on the Governing Council and members are elected by the UNGA for a 
period of three years321 on a geographical basis as follows322: Africa – 16, Asia – 13, Latin 
America – 10, Eastern Europe – 6, and Western Europe, North America and Other States – 
13. It is obvious, therefore, that developing countries enjoy a broader mandate in the 
Governing Council than developed countries.  Nevertheless, as Agarwal et al argue, an 
everlasting South-North debate continues to run323 in that Southern stress the importance of 
issues relating to sustainable development, while their Northern counterparts believe that 
environmental protection deserves a higher priority.324  
 
The different positions of the North and the South within the General Council, whose 
powers and functions are very broad, could strongly influence UNEP’s direction, since it 
reviews and approves the annual budget, directs funding, provides general policy guidance 
for the promotion and coordination of environmental programmes.325 It also has multiple 
responsibilities in international environmental negotiations, such as reviewing the world 
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environmental situation to ensure that environmental problems receive adequate attention, 
reviewing the effects of national and international environmental policies on developing 
countries, and promoting and supporting the acquisition and exchange of environmental 
knowledge and information.326   
 
UNEP in the context of the North - South Dimension  
 
Ever since the establishment of UNEP the developing countries have used it as a source of 
authority to voice their interests against the political power of the developed nations, who 
had been able to exhibit their ‘numerical strength’ and ‘the consolidation of their political 
interests’ at the first session of the Governing Council.327  The Report on the First Session 
of the UNEP Governing Council in June, 1973, pointed out the differences in the 
environmental concerns of North and South328 when it was emphasised that the 
“environmental problems of developing countries were often not the side-effects of 
excessive industrialization, but the direct consequence of underdevelopment.”329 They 
further recognised development as being one of the primary means for improving the 
environment and they reiterated that the North was responsible for causing the global 
environmental catastrophe.  
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Consequently, at the first session of the Governing Council, it was emphasised that “since 
the developing countries were not primarily responsible for the pollution of the world 
environment, the burden of the needed protective measures should not fall upon them”.330 
The importance of ensuring a balance between economic growth and environmental 
protection was also stressed and that it should be achieved by a combination of high 
economic growth and low environmental risk. Throughout that first UNEP session the 
developing countries of the South were not just criticising the North’s environmental 
policies, they were advocating a more constructive balance for international environmental 
decision-making that would take Southern concerns into consideration.  
 
Decisions made by the Governing Council at its first sessions favoured many issues put 
forward by the South, such as in education, training, assistance and information.331 Also, as 
was emphasised in Chapter One, matters relating to environmental research, awareness and 
support, the training of experts and the upgrading and development of effective 
mechanisms in collecting, dissemination and analysing information, that had been of great 
concern to those involved in the earlier discussions about the North-South dimension were 
promoted in favour of the South.332    
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As has been mentioned earlier, the location of UNEP headquarters in Nairobi is 
strategically important in many ways for resolving the North-South issue333, since it is the 
first – and only – UN headquarters to locate in a developing country, consequently it 
symbolises the solidarity of the southern states.334 Andersen and Hey point out “[…] the 
fact that UNEP’s headquarters were located in Nairobi strongly contributed [to] it being 
perceived as a more legitimate institution on the part of the developing states.”
335 Also, Najam 
notes: 
 
In retrospect it has been argued that the decision to house UNEP in Kenya has not only 
allowed developing countries to exert influence on this organization but, in fact, it has also 
helped move developing countries from their contestation towards greater participation in the 
global environmental agenda.
336  
 
The second major effect of the headquarters being located in a developing country is that it 
helps to enhance the participation of other developing countries. From a practical point of 
view, affordability of participation for environmental negotiations in many industrial 
capitals incurs extra burdens on many Southern states.  UNEP in Kenya, therefore, offers 
advantages to countries that can now afford to send delegates to international 
environmental negotiations.337   
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The third effect is that it offers a chance to influence the governance mechanisms with 
issues that are significant to the South.  It offers better connection for the local issues with 
the decision making authorities.  Miller explains that UNEP has been a forum for Third 
World countries to develop mutual understanding of each other’s environmental 
problems.338 
   
However, location of the UNEP headquarters has not always been recognized as an 
effective place to carry out the functions for which it was established339 in that, as Caldwell 
observes, it loses out on some opportunities as a result of its isolation from the other major  
international institutions, most of which are located either in the US or Europe: 340 
 
The location of the secretariat in Nairobi has complicated both UNEP’s coordination with 
other UN bodies and its contact with governments, the scientific community, the 
environment movement, and the information media.  More important, the Third World’s 
tactical victory on priorities for UNEP threatened to jeopardize financial and political support 
from the developed countries […]
341 
 
From a practical point of view, Miller observes that this isolation has made it difficult to 
recruit qualified staff.342 Mee, however, points out that locating its headquarters in Nairobi 
has been a step forward for the South, although she expresses her concern over travel and 
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communication costs for some countries to send delegates to Kenya for annual Council 
meetings.343  Her argument on high travelling cost is the same put forward about attending 
environmental negotiations in such places as Geneva, Vienna, Montreal, Helsinki, 
Copenhagen and Washington, therefore this cannot be considered to be an issue associated 
with its location in Nairobi344; it is more a general concern that many Southern states face 
in attending international negotiations. 
 
On a positive note, according to Article 47 of the UNGA Resolution, each member of the 
UNEP Governing Council has one vote345, a situation that is accepted by the South since it 
acknowledges the equality of participants and it also gives the South a majority.  The 
South’s numerical strength, therefore, is significant when the Executive Director is 
appointed, because the UNEP executive director, who is also the head of the Environment 
Secretariat, is elected by the UNGA.346  This strengthens the South‘s voice when UNEP’s 
governance agenda is being formatted, thereby contributing further to the North-South 
debate on environmental concerns.   
 
As has been mentioned earlier in this Chapter, since its first session in 1973, UNEP has 
been providing additional resources for the South in promoting environmental research, 
expertise and technology, nevertheless, Southern states are still struggling to voice their 
concerns and achieve equity, fairness and justice. The role of UNEP, therefore, in making 
the space for equitable grounds for Southern participation is yet to be improved and there 
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World Environmental Organisation Benefit the South? International Environmental Agreements:  Politics, 
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have been many criticisms levelled at the failure of its own mandate and governance.  For 
instance, Elliot states that UNEP has not been able to overcome a general lack of political 
and financial support.347 
 
Thus UNEP has been criticised for its ineffectiveness as a focal institution in global 
environmental governance.348 These criticisms fall into the following three major 
categories349: location, mandate and resources. Location has been discussed above.350 Its 
mandate, which is not broad enough to address the threats to the global environment351, 
provides it with less authority than that enjoyed by other UN specialised agencies352, 
therefore it is prevented from adopting treaties or regulations independently.353 In her 
analysis of the failure of UNEP to coordinate the world’s environmental policies, Ivanova 
explains that “[it] has not been able to establish the autonomy necessary to become a 
strong anchor institution for the global environment.”354 Also, some critics argue that it has 
not succeeded in its area of concern – the environment – in the same way that stable 
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institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, have done in the areas of economics and trade.355 Consequently, there has 
been a number of proposals for a more efficient environmental organization that would 
ensure a “sizable mandate, significant resources and [a] sufficient [degree of] 
autonomy.”356 
 
Originally it had two main sources of financial resources: the UN regular budget 
allocation; and unrestricted voluntary contributions to the Environment Fund.357 However, 
contributions have been delayed or even absent on many occasions, consequently its 
funding has been a constant problem.358 Being less interested in the institution than 
developing countries, developed countries have never been inclined to maintain a 
progressive budget, consequently, it has always suffered from one that is “modest and 
declining”.359 Thus, addressing its financial crisis has become an urgent task for member 
states.360 Mee identifies three reasons for the failure in building up the Environment 
Fund:361 internal delays of complicated treasury procedures of some countries; the absence 
of political momentum to keep all the states regularly committed on their contributions; 
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and protests regarding its management and functioning.362  Najam, in recognizing the lack 
of resource and budgetary supplements as the main reason for its inefficiencies in 
implementing and maintaining its agenda,363 states: “[T]here is no need to change [its] 
mandate.  There is, however, an urgent need to provide it with the resources, staff, and 
authority it needs to fulfil its mandate”.364 
 
Consequent to the above, however, upgrading UNEP by increasing its autonomy and 
resources has been cited as an argument against the creation of a world environment 
organization.365 The debate over whether or not a new global environmental institution is 
justified is important regarding what justice would be done in terms of the North-South 
dimension, since it is questionable whether a new institution would be granted a wide 
enough mandate to meet Southern environmental concerns. However, several scholars 
have suggested the creation of a world environment organization.366 From a Southern 
perspective, such a creation would provide a single central location, which would restrict 
the number of negotiations taking place in different locations, thereby reducing travel and 
expertise costs for many Southern countries.367 Currently, different conventions require 
national environment reports in different formats, which are difficult and costly for the 
countries of the South to produce, whereas, under a world environment organization, these 
would be regulated by way of a unitary reporting system. A further advantage, Biermann 
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suggests, would be that a world environment organization would facilitate the 
establishment of “environmental embassies” to help the South in terms of expertise and 
technical support, which would also strengthen its voice at decision-making forums.368   
 
Those who argue for a world environmental organization believe it would have a broader 
mandate to enable it to regulate financial resources and coordination between South and 
North.  In emphasizing the importance of a world environmental organization to bridge 
North-South dimension in environmental governance, Biermann stresses:  
 
A world environmental organization would not solve all problems neither [for] industrialized 
countries nor for developing countries.  But it would be an important institutional step in 
humankind’s efforts to both equitably and effectively managing planet Earth.
369 
 
Najam, however, disagrees; he supports upgrading UNEP by it being provided with 
sufficient resources to operate its mandate effectively: 
 
If coordination is the real deadlock to better environmental performance, then why should 
one believe that a new organization could achieve it better than UNEP? […] Why should one 
assume that rich nations that have been so stingy in meeting their global fiscal 
responsibilities in the past – in environmental as well as other areas – will suddenly turn 
generous for a new organization?370 
 
UNEP’s role in global environmental governance is significant in relation to the North-
South dimension.  The South has used UNEP as a forum to address its own environmental 
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concerns by using its strength as the majority participant; however, there are many issues 
still to be resolved with regard to the financial strength of the institution that ultimately 
affect Southern environmental issues.  In contrast, a global environment facility would 
exercise relatively higher financial powers, which would be specified by the World Bank.  
 
GEF in the Context of the North-South Dimension 
The call for a Global Environment Fund 
In 1972, the Stockholm Declaration had expressed the need for a global financial 
mechanism in order to assist developing countries in their effort to incorporate 
international environmental standards in their development planning.371 Principle 24 of the 
Stockholm Declaration refers to the importance of the cooperation of all states regardless 
of their political capacity372:  
International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should 
be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big and small, on an equal footing.  
Cooperation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is 
essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects 
resulting from activities conducted in all spheres; in such a way that due account is taken of 
the sovereignty and interests of all States.
373  
Principle 24 further expressed the need for cooperation between countries from North and 
South in order to face the world’s environmental challenges.  The language of the Principle 
was carefully chosen in order to take into account Southern concerns and to attract those 
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countries of the region that were less interested in the conference by assuring them that 
their sovereignty over the natural resources would not be violated. The post-Stockholm era 
saw the development of international environmental law and policy alongside a growing 
number of initiatives that created a need for a global environmental fund, which became a 
key issue, even at other international conferences.  For example, in 1989, at the summit of 
the non-aligned countries, the Prime Minister of India proposed a UN Planet Protection 
Fund374 and the World Resources Institute proposed a global environmental fund that 
would provide assistance to projects in the poorest countries.375  
 
Then, in 1987, the Brundtland Report called for the establishment of a global fund 
dedicated to environmental projects to assist the developing countries to maintain the 
environmental standards in the development process, primarily in order to prevent the 
same environmental damage that had been caused by developed states during their 
development.376  The report also recommended the establishment of an international fund 
under the aegis of the UN and multilateral development banks.377  
 
The North-South Dimension in the Pilot Phase of GEF 
 
Following the Brundtland Report, at the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the 
World Bank in 1989, the French Prime Minister emphasised the need for establishing a 
global environmental fund, simultaneously pledging his commitment to its success by 
contributing 900 million French Francs.  The Board of Governors approved this proposal 
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and in 1991 adopted Resolution 91-5, which established the GEF.378 The initial plan was to 
implement a pilot phase for a period of three years to help developing states protect the 
international environment and to promote sustainable development. According to Jacob 
Werksman, two considerations were attached to the pilot phase: to bring together donor 
and recipients interests in funding environmental projects; and to bring together 
international institutions – the World Bank, UNEP, UNDP – which reached an agreement 
regarding their respective responsibilities379. These were the World Bank as trustee and 
administrator, UNEP as the scientific and technical advice provider, and UNDP which 
would assist with technical issues. The Science and Technological Advisory Panel (STAP) 
was also established as an advisory body.380 However, in spite of the involvement of the 
other agencies, the World Bank was the dominant force throughout the implementation 
process. 
 
Resolution 91-5 required the World Bank to administer the GEF within its own legal 
framework, therefore, since the GEF had no international legal personality, the Bank’s 
dominant role became even more apparent381, which meant that legally binding decisions 
required the approval of the Bank’s directors.  The participant states, therefore, had very 
little discretion over its important decisions.  As Werksman explains, the meetings were 
chaired by the head of the Bank’s environmental department, and reports were issued, on 
an emergency basis, by consensus of the status involved.382 At a decision-making level, 
neither participant states nor any other implementing agencies possessed formal powers. In 
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effect, therefore, it was the donor countries – i.e. the developed countries – who exercised 
control, since they held majority voting powers in the World Bank.383  
 
Four focal areas operated under the fund during the three years pilot phase of GEF: climate 
change; biodiversity; international waters; and ozone depletion.  In this period, 115 
projects in 63 countries were approved at an estimated value of 730 million US$.384 Of 
these, more than three-quarters of the funds were dedicated to projects with objectives to 
reduce the effects of green-house gas and to promote biodiversity.385 An analysis of the 
process of the pilot phase reveals the powerful role played by the northern donor countries 
who prioritised projects according to their perceived urgency, often leaving the question as 
to whether they were really country-oriented386, which meant that some projects in the 
South were not what the recipient state needed to implement. The GEF’s funding 
decisions, therefore, were largely influenced by Northern environmental priorities without 
taking into account those of the state concerned. This analysis raises the question as to 
what extent was the decision-making equitable, fair and just – principles that had been 
considered central to GEF’s governance. Thus the North-South dimension played an 
immense role throughout the pilot phase   
 
The GEF pilot phase operated under the Bretton Woods system implemented by the World 
Bank, by which the number of votes allotted to members equates to its financial 
contribution to the institution, resulting in the countries with the greatest financial 
resources holding the most votes, consequently, the US was granted the greatest share of 
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votes amounting to 16% of the total contributions to the World Bank.387  Thus, many 
issues were decided in favour of the North, while the South were denied any meaningful 
political and financial influence. 
 
During the last year of the pilot phase, and twenty years after UNCHE in 1972, the world 
was preparing for the Earth Summit – the international environmental conference. 
Following UNCED (1992), various multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), which 
contained general principles and institutional structures aimed at achieving sustainable 
development, provided the foundation for the solution of particular environmental 
problems.388 Each MEA had established a financial mechanism to assist developing 
countries to fulfil their obligations389, and it had been two of these – the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change390 and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Biological Diversity391, which had been adopted at the 1992 Rio 
Conference, had demonstrated the need for a global environmental fund.   
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The developed countries, therefore, had proposed to accept the GEF as the financial 
mechanism for these two conventions, whereas the developing countries expressed their 
concerns. Consequently, the institutional structure and decision-making basis of the GEF 
had not taken the South-North dimension within MEAs into consideration. This resulted in 
the developing countries rejecting the developed states’ proposal to accept the GEF as the 
main financial mechanism for both Conventions.392 The Southern countries, however, were 
more concerned about poverty alleviation and economic development.  In the meantime, 
discussions were taking place about the restructuring of the GEF.  
 
North-South Issues in the GEF Restructuring Process  
 
Southern countries, which had begun to query the existing agendas of international 
environmental politics, participated very actively in the restructuring process, representing 
their concerns more vociferously than they had during the pilot phase. In spite of this, 
influencing the restructuring process proved to be a difficult task.  The South came up with 
the suggestion of establishing a new green fund393, with G77 advocating a separate fund, to 
operate under the auspices of the UN, which would operate free from Northern dominance. 
The developed countries, however, continued to emphasise the importance of a 
restructured GEF to implement projects under the MEAs as an alternative to a new one394 
in which they, the donors, would have limited involvement. In May 1991, at a participants’ 
meeting, the chairman of GEF, Mr. Wilfred Thalwitz, responding to the concerns about its 
future structure, gave an assurance that “the governance was a matter of fine tuning”; he 
                                                 
392 Chazournes L. B. (1999), The Global Environmental Facility Galaxy: On Linkages among Institutions, 
Max Plank Year Book of United Nations Law, Volume 3, pp.243-285  at p. 250 
393 Charounes L. B. (2003), The Global Environmental facility as a Pioneer Institution, Working paper 19, 
GEF, p. 8,  
394 Chazournes L. B. (1999), The Global Environmental Facility Galaxy: On Linkages among Institutions, 
Max Plank Year Book of United Nations Law, Volume 3, pp.243-285 
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further stated that change was unavoidable and he predicted that it would be needed before 
the end of the pilot phase. 395  
 
At the end of a long struggle, developing countries had to accept the proposal to restructure 
the GEF, although they did try to make it more balanced. As has been explained 
previously, at the time the pilot phase was created they had no opportunity to participate 
actively, however, one of their proposals in an attempt to make their national priorities 
eligible, they made a proposal to expand the funding possibilities beyond the four focal 
areas.396  However, the GEF was focusing more on the four focal areas with an emphasis on 
promoting bio-diversity and climate change. Sjoberd quotes the GEF chairman (1991-
2002), Mohammad El Ashry, on this aspect397: 
 
The GEF could function as the unitary funding mechanism for global environmental 
conventions that are currently being negotiated.  In that regard it is the desire of the 
participants to signal to the climate and biodiversity negotiations that, in its new form, the 
GEF will be ready to serve as the financing mechanism for the global conventions if the 
negotiators so desire.
398 
 
After two years of long negotiations the developing countries finally accepted the 
restructured GEF as the main financial mechanism for biodiversity and climate changing 
conventions. A number of writers saw the negotiations between North and South regarding 
the restructure as complex. Werksman says: 
 
                                                 
395 Sjoberg H. (1999), Restructuring Global Environmental facility, Working Paper13, GEF, p.15. 
396 Climate Change problem was the central focus of many developed countries and it had the highest amount 
of GEF funds during the pilot phase. http://www.gefweb.org (last accessed on 07.10.2010) 
397 Sjoberg H. (1999), Restructuring Global Environmental facility, Working Paper13, GEF, P.18. 
398 Article 4 of the GEF instrument states the fund programmes and projects shall be country driven and 
based on national priorities. 
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As a result of a difficult and curious compromise, the developing countries’ delegations to 
both the biodiversity and climate change negotiation accepted the GEF as the financing entity 
for their Conventions.
399 
 
 And Boisson stated,  
 
Developing countries accepted the GEF as the financing entity for the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity but only on an 
interim basis and on condition that it is restructured in accordance with criteria contained in 
both conventions.
400 
 
Both these statements demonstrate the developing countries’ lack of enthusiasm to accept 
the GEF as the financial mechanism for the Conventions and the close relationship 
between the World Bank and the North caused the South to lose faith. It is important, 
therefore, to examine the different organs of the restructured GEF to see what 
developments have been made in respect of the legitimacy of its decision-making. 
 
The Organisational Structure of the Restructured GEF 
 
Instead of concluding an interstate treaty, the parties had successfully completed the 
negotiations and supported the adoption of the instrument.401 In March 1994, therefore, at a 
meeting in Geneva, 73 states agreed to the adoption of the restructured GEF. This had been 
done quite differently from the traditional pattern of establishing international institutions, 
                                                 
399 Werksman J. (1995), Consolidating Governance of the Global Commons: Insights from the Global 
Environmental Facility, Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Volume 6, p.p.27-63, p.52. 
400 Charounes L. B. (2003), The Global Environmental facility as a Pioneer Institution, Working paper 19, 
GEF, p.9. 
401 ILM 33(1994), 1283. 
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which means that the GEF, in its current form, was established on a special legal basis. 
After its adoption the three implementing agencies, the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP, 
adopted separate instruments, either as a resolution or as a decision, according to their 
institutional rules and regulations.402 This approach of joint action of the World Bank and 
the UN was different from the pilot phase of GEF where the Bank had played the dominant 
role.403 
 
After being criticised for the lack of legitimacy of its operation at the pilot phase, the 
carefully worded preamble of the GEF instrument shows more concern about justice, 
fairness and equality in its functions, thus: “to ensure governance that is transparent and 
democratic in nature, to promote universality in its participation”.404 To judge whether 
these concepts are promoted in the actual functioning of the GEF, this discussion will now 
focus on two main areas – equality of voting, and fairness and equality in processes and 
procedures.  
 
Part III of the GEF Instrument provides for its Governance and Structure, together with a 
Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel, established under Para 24. The GEF provides 
funds to meet incremental cost405 required by projects relating to the focal areas.406  It is 
worth looking into these entities in order to understand how decision-making takes place in 
                                                 
402 Charounes L. B. (2003), The Global Environmental facility as a Pioneer Institution, Working paper 19, 
GEF, p.10. 
403   Pilot Phase GEF was based on the World Bank resolution 91-5 of 1991 
404 http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/publication/GEF_Instrument_March08.pdf (last accessed 
on 24.11.2010) 
405 Incremental cost is the cost that a country makes in order to implement international environmental 
standards in addition to national environmental policies.  In order to access to GEF funds the receiving 
country should make a project proposal.  In that proposal a calculation of the incremental cost should be 
included.  “…The brief must provide a budget for the life of the proposed project. It must also address the 
issue of Incremental Costs - at least in terms of methodology, approach to the calculations, and the best 
preliminary calculations available…” More information is on http://www.gefweb.org. (last accessed on 
24.09.2010) 
406 Article 2 of the GEF Instrument. 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/publication/GEF_Instrument_March08.pdf (last accessed on 
24.11.2010) 
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the GEF in such a way that will ultimately deliver the principles of equity, fairness and 
justice in relation to the North-South dimension. 
 
Functionally, the GEF Assembly resembles UNGA.  It comprises all its member states, 
which, at the second Assembly meeting held in Beijing in 2002, totalled 173 (today, there 
are 182 members).407  Each participant appoints one representative and one alternative, to 
the Assembly, which meets every four years with the first meeting taking place in New 
Delhi in 1998.  Under Para 14 of the GEF instrument the Assembly reviews the policies 
and functions of the GEF, and, under paragraph 34, any amendment to the Instrument 
should be approved by the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council. However, 
such a decision becomes effective only after adoption by the implementing agencies and 
the trustee.408  This provision demonstrates that the Assembly has a limited mandate over 
important modifications to the GEF governance, which means that the World Bank and the 
implementing agencies are vested with considerable authority on matters of GEF 
governance. Also, of the three implementing agencies, the World Bank has additional 
powers to UNEP and UNDP since it is also the Trustee.  This dominance further affects the 
North-South dimension because of the minimum influence the South has in World Bank 
decision-making, this chapter argues that this disparity greatly affects the equality of 
participation between North and South.  
 
Recognizing the different environmental priorities of North and South has been a problem 
with regard to equality of participating states. The pilot phase of the GEF was widely 
criticised for its North-favoured approach in those project based on Northern priorities, 
                                                 
407 http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef (last accessed on 24.11.2010) 
408 Instrument for the Restructured Global Environmental Facility, 2008.  The Instrument can be accessed on 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/publication/GEF_Instrument_March08.pdf . (Last accessed 
on 26.10.2010) 
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such as climate change and biodiversity, and for the very little attention that was paid to 
the considerations and recommendations of the receiving Southern states.  
 
At the first Assembly of the restructured GEF, one of its main goals was to ensure that all 
the projects were based on national priorities of the state where the project would be 
implemented.409At its second meeting in 2002 the same commitments were agreed upon by 
the Assembly for the next four years.  Two new focal areas were introduced to the GEF 
agenda i.e. Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP) and combat of desertification and land 
degradation.410 The participants pledged to assist in the implementation of the 
commitments assured by the 2002 World Summit in Johannesburg (the United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development).  The GEF made a commitment to help 
developing states to integrate sustainable development into their development plans and 
greater opportunities for local community  NGO involvement were discussed411 as was 
‘country driven’ project implementation, which was a central focus of the plans.412  These 
initiatives of GEF showed considerable bias towards Southern desires for environmental 
governance. This greater recognition of Southern aspirations was emphasised when, at the 
2002 Assembly meeting, the importance of building up strong relationship and networks 
within the global scientific community was emphasised, together with the priority that was 
accorded to the use of scientists and institutions from the host countries.413 These 
                                                 
409 Sjoberg H. (1999), Restructuring the Global Environment Facility, GEF Working Paper 13, p.12 
410 There had been suggestions to expand the focal areas of the GEF since the beginning of the current GEF. 
In one of his articles, “The GEF and its Future’, Mohamed T. El-Ashry in Network ’92 published by The 
Centre For Our Common Future, Number 8, July 1991 wrote his views on this matter. “Several countries-
developing and developed-have called for the GEF funds to deal with national environmental problems such 
as lack of clean water or regional blights such as desertification …The best response, however, is probably to 
provide assistance through existing bilateral and multilateral development programmes.”   
411 http://www.thegef.org/gef/meetingdocs/360/38(last accessed on 17.02.2011) 
412Ibid. 
413 http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_Documents_Publications (last accessed on 17.02.2011) 
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comments, together with the greater numerical strength of the South at the Assembly, 
demonstrate a better understanding between the South and the newly restructured GEF.414  
The Council, which is the primary decision-making authority and is responsible for 
developing, adopting and evaluating policies, programmes and financial decisions415, was 
established by Para 15 of the GEF Instrument.  It meets twice a year and consists of 32 
members – sixteen from developing countries, fourteen from developed countries and two 
from countries whose economies are in transition 416. With regard to this composition, L.B. 
Charounes states: “[It] is designed to reflect two preoccupations, one relating to 
representation of all participation in a balance and equitable way, the other taking into 
account the financing efforts made by contributors.”417 The system reflects both the UN 
and the Bretton Woods systems, however the most crucial financial decisions are based on 
the Bretton Woods system418, which favours economic criteria, whereas the UN system 
values political criteria, such as universality and accountability.419 This means that when 
such matters are debated the North tends to focus on efficiencies in the system, while the 
South focuses on the democratic legitimacy of the processes. Helen Sojerg describes the 
situation thus:  
 
[…] it is clear that both the UN and [the] Bretton Woods systems institutionalize a bias 
toward one set of values, while being criticized for neglecting others.  The UN, struggling 
with a dire financial situation, is under fire for being both ineffective and inefficient.  And 
the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods system has suffered as the World Bank has been 
                                                 
414 Karlsson S. (2002), The North-South Knowledge Divide: consequences for Global Environmental 
Governance, Global Environmental Governance in Strengthening Global Environmental Governance: 
Options and Opportunities edited by Esty, D. C. and Ivanova M., New Haven CT: Yale School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies  
415  Para. 20 of the GEF Instrument. 
416 http://www.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=254 (last accessed on 26.09.2010) 
417 Charounes L.B. (2005), The Global Environmental Facility (GEF): A Unique and Crucial Institutions, 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 14 , Number 3, p.196  
418 Para. 8 of the GEF Instrument. 
419  Sjoberg, H. (1999), Restructuring Global Environmental facility, Working Paper13, GEF, p. 54. 
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charged with, inter alia, insufficient transparency and undemocratic decision–making 
procedures, excessive reliance on neoclassical economic theories, and inadequate sensitivity 
toward political, social, and environmental concerns. 420 
 
This describes the complicated decision-making procedures of the GEF governance system 
that ultimately lead to conflicts of governance between legitimacy and efficiency. 
 
Voting procedure tries to strike a balance between the two positions.421  All the decisions 
in the council are taken by consensus and where a consensus is not found, matters are 
referred for formal voting where decisions are arrived at by double-majority – i.e. a 60% 
majority of the total number of participants and a 60% majority of the total number of 
contributors. This differs from both the World Bank voting system, whereby the number of 
votes depends on the amount of contribution to the institution, and from the UN, where 
voting is based on the one-country-one-vote system. The voting system adopted by the 
GEF appears to be a more equitable process in comparison to the weighted system that 
operated in the pilot phase of the GEF.422  
 
Operational functions of an institution are largely responsible for the transparency of 
decision making and implementation.  Paragraph 21 of the GEF Instrument created the 
Secretariat for this purpose in that it formulates and coordinates projects; it is also 
responsible for the effective implementation of the decisions taken by the Assembly. The 
Secretariat partly operates as an independent organ and partly under the supervision of the 
World Bank, which appoints its Chief Executive Officer.  Although the GEF Council has 
the authority to appoint him and remove him and gives a fair amount of opportunity to the 
                                                 
420Ibid. 
421 Para. 25 of the GEF Instrument. 
422 Andersen S. and Hey E. (2005), The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of International Environmental 
Institutions, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, pp: 211-226 at p. 221 
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South to decide on this vital matter, the appointment and function of the CEO greatly 
reflect the policies and principles of the World Bank.  Also, about forty people are on the 
Secretariat staff, all of whom are employed by the World Bank. Consequently, the 
Northern states exercise a greater influence over administrative issues and operations 
relating to the Secretariat. 
  
According to Matz, those environmental initiatives funded by the World Bank through 
GEF potentially have three effects on the global environment: firstly environmental harms, 
created as a result of development process; secondly, environmental friendly outcomes, 
created as a result of incorporation of environmental priorities into development projects; 
and thirdly active implementation of environmental standards as a primary project goal.423 
All these effects reflect the environmental protection-centred policy making of the World 
Bank financial mechanisms, which raises doubts about whether Southern environmental 
concerns are given the necessary attention by the GEF, particularly under the Bretton 
Woods system.  As Matz further explains:  
 
Yet the institution has been and still is contested in the context of North-South discussions on 
development.  The main underlying issue in this context is the potential right to development 
for non-industrialized countries that may be constrained or even jeopardised by the influence 
or domination of the industrialized North’s financial power in financial institutions. From 
this perspective it is apparent that legitimacy of decision-making process must, in particular, 
be concerned with a balancing of interests, e.g. reflected in specific voting procedures or 
accountability process.
424 
 
                                                 
423 Matz N. (2005),Financial Institutions Between Effectiveness and Legitimacy – A legal Analysis of the 
World Bank, Global Environment facility and Prototype Carbon Fund, International Environmental 
Agreements, Volume 5, pp: 265-302, at P.273-274 
424 Ibid. 
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During GEF restructuring, the South made great efforts to make it independent, however, 
despite their efforts, the World Bank’s influence and authority over its governance and 
operational systems has been maintained. There are two reasons for this – firstly, of the 
three implementing agencies, only the World Bank has the legal capacity to carry out GEF 
functions; and, secondly, the donors’ trust is heavily reliant on World Bank 
involvement.425 This means that the World Bank, and the North in general, still maintains 
authority and domination in GEF governance, which raises questions regarding equity, 
fairness and justice in the context of the North-South dimension.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the international environmental law and governance process is 
affected immensely by the North–South dimension in every aspect of its institutional and 
functional performance.  The failure to embrace principles of equity, fairness and justice in 
its decision-making process is resulting in further damage to the environment as well as to 
the development strategies of the South.  As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the 
nature of the world’s environmental problems has created a different set of priorities, 
duties and responsibilities for both South and North. International law presents several 
general principles, such as state consent, common but differentiated principles, and rights 
to development, to help bridge the different environmental approaches between the 
Southern ‘usage’ and the Northern ‘conservationist’ approaches.  The South has applied, 
and is continuing to exercise, these general principles of international environmental law; 
however, due to its lack of financial resources and technological facilities, and its minimal 
                                                 
425 Werksman J. (1995), Consolidating Governance of the Global Commons: Insights from the Global 
Environmental Facility, Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Volume 6, p.p.27-63 
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expertise and scientific base, it is still marginalized in the critical arena of global 
environmental governance.  
 
This thesis argues that any equitable and effective participatory process should embrace a 
system of governance that provides the necessary framework and facilities for every 
member to enjoy full and equal decision-making powers.  The two environmental 
institutions that have been discussed in this chapter – UNEP and the GEF – illustrate those 
areas of environmental governance that still require improvement. In order to establish the 
equitable and effective participation of the South, such as by devising a different voting 
system, adjusting its legal authority and curtailing the North’s domination over decision-
making and its political and financial authority over administrative functions, all of which 
is needed in order for the GEF to attain equitable, fair and just governance in the context of 
the North-South dimension.  
 
The next chapter will explore the North-South dimension in terms of global environmental 
governance in relation to one of the more highly recently debated issues – the possibility of 
enhancing a multidimensional framework of governance where non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are able to voice Southern environmental concerns alongside the 
member states.     
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3. NGOs in Global Politics: A Legal Analysis 
 
“[…] either the rigidity of international law 
cannot be much longer maintained or a new 
form of law applicable to the conduct of 
non-governmental groups in international 
society will be necessary to bridge the 
gulf.”426  
Bailey S.H. 
 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapters examined some of the intergovernmental efforts aimed at addressing 
environmental issues in the context of the North-South dimension. Because of the many 
historical, political and economic considerations, referred to in Chapter 1 and 2, 
developing countries have inherited a less influential role in global decision-making 
forums.  Not only are the decision-making processes and procedures affected by these 
North-South differences, but overall governance structures are also affected.  Despite the 
various interstate experiments in the aftermath of the establishment of the United Nations 
and other international organisations, as yet Southern environmental concerns have not 
been voiced effectively at a global level through the interstate institutional governance 
mechanisms that were discussed in Chapter 1 and 2.  
 
                                                 
426 Charnovitz refers Bailey S.H. (1932), The Framework of International Society, p. 81 in Charnovitz  S. 
(2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of International Law, 
Volume 100, p. 360 
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In this chapter, I analyse multidimensional approaches to environmental governance that 
have been brought about as a result of globalization and a recognition of environmental 
problems as being transnational issues.  The rationale for the entrance of non-traditional 
actors into global environmental governance is the demand created for these actors to voice 
their concerns regarding the lack of intergovernmental success in order to open to up the 
territorial boundaries to search for a global solution, in which state and non-state, parties 
are encouraged to collaborate.  Currently, global governance centres on a series of political 
actions that involve horizontal and vertical relationships among an array of state and non-
state.427 Not only hierarchical political authorities interact in global political context but 
also several third party actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations, religious groups 
and individuals involve in international decision-making. Guruswamy argues “[…] 
corporations and NGOs are changing the geo-political and socio-economic boundaries of 
national and international governance”.428 Consequently, this inter-state participation 
reflects the complex nature of making, and implementing, law at a global level by creating 
transnational decision-making forums to establish efficient mechanisms for the handling of 
multidimensional systems of governance.  
 
Such a multidimensional framework of governance includes states, intergovernmental 
organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private entities and other parties 
of civil society.429  The main focus of this chapter, therefore, will be on the contribution of 
                                                 
427 Rosenau J.  N. (1995), Governance in the Twenty First Century, Global Governance, Volume 1, Issue 1, 
p.13 
428 Guruswamy L.D. (2002), Cartography of Governance: An Introduction, Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy, Volume 13, pp.7-14 at p.8 
429 I do not intend to define civil society in detail here.  For the purpose of this chapter I use the word ‘civil 
society’ as a broader category which represents several single categories such as NGOs, business community, 
experts and academics.  For more in depth analysis on civil society read Rooy A.V. (2004), The Global 
Legitimacy Game: Civil Society, Globalization, and Protest, Palgrave Macmillan, Coleman W.D. and 
Wayland S. (2006), The Origins of Global Civil Society and Non territorial Governance: Some Empirical 
Reflections, Global Governance, Volume 12, pp.241-261, Cullen H. and Marrow K. (2001), International 
Society in International Law : The Growth of NGO participation, Non-state actors and International Law, 
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NGOs to environmental governance and how their engagement reflects the wider 
opportunities for parties other than states in the global decision-making arena.  The chapter 
will present an overview of the evolution of NGOs and will examine their broader roles in 
the international system together with their legal and institutional limitations. It will 
analyse the power shift in decision-making processes from exclusively interstate structures 
to multidimensional frameworks of governance. The chapter further aims to provide a 
critical analysis of international law based on the role of NGOs in global governance, 
together with what challenges they pose to framework traditional state-centric framework.   
 
In particular, this chapter will offer a vital and comprehensive understanding of the nature 
of NGO participation in global environmental governance by exploring their use as 
‘loudspeakers’ in order to represent the Southern voice wherever states fail to do so.  As 
stated in previous chapters, interstate decision making forums very often have not, because 
of historical, political and financial differences, been able to represent developing 
countries’ positions effectively since, in practice, all states are not equal.430 Consequently, 
the interests of all states cannot be represented to the same degree nor can states have an 
equal impact in global forums due to a lack of resources and expertise, together with 
scientific, technological and many other factors that hamper Southern participation. 
   
                                                                                                                                                    
Volume 1, pp:7-39, Anderson K. (2000), The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, The Role of 
International Non-Governmental Organisations and the Idea of Civil Society, European Journal of 
International Law Volume 11, p.91  Fine R. and Rai S. (eds.) (1997), Civil Society: Democratic Perspectives, 
London: Frank Cass.,  Lipschutz R. D. (1992), Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global 
Civil Society, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 21, Number 03, p.390, Shaw M. (1994), 
Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach, Millenium, Journal of 
International Studies Volume 23, Number 03, p. 655   
430 The United Nations Organisation is based on principles of equality of all the states.  Chapter 1, Article 
2(1) states “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” But, 
under the discussion on North-South dimension all states are not equal in practice.  Discussed in detail in 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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However, many transnational NGOs are rich in resources; they have much expertise based 
on scientific research and they are often entirely dedicated to work on specific issues.  
Unlike most Southern states, therefore, these NGOs have wider prospectuses that allow 
them to be more effective in global forums.   The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to show 
that NGOs are more likely to be better positioned to articulate Southern interests. This 
chapter will develop this argument further in Chapter 5 by examining the gradual 
enhancement of NGOs’ contributions to international decision-making, especially in 
environmental forums, where they might improve developing countries’ prospects by 
allowing their voices to be more effectively heard.  
 
This chapter, therefore, outlines the background for the role of NGOs within the larger 
context of global environmental governance.  The first section will define NGOs and their 
legal personality within the global governance system and the second will analyse the legal 
and institutional structures for NGO participation within the existing international political 
framework. In this context, the chapter will examine key UN Charter provisions on the 
consultative status of NGOs as well as environmental related institutional approach 
towards NGO participation. This chapter will also explore the existing governance 
framework of NGOs by arguing that the prevailing provisions need to be enhanced to 
advocate the preference of NGOs in environmental negotiations.  The chapter will then 
develop the ultimate aim of this thesis, which is to explore the opportunities for 
transnational NGO collaboration in order to voice Southern environmental concerns more 
effectively.  
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Why NGOs? 
 
In developing an analysis of NGOs that argues for their utility in voicing Southern 
environmental concerns, it is important to consider two issues: firstly, whether NGO 
involvement will only apply when state representation fails or rather in a general context at 
a global level, and, secondly, to what degree are NGOs competent to address those 
concerns.  To analyse these issues I shall draw on Charnovitz’s work. He argues that there 
are two essential factors for NGO involvement: 
 
The needs of governments, or more descriptively, of particular government agencies or 
officials, and the capability of NGOs.  These factors might also be viewed as political 
demand and supply.
 431 
 
These factors guide this chapter primarily in two directions.  Firstly, as the thesis has 
established in Chapters 1 and 2, Southern states need assistance to put across their 
concerns at global levels because these states often struggle to do this themselves.  
Secondly, the capability of NGOs to voice Southern concerns is decisive in 
multidimensional governance efforts. During the early period of NGO involvement in the 
international arena their significance was highlighted either when the states were absent, or 
when there was a lack of state capacity to represent and negotiate their concerns.  
Charnovitz, in identifying a historical pattern to NGO involvement in global governance, 
observes that the presence of NGOs rises when the governments are weaker, or absent, and 
falls when governments re-establish their strength.432 This ‘cyclical pattern’ of NGO 
                                                 
431 Charnovitz  S. (1997), Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Volume 18, p.183 at p. 269 
432 Ibid, p.190 
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involvement and relationships with states has now changed to a less dependent 
relationship, whereby NGOs act independently from states.  
 
It is often argued that states and NGOs act more like ‘partners’, even though technically 
they are still disparate actors in global governance.433 For example, in the Critical 
Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF), NGOs work in partnership with governments in 
conservation efforts at the global level.434 This Fund, which was established in 2000 as a 
collaboration of Conservation International, the Global Environment Facility, the 
Government of Japan, The MacArthur Foundation and the World Bank,435 provides 
funding and technical assistance to non-governmental organisations and the private sector 
for programmes to conserve bio diversity hotspots in the world, mainly in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America.  The Fund has already implemented eighteen hotspot strategies in fifty two 
countries world-wide.  As with CEPF, such NGOs work in partnership with the host 
government, in different ways to the state/NGO relationship under the traditional 
interpretation of international principles.  
 
Willets points out that the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements 
(Habitat II) in 1996 was a landmark event in the recognition of the value of NGOs as 
partners in international decision-making.436  At this conference NGOs were allowed to sit 
down with governments in the inter-sessional drafting groups during the preparatory 
process and they were even allowed to present amendments to the documents and to 
                                                 
433 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp.191-212 at pp.206-208 
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of Global Legal Studies, Volume 13, p. 617 at pp: 627-628 
435http://www.cepf.net/ImageCache/cepf/content/pdfs/cepf_2e2002_2eannualreport_2eonline_2epdf/v1/cepf.
2002.annualreport.online.pdf (last visited on 11.01.2009) 
436 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp.191-212 at pp: 195-196 
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defend their suggestions. Consequently, NGOs are now able to contribute more closely 
than ever before to the global governance discourse in many different ways. 
 
The above discussion demonstrates how complex the present engagement of NGOs in 
global governance is. It is therefore important to understand what the existing legal 
framework provides for their participation within international law. This chapter will 
examine the strict interpretation of international law with regard to non-state actors. It will 
identify those NGOs that do not possess sufficient flexibility in their structures to allow for 
effective participation in governance, and it will demonstrate the need for alternative 
governance approaches in order to encourage wider participation in global affairs.  First of 
all, though, it is important to offer a definition of NGOs and to consider their evolutionary 
role in order to understand how they have become increasingly influential in international 
decision-making. 
 
Defining NGOs  
 
There is no generally accepted one formal definition of an NGO.437  Although many 
international instruments and soft law documents include the term, none of them actually 
offer a definition, and no consensus has been reached among scholars as to what the term 
means. Nevertheless, the term NGO is commonly used in every sphere of the international 
system. As Bakker and Vierucci explain, “[E]ven in the absence of an agreed normative 
definition, both experts and the public at large constantly use the term, confident that 
                                                 
437 Willetts P, What is a Non-Governmental Organization?, UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support 
Systems, Section 1, Institutional and Infrastructure Resource Issues, Article 1.44.3.7. Non-Governmental 
Organisations.   http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM#Part1 (last accessed on 
03.09.2010) 
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others know what they are talking about.”438 Consequently, an understanding of the term 
‘NGO’ is often reached, according to the context, which leads to many ambiguities. 439 
 
Not only is the concept of ‘NGO’ complex, but, because it isn’t defined, what is included 
in the category is never mentioned. Therefore, in most instances, it is interpreted 
differently in different contexts.440 As Willetts notes, “there is no generally accepted 
definition of an NGO and the term carries different connotations in different 
circumstances”, 441 consequently, NGOs are often defined on an ‘ad hoc’ basis. NGO 
implies a negative, because it says something that it is not, i.e. ‘not governmental’, not 
what it actually is. NGOs denote two ideas: firstly, they are ‘organisations’, secondly, they 
are ‘not governments’. The meaning of NGO, therefore, is left open in that its compass is 
not explicitly, or deliberately, demarcated.  In order to understand what it means, it is 
necessary to relate it to something else, i.e. to ‘government’.  Therefore NGOs can 
principally be known as those organisations that do not fall into the category of 
government. However, the idea of ‘organisations that are not governmental’ is very broad 
indeed, a “normative loophole”442 that opens up various interpretation of the term, some of 
which will be analysed below. 
                                                 
438 Bakker C. and Vierucci L. (2008), Introduction: a normative or pragmatic definition of NGOs? in NGOs 
in International Law: Efficiency in Flexibility? edited by Dupuy P and Vierucci, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd., p.12 
439 Bakker C. and Vierucci L. (2008), Introduction: a normative or pragmatic definition of NGOs? In NGOs 
in International Law: Efficiency in Flexibility? Edited by Dupuy P and Vierucci, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd., pp.12-15 
440 Charnovitz refers Kerstin M. (2002), Mission Impossible? Defining Non-governmental Organizations, 
International Voluntary & Nonprofit Organization, Volume.13, p. 271, at p. 277.  Martens explains that in 
some languages “non-government” is translated as “against the government” or “antigovernment.”, 
Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, volume 100, p. 348 at p.251 
441 Willetts P., What is a Non-Governmental Organization? UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support 
Systems, Section 1, Institutional and Infrastructure Resource Issues, Article 1.44.3.7. Non-Governmental 
Organizations.   http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM#Part1 (last accessed on 
02.09.2010) 
442 Bakker C. and Vierucci L. (2008), Introduction: a normative or pragmatic definition of NGOs? in NGOs 
in International Law: Efficiency in Flexibility? edited by Dupuy P and Vierucci, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd., p.12 
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Firstly, it is important to discuss what international legal provisions exist to define NGOs. 
Although the term is included in vast numbers of international instruments, only a few 
provide some sort of definition.  During the time of the League of Nations NGOs were 
referred to as ‘international organisations’ along with other private institutional bodies.443  
In 1945, when the United Nations Charter was drafted, the common category of 
‘international organisations’ was divided into two categories, under two separate 
provisions, on the basis of the type of their relationship with the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC).444 Specialised agencies established by intergovernmental agreements 
were introduced under Article 70 and non-governmental organisations were introduced 
under Article 71.  As Willetts explains, the terminology of NGO was introduced as an 
initiative to clarify the ECOSOC’s relationship with private parties outside of the 
intergovernmental framework. He observes, 
 
“To clarify matters, new terminology was introduced to cover ECOSOC's relationship with 
two types of international organizations. Under Article 70, "specialized agencies, established 
by intergovernmental agreement" could "participate without a vote in its deliberations", 
while under Article 71 "non-governmental organizations" could have "suitable arrangements 
for consultation". Thus, "specialized agencies" and "NGOs" became technical UN jargon. 
Unlike much UN jargon, the term, NGO, passed into popular usage, particularly from the 
early 1970s onwards.445   
 
                                                 
443 Willetts P., What is a Non-Governmental Organization? UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life Support 
Systems, Section 1, Institutional and Infrastructure Resource Issues, Article 1.44.3.7. Non-Governmental 
Organizations.   http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM#Part1 (last accessed on 
02.09.2010) 
444 Ibid. 
445 Ibid. 
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Article 71 of the UN Charter uses the term ‘NGOs’ without providing its definition.446 At 
the time of the creation of the Charter’s provision for NGOs, the position of their 
involvement in governance was not as complex as it is at present.  Perhaps the drafters of 
the Article 71 did not anticipate that the term ‘NGO’ would eventually become more 
broadly used in governance. However, subsequently, the following definition was 
introduced in 1950: “[a]ny international organization which is not created by 
intergovernmental agreement.”447 Such a definition fit the context whereby most 
international negotiations of the day took place within state-centred frameworks. As NGO 
participation in governance increased, particularly with the series of United Nations 
conferences and other international events that took place at the beginning of 1970s, the  
term ‘NGO’ became more frequently used.448  
 
As a consequence of globalisation and the transnationalisation of many human rights and 
environmental issues, the role of NGOs became more prominent, so that, by the time the 
second United Nations Environmental Conference took place in 1992 in Rio, their 
activities had diversified considerably. For instance, roles included lobbying, advocacy and 
many other areas, their formal participation in global governance being recognised when 
they were classed in Agenda 21 as ‘major groups’.  While these developments were taking 
place within global forums, a formal definition of ‘NGOs’ appeared in UN Resolution 
1996/31 of ECOSOC, which, significantly, allowed national NGOs consultative status.449 
The recognition in Agenda 21 of NGOs as ‘major groups’ was reinforced by their being 
                                                 
446 Later in 1959,  Para 8 of the Review of Consultative Arrangements with Non-Governmental 
Organizations, 27 February 1959 define NGOs as “… any international organization which is not created by 
intergovernmental agreement.” 
447 E/RES/288(X), Review of consultative arrangements with non-governmental organizations, 27th February 
1959, para 8 
448 One of the principle events was the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in 1972 that 
attracts the interest of many international NGOs.   
449. http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm (last accessed on 22.01.2011) 
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accorded consultation status to ECOSOC in order to involve more grassroots organisations, 
which broadened the opportunities for both local and national NGOs to voice their 
environmental concerns in global forums.  The existing legal definition of NGOs in UN 
Resolution 1996/31 is:  
 
Any such organization that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental 
agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organization for the purpose of these 
arrangements, including organizations that accept members designated by governmental 
authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of 
views of the organization.450   
 
Even though Resolution 1996/31 of ECOSOC provides a clarification of the internal 
structure of NGOs, the Resolution itself was mainly concerned with their formation; in this 
respect it failed to explain either their functions, geographical locations or the nature of 
their participation.451 The definition, therefore, was based on whether a particular 
organisation was, or was not, established either by a governmental entity, or an 
intergovernmental agreement. Consequently, therefore, the Resolution noted that no 
feature, other than “non-governmental”, would be included in the formal legal definition of 
NGOs. 
 
                                                 
450E/RES/1996/31, Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental 
organizations, 25 July 1996, para 12  
451 NGOs involve in wide range of functions such as service providing, lobbying, advocacy and their 
geographical location is varied from grass roots, local, national, regional and international and transnational. 
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Regional attempts have been made to provide detailed definitions of NGOs.452 Article 1 of 
the European Convention of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental 
Organizations (1st January, 1991) states that: 
This Convention shall apply to associations, foundations and other private institutions 
(hereinafter referred to as "NGOs") which satisfy the following conditions:  
a. have a non-profit-making aim of international utility;  
b. have been established by an instrument governed by the internal law of a Party;  
c. carry on their activities with effect in at least two States; and  
d. have their statutory office in the territory of a Party and the central management and 
control in the territory of that Party or of another Party.453  
As may be seen from the above, the European Convention gave a detailed account of the 
formation and functions of NGOs. It included associations, foundations and other private 
institutions that have a non-profit making aim of international utility. It also ensured that 
an NGO should be established under the national law of the European Union member 
country and that it should carry on its activities transnationally.  Another regional legal 
definition of an NGO may be found in the Guidelines for Participation by Civil Society 
Organizations in OAS activities established by the Organization of American States (OAS) 
in 1999,454 whereby a ‘civil society organisation’ is defined as “any national or 
international institution, organization or entity made up of natural or judicial persons of a 
private nature”.455 
 
                                                 
452 Bakker C. and Vierucci L. (2008), Introduction: a normative or pragmatic definition of NGOs? in NGOs 
in International Law: Efficiency in Flexibility? edited by Dupuy P and Vierucci L., Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd., p.14 
453 Council of Europe,  European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International 
Non-Governmental Organizations, ETS No. 124, entered into force on 1 January 1991 
454 CP/Res. 759 (1217/99), Guidelines for Participation by Civil Society Organisations in OAS Activities, 15 
December 1999. 
455 Ibid. 
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Apart from legal provisions in international instruments, it is important to analyse the 
academic approach to the definition of NGO. Different writers describe them by 
emphasizing their different elements; for example, some highlight their characteristics 
while others emphasize their functions. Vedder, for instance, identifies three basic 
characteristics of NGOs. Firstly, they must be non-profit making, secondly, they must 
consist, at least partially, of voluntary citizens’ groups, and thirdly, they must be 
dependent, at least in part, on donations from private citizens or voluntary activities.456 
Charnovitz, however, in looking at the functional dimension of NGOs within international 
law, states that they should ‘contribute to the development, interpretation, judicial 
application and enforcement of international law’.457 Lung-Chu Chen takes a broader 
perspective by noting that NGOs’ functional activities should involve “intelligence, 
promoting, prescribing, invoking, applying, terminating, and appraising”.458 
 
In addition to their characteristics and functions, scholars emphasise the transnational 
character of NGOs in their definitions, as this is a significant feature of their discourse.  
Charnovitz states, “[…] NGOs […] are groups of persons or of societies, freely created by 
private initiative, that pursue an interest in matters that cross or transcend national borders 
and are not profit seeking”.459 Vedder provides another definition from the transnational 
perspective: “An NGO is generally defined as an essentially non-profit, voluntary citizens’ 
group which is organized at a local, national, or international level, and is locally, 
                                                 
456 Vedder A. (2007), Questioning the Legitimacy of Non-Governmental Organizations in NGO Involvement 
in International Governance and Policy : Sources of Legitimacy edited by Vedder A.  Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden.Boston, pp: 1-16 at  P.3 
457 Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 100, p. 348 at P.352 
458 Charnovitz refers Lung-Chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law (2000), 2nd 
edition, Chapter 4, in Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 
American Journal of International Law, Volume 100, p. 348 at P.352 
459 Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 100, p. 350 
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nationally, or internationally active.”460  Judging by these definitions, therefore, the 
transnational nature of an NGO’s activities ensures its inherent ability to act beyond 
territorial boundaries. 
 
However, in all the above definitions, there is a vagueness and ambiguity when an attempt 
is made to develop a precise definition that satisfies the requirements of international legal 
instruments as well as for scholarly debate.  The limitations of the legal involvement of 
NGOs, as set out in the traditional international legal interpretation laid down in Article 71 
of the UN Charter, and ECOSOC Res 1996/31, poses many challenges to the creation of a 
firm definition of NGOs that reflects its true nature. It is important to mention that the 
laws, rules and regulations of global negotiations, as laid down by the States, must be 
abided by, even though NGOs do not have powers to be involved in their formulation.  
 
The following section will explore this contradictory nature of the traditional state-centred 
governance system and, in this context, the NGOs need to develop a strategy that would 
allow them to influence the decision making fora.   
  
Beginning of multidimensional governance structures in the 
international system: NGO participation in the Westphalian 
governance system 
 
NGOs are recognised as some of the most active players in the international system of 
global governance, and some scholars argue that they are already established as key 
                                                 
460 Vedder A. (2007), Questioning the Legitimacy of Non-Governmental Organizations in , NGO 
Involvement in International Governance and Policy : Sources of Legitimacy edited by Vedder A., Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden.Boston, pp: 1-16 at  P.2 
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actors.461 Others, however, believe that states should be the key actors as an unshakable 
principle.462  However, it is recognised that the idea of the state being the supreme actor is 
increasingly in doubt because of changes to the world system, due to globalisation, 
together with the development of information technology.463 As Dhanapala explains, “in an 
age of total war, of instant global communications and fast, cheap travel, the nation-state 
appeared to many observers as a quaint, even dangerous anachronism”.464 In the light of 
these changes, many would argue that it is necessary to make adjustments to the state-
centric system, rooted as it is in traditional international law discourse. In her analysis of 
the contradictions between the demands of the 21st century global society and traditional 
state-centric theories, Pearson states: 
 
Globalization and global civil society discourses present challenges to underlying 
assumptions of the homogeneity of international law created by traditional state-centric 
theories by moving beyond debates about the centrality of the state in the international order, 
to exploring ways to encompass and utilise the diversity of actors and sites of interaction in 
international governance.465 
 
As has been mentioned above, since the early 1980s NGOs have increasingly influenced 
international decision-making process and procedures466 and their changing nature is has 
                                                 
461 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at he UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp: 191-212 at p.191 
462 Clark A. M. (1995), Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International society, 
Journal of International Affairs, Volume 48, Number 2, Slaughter A.M. (1997), The Real New World Order, 
Foreign Affairs, September/October. 
463 Mathews J. T. (1997), Power Shift, Foreign Affairs, Volume 76, Number 1, p.50 at pp. 51- 52   
464 Dhanapala J. (2002), Globalization and the Nation-State, Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy, Volume 13, pp: 29- 39 at 34 
465 Pearson Z. (2004), Non-Governmental Organisations and International Law: Mapping New Mechanisms 
for Governance, Australian Year Book of International Law, Volume 23, pp:73-103 at p. 77 
466 Collinwood V. (2006), Non-governmental organisations, power and legitimacy in international society, 
Review of International Studies, Volume 32, pp. 439-454 at 440, For further understanding of NGO influence 
in international environmental negotiations: Corell E. and Betsill M. (2001), A Comparative Look at NGO 
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been noticeable in many aspects of their global engagements, such as the significant rise in 
their numbers.467 Within the past ten years, those engaged in consultation with ECOSOC 
have almost doubled. Whereas, in 1999, there had been a total of 1,701 in consultation 
with the UN, of which 111 were of general status, 918 had special status and 672 were on 
the roster, as of September 2010, 3,336 were listed of which 137 were of general status, 
2211 had special status and 988 were on the roster.468 Another significant change is 
noticeable in the nature of NGO’s international activities – compared with a few decades 
ago, their roles are more diverse and they are gradually influencing the centre of 
international decision making processes in many areas.469 For example the importance of 
their influence in sustainable development was recognised in Chapter 27 of Agenda 21 that 
states,  
 
Non-governmental organizations play a vital role in the shaping and implementation of 
participatory democracy. Their credibility lies in the responsible and constructive role they 
play in society. Formal and informal organizations, as well as grass-roots movements, should 
be recognized as partners in the implementation of Agenda 21. The nature of the independent 
role played by non-governmental organizations within a society calls for real participation; 
                                                                                                                                                    
Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: Desertification and Climate Change, Global 
Environmental Politics, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp: 86-107 
467 Collinwood V. (2006), Non-governmental organisations, power and legitimacy in international society, 
Review of International Studies, Volume 32, pp. 439-454, Pearson Z. (2004), Non-Governmental 
Organisations and International Law: Mapping New Mechanisms for Governance, Australian Year Book of 
International Law, Volume 23, pp:73-103 
468 http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/ [last visited on 21.04.2011] A detailed analysis on different 
consultative status is in later in this chapter, Willets Peter (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to 
“Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p.191 
at p. 208 
469 Reinisch A. and Irgel C. (2001), The Participation of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the 
WTO dispute settlement system, Non-State Actors and International Law, Volume 1, pp: 127-151, Nelson P. 
(2000), Whose Civil Society? Whose Governance? Decisionmaking and Practice in the New Agenda of the 
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp: 405-431, 
Bradley M. Bernau (2006), Help for Hotspot: NGO Participation in the Preservation of Worldwide 
Biodiversity, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 13, p. 617 
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therefore, independence is a major attribute of non-governmental organizations and is the 
precondition of real participation.470 
 
Likewise, NGOs are involved in international negotiations by proposing new international 
conventions, participating and negotiating the drafting of new treaties and, sometimes, they 
even represent governments as members of official delegations.471 Consequently, they 
maintain close and extensive relationships with state actors and international organisations.  
They also appear in a variety of forms in order to emphasise different issues, and to 
contribute in many aspects of international negotiations.472 The following are some of the 
forms in which NGOs appear: transnational, government-organised, business and industry, 
donor-organized, operational, advocacy, transnational movements, and social 
movements.473 This wider NGO participation emphasises the multidimensional nature of 
global governance, and their increasing presence as non-state actors in international 
negotiations means that the dividing line between state and non-state participation has 
become increasingly blurred,474 especially now that they have established their position in 
such fora as UN conferences and institutions as well as in other arenas where they have 
become essential political partners.475 Some, though, dispute the legality of NGOs presence 
in the traditional state-centred system of governance. However, in countering this 
objection, Willetts argues that NGOs and states can be effective “social partners” and that, 
                                                 
470 Article 1, Chapter 27, Agenda 21.  http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/index.htm  (Last 
visited on 10.01.2010) 
471 Small islands nations were represented at climate change negotiations by NGOs.  Karsten N. (1999), 
Legal Consequences of globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations Under International 
Law, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 6, p. 579 at pp: 591-596, Weiss E. B. (1993), 
International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a  New World Order, The 
Georgetown Law Journal, Volume 81, p. 675 
472 Karns M.P., Mingst K.A. (2004), International Organizations : The political Processes of Global 
Governance, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 18  
473 Ibid. 
474 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at he UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p.191 at pp.205-208,  
475 A description on NGO involvement within UN institutions is discussed later in this chapter. 
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by so being, states and NGOs may be seen as social partners, implying that “[such] 
partners are equal in the sense that each has legal personality, but not in the sense that they 
have the same rights and obligations.”476 
  
There have always been mixed feelings about NGO involvement in matters of state 
governance. Many states object to the increasing presence of NGOs in international 
decision-making bodies.477 In commenting on the different opinions expressed at the UN 
General Assembly on NGO participation, Willets identifies two distinct reasons for this:  
firstly, states that feel they are under attack from NGOs over their human rights records 
and other issues do not welcome the presence of NGOs in decision making fora. Secondly, 
those states that were happy with NGO involvement in environmental, economic, and 
social questions did not wish them to take part also in debates on arms control and 
international conflicts.478  It is clear, therefore, that states are selective in opening up access 
to NGOs. The Background Paper for the Cardoso Report in 2003, states that:  
 
[the well-handled involvement of NGOs] enhances the quality of decision-making, increases 
ownership of the decisions, improves accountability and transparency of the process and 
enriches outcomes through a variety of views and experiences. But-handled badly-it can 
confuse choices, hamper the intergovernmental search for common ground, and erode the 
privacy needed for sensitive discussions, over-crowd agendas and present distractions at 
important meetings.479  
                                                 
476 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at he UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p.191 at p. 206 
477 State’s rejection of NGOs as formal participants in governance is clearly reflected in policy making 
process with the UN General Assembly.  States expressed their displeasure over awarding a permanent 
official status for NGOs in the General Assembly in 1996 when this matter was brought before the GA.  
478 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp.191-212 at.p.198 
479 Ripinsky and Bossche refer UN System and Civil Society: An Inventory and Analysis of Practices, 
Background Paper for the Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations Relations with 
Civil Society (May 2003) Introduction, <http://www.un.org/refprm/pdfs/hlp9.htm> in Ripinsky S. and 
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A global governance system will benefit from the expertise, networking capacities, and 
awareness raising capabilities of NGOs.  However, writings on NGO participation in 
decision-making processes also reflect mixed opinions.  Generally, scholars observe two 
competing schools: the ‘accommodationists’ and the ‘restrictionists’.480 Ripinsky and Van 
den Bossche subdivide accommodationists into two categories: radicals and moderates.481  
Radical accommmodationists favour equal status of NGOs with states in terms of 
participation, representation and even voting rights in decision-making bodies.  Moderate 
accommodationists, who support full integration of NGOs in international decision-making 
panels, believe that opening up more access to participation, oral statements and a formal 
legal framework would provide them with more opportunities to enhance the global 
decision-making system.  Opposing the accomodationists are the restrictionists, who do not 
believe in NGO participation in international decision-making alongside states and who 
argue for constraints to be placed on them.482 
 
Both the above viewpoints are logical.  The ‘accommodationist’ argument is based on the 
nature of the multilateral function of global politics in that states can no longer act in a 
manner that takes little regard of other actors who have proved that they are capable of 
influencing crucial decision-making.  Whereas the ‘restrictionist’ argument is based on the 
sovereignty of the state, in that they represent the people within a sovereign boundary, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bossche P. V. (2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal Analysis, British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law, p.13 
480 Hartwick J.A. (2003), Non-Governmental Organizations a the United Nations-Sponsored World 
Conferences; A Framework for Participation Reform, Loyola of Los Angeles Intl & Comparative Law 
Review, Volume 26 , p. 217at 243-250  
481 Ripinsky S.and Bossche P. V. (2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal 
Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, p.16 
482 Hartwick J.A. (2003), Non-Governmental Organizations a the United Nations-Sponsored World 
Conferences; A Framework for Participation Reform, Loyola of Los Angeles Intl & Comparative Law Review 
Volume 26 , p. 217at 243-250, Ripinsky S. and Bossche P. V. (2007), NGO Involvement in International 
Organizations : A Legal Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
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since they have been democratically elected. By contrast, NGOs are not democratically 
elected.   
 
This chapter, however, will avoid these extreme opinions. The level of NGO participation 
should neither be extremely restricted nor should it be equal to a state’s participation. 
Instead, it will explore the possibilities of enhancing NGO participation within a legitimate 
framework. Such a proposition raises many heavily debated practicability, accountability 
and risk issues.483 However, as Dhanapala declares, “… [al]though they [NGOs] are not 
elected by [any]one, and lack legal authority themselves to govern, they play a crucial role 
in helping the state to identify new goals.”484 Therefore this thesis stress that the traditional 
criteria that frames the legality of NGOs needs to be re-examined.  However, as Dhanapala 
correctly states, even though NGOs’ presence in global governance is contested at various 
levels, their influence is continuing to make considerable impact on the decision making 
processes.   
 
In order to voice Southern environmental concerns, NGOs, at both national and local  
levels, must be able to participate in global negotiations, since their contributions are 
significant in order to deliver Southern environmental agendas at international decision 
making fora.  However, as has been suggested above, NGO participation is often 
questioned for not having a legal personality, therefore, in order for this discussion to be 
expanded, it is important to understand their conduct in the international legal arena, 
because it has been difficult to restrict them to rigid international boundaries. Hence the 
                                                 
483 Legitimacy of NGOs will be analysed in detailed in chapter 5 in which the thesis explores the 
transnational NGO networks and examines the constraints upon them.  
484 Dhanapala J. (2002), Globalization and the Nation-State, Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy, Volume 13, p. 29- 39 at 37 
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legal context, in which they presently only have limited access to decision-making fora, 
will be discussed in the next section.  
 
“Legal personality” or “NGO personality”? 
 
Soon after the end of World War II, the United Nations and its many institutions, special 
agencies and programmes dedicated to different areas of the international system, was 
established resulting in radical changes in the international system and the emergence of 
numerous intergovernmental agencies of global governance, such as in trade and finance, 
health and education, human rights and environment.485 In parallel with these events, non-
state actors, such as NGOs, business groupings, corporations and other parties, became 
involved in various international engagements alongside the member states.486  
Academics, writing about NGOs, have proposed numerous methods by which the roles of 
NGOs might be enlarged across many areas of international law and politics.487 Recently 
                                                 
485 For an in depth research analysis on the role of NGOs during the period after the World War II: 
Charnovitz S. (1997), Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Volume 18, p.183-286 at pp: 249-257, Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative 
Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN, Global 
Governance, Volume 6, p.191 
486 For example for some of the earlier engagement of NGOs in global governance: International Committee 
of Red Cross (ICRC) is the first NGO to be recognised to enforce international law in 1863.  International 
Union of Conservation of Nature(IUCN) contribution in the development of environmental law. For detail 
analysis on the early stage of NGO involvement in governance: Charnovitz S. (1997), Two Centuries of 
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, Michigan Journal of International Law, Volume 18, 
p.183 at pp:253-257, Weiss E. B. (1993), International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the 
Emergence of a  New World Order, The Georgetown Law Journal, Volume 81, p. 675, Karsten N. (1999), 
Legal Consequences of globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations Under International 
Law, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 6, p. 579, Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative 
Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at he UN, Global 
Governance, Volume 6, p.191, Pearson Z. (2004), Non-Governmental Organisations and International Law: 
Mapping New Mechanisms for Governance, Australian Year Book of International Law, Volume 23, pp:73-
103, p.73, Mathews J. T. (1997), Power Shift, Foreign Affairs, Volume 76, Number 1, p.50,  Cullen H. and 
Marrow K. (2001), International Society in International Law : The Growth of NGO participation, Non-state 
actors and International Law, Volume 1, pp:7-39  
487 Welling J.J (2007)., Non Governmental Organizations, Prevention, and Intervention in Internal Conflict: 
Through the Lens of Darfur, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 17, p.147, True-Frost Cora C. 
(2007), The Security Council and Norm Consumption, New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics, Volume 40, p.115,  Bossche P.V. (2008), NGO Involvement in the WTO: A comparative 
Perspective, Journal of International Economic Law, Volume 11, p. 717, Knight Andy W. (2002), The 
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scholars seek NGO coordination in some areas that traditionally limited entirely as 
interstate affairs such as humanitarian intervention and state security.  Welling argues that 
present interstate collective action has failed to effectively address humanitarian crisis by 
traditional multilateral inter-state action.  Welling suggests that international law in 
addressing humanitarian issues should involve coordinated action between states and 
NGOs.488  True-Frost shows NGO participation in the Security Council as one way of 
ensuring transparency of the Security Council.489 In 2004 the Council first permitted NGOs 
to address the Security Council regular session and in 2005 and 2006 the civil societies 
were invited to address at ‘open debates’ on women, peace and security. World Trade 
Organization appears to be another important issue area that many scholars analyse the role 
of NGO in international law.490 
 
Meanwhile the NGOs have established positions mainly in areas such as environment, 
development and human rights, and they have gradually spread their influence into areas 
such as security, trade and finance.491 With an equally steady increase in their numbers, the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Future of the UN Security Council: Questions of legitimacy and representation in multilateral governance, in 
Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy? edited by Cooper Andrew F. et al, The United 
Nations University Press, pp.19-37, Reinisch A. and Irgel C. (2001), The Participation of the non-
governmental organizations(NGOs) in the WTO dispute settlement system, Non-State Actors and 
International Law, Volume 1, pp: 127-151, Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and 
International Law, American Journal of International Law, Volume 100, p. 348, Charnovitz S. (1996), 
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Volume 17, at pp:331-357, Esty D.C. (1998), Non-
governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 
Journal of International Economic Law, Volume 1, pp: 123-147, Besides these issue areas NGO involvement 
in international environmental issues and human rights issues have been widely discussed in many occasions. 
Charnovitz S. (1997), Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Volume 18, p.183-286, Sands P. J. (1989), The Environment, Community and 
International Law, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 30, p. 393  
488
 Welling J.J. (2007), Non Governmental Organizations, Prevention, and Intervention in Internal Conflict: 
Through the Lens of Darfur, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 17, p.147 
489
 True-Frost Cora C. (2007), The Security Council and Norm Consumption, New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics, Volume 40, p.115 
490
 Bossche P.V. (2008), NGO Involvement in the WTO: A comparative Perspective, Journal of 
International Economic Law, Volume 11, p. 717 
491 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp: 191-212 at p.191 
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dimensions of their involvement have widened into global governance, therefore the 
question of their validity in the international law arena has been brought forward.492 
 
Within the current international system, states are considered to be the key actors by way 
of their legal personality in the area of international law, and global political and financial 
institutions, international conventions and other legal entities all agree with this position.  
Therefore, international law accepts that ‘legal personality’ awards certain rights and duties 
of law, and it also determines the standing before the court.493  According to traditional 
international law interpretation, states are the only subjects of international law that can 
negotiate international agreements, possess the rights to vote and adopt declarations or 
conventions. Furthermore, many legal provisions can be found in various international 
documents that only include states as legal subjects in international law, for instance, under 
Article 34.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ. Statute) it is stated that 
“only states may be parties in cases before the Court”.494 The ICJ Statute drafters strictly 
limit the standing before the Court to states. Also, Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of the Treaties, notes that “only states can conclude treaties”.495 This suggests that 
international legal foundations favour state over non-state actors because governments are 
democratically elected to represent them and their citizens, and NGOs are not. Therefore 
NGOs are considered not to have international legal personality, which is a negative point 
for NGOs in their attempts to make an impact on the state-centric global system, especially 
in their participation in global governance. Consequently, they may not act in their fullest 
                                                 
492 Legal personality of NGOs in the national system is different to international approach.  NGOs operating 
under any national system are normally registered under the national law.  Therefore national NGOs are 
recognized as legal person in front of a national court.  They are entitled for rights and immunities provided 
by the particular laws and regulations.  
493 “Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations” , I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p, 174, 
Article 38 of the ICJ statute 
494 http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_I (last accessed on 
09.09.2010) 
495 http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (last accessed on 
09.09.2010) 
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capacity, which suggests that the traditional international law interpretation of the legal 
personality of non-state actors could be a subject for change. 
 
At this point it is necessary to note that, on one occasion the legal personality of actors, 
other than states, was acknowledged. In 1949, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in an 
advisory opinion in “Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United 
Nations”496 held the United Nations as a subject of international law.  However the court 
was very careful in its interpretation when analysing the difference between the state and 
an international organisation by saying:  
 
Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international 
person.  That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that 
its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State.  Still less is it the 
same thing as saying that it is 'a super-State', whatever that expression may mean.  It does not 
even imply that all its rights and duties must be upon the international plane, any more than 
all the rights and duties of a State must be upon that plane. What it does mean is that it is a 
subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that 
it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.497 
 
The above ICJ decision reiterates the states’ domination in the discussion of the legal 
personality in an international legal framework, even though it recognises the UN as an 
international ‘person’.  Similarly, in customary international law, the contribution of states 
plays a significant role in establishing customary international legal principles. States also 
hold sole authority in establishing customary international law by sustaining long term 
                                                 
496 “Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations” , I.C.J. Reports, 1949, The case 
report can be found at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/1835.pdf (last accessed on 21.04.2011),p.174 
497
 “Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations” , I.C.J. Reports, 1949: The case 
report can be found at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/1835.pdf (last accessed on 21.04.2011) 
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applicability of a certain practice.498 However, in this instance, the court looked at the issue 
of legal personality not from the perspective of states as sole subjects, but from the 
requirement of a contemporary global context.  In rationalising its decision, the ICJ, in 
“Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations”, held that: 
 
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the 
extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.  
Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the 
requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective activities of 
States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain 
entities which are not States. 499  
 
This opinion indicates the international law is influenced by the requirement of 
international life.  Such an argument recognises the necessity to change the perception of 
international subjects under traditional international law and, therefore, should seek the 
possibilities for recognising NGOs as crucial actors in international law.  Willetts points 
out, in favour of this position, that the changes in “UN resolutions and UN practice “[…] 
are so extensive that the international NGOs recognised by ECOSOC may be considered to 
have acquired a legal personality”.500 Nevertheless, NGO practice in global governance 
shows that strict legal interpretation on states as sole subjects of international law has not 
been able to prevent them from contributing to international systems.  Rebasti explains that 
“[the] lack of formal provisions concerning NGOs’ participation in the activity of a 
                                                 
498 Pearson Z. (2004), Non-Governmental Organisations and International Law: Mapping New Mechanisms 
for Governance, Australian Year Book of International Law, Volume 23, pp:73-103at p.75 
499 “Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations” , I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p; 174 
500 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p.191 at p.206 
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specific organ has not prevented NGOs from having informal relations with it” .501 This is 
proved by the argument that, even though NGO consultative relationship is strictly limited 
to ECOSOC, informal collaboration with other major UN bodies has often been successful. 
Formalities are often challenged by the comprehensive and strategic participation by 
NGOs at global negotiations and Willetts argues that NGO rights have become established, 
even in customary law, by pointing out the way in which they gain access to 
intergovernmental negotiations, despite the objections and barriers they face.502  
 
There have been several regional attempts to recognise that NGOs have legal 
personality.503 As noted above, ‘The European Convention on the Recognition of Legal 
Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations’ is a regional convention 
that provides general recognition for NGOs.504 By this Convention, signatory States agree 
to recognise the organisations that shall satisfy the requirements specified under the 
Convention as international NGOs having legal status within their borders.505 This 
provision directly ensures the legal personality of international NGOs, which incorporates 
their capacity to enrich the decision-making of the European Union and its member states.  
Under European law, therefore, the formal acceptance of NGOs as legal subjects is 
protected.506  
                                                 
501 Rebasti E. (2008), Beyond consultative status: which legal framework for enhanced interaction between 
NGOs and intergovernmental organizations?  in NGOs in International Law: Efficiency in Flexibility? edited 
by Dupuy P. and Vierucci l., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., p.27 
502 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp: 191-212 at p. 205 
503 Charnovitz S. (1997), Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Volume 18, p.183 at 188-189 
504European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental 
Organizations, Strasbourg, 24.IV.1986, http://reflex.raadvst-consetat.be/reflex/pdf/Mbbs/traiverd%5C140.pdf  
, (last accessed on 21.04.2011), Bakker C. and Vierucci L.(2008), Introduction: a normative or pragmatic 
definition of NGOs? in NGOs in International Law: Efficiency in Flexibility? edited by Dupuy P. and 
Vierucci l., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., p.14 
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 Article 1 of the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-
Governmental Organizations, Strasbourg, 24.IV.1986 available at http://reflex.raadvst-
consetat.be/reflex/pdf/Mbbs/traiverd%5C140.pdf (last accessed on 21.04.2011) 
506 Ibid. 
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It is clear that there is no agreement in the literature and practice as to what extent the legal 
capacity of NGOs is valid.  According to international law theories, legal personality is 
based on a state-centred framework of governance, which consists of governments and 
international organisations together with their member states.507  However, in practice, it is 
obvious that NGO participation enlightens global negotiations with their productive 
contributions.  As the ICJ correctly held  in Reparation case, “[T]hroughout its history, the 
development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international 
life.”  Therefore the international legal boundaries on NGO participation need to look 
beyond the formalities into the requirements of international life.  Establishing a significant 
presence in various regional instruments, NGOs have been gradually moving towards the 
centre of the international system.  The regional provisions on legal personality of NGOs 
certainly encourage international law to apply more flexible and timely approaches in the 
international interpretation of this topic.   
 
Existing legal and institutional frameworks for NGO 
participation 
 
According to Charnovitz, the first opportunity for NGO participation was marked within 
the Convention on the International Institute of Agriculture in 1905.508 Article 9f of the 
Convention states that: “[…] wishes [were] expressed by international or other agricultural 
congresses [that] agricultural societies, academics, [and] learned bodies […] are utilized 
for intergovernmental decision-making processes”. This provision emphasises the 
importance of “non-state” involvement for the enhancement of international agricultural 
                                                 
507 Shaw M. (2001), International Law, 5th Edition, Cambridge University Press. 
508 Convention on the International Institute of Agriculture signed in 7th of June1905: The document available 
at The American Journal of International Law, Volume 2, Number 4, 1908, p. 358 
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policies, even in the early years of the twentieth century.  Then, in 1919, the League of 
Nations Covenant provided access for NGO participation in interstate decision-making 
processes, with Article 25 of the Covenant declaring that the member states “…agree to 
encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary 
national Red Cross Organizations”.509  Although this provision does not provide access to 
the NGO community in general, it could be considered as a progressive step in the 
evolution of the role of NGOs in the international system.   
 
The necessity for NGO contributions in the UN was mentioned in the very first General 
Assembly Resolution in 1946.510  International, regional and national non-governmental 
organisations were requested to “collaborate for purposes of consultation with the 
ECOSOC.”  The use of the words in the Resolution  ‘…as soon as possible adopts suitable 
arrangements…’ implies the greater necessity of NGO participation even at the time of 
formation.511  In the event, two international NGOs and one regional NGO were 
specifically mentioned in the General Assembly Resolution, since they were the initiators 
behind the acceptance of this provision.512  
 
Understanding the issues surrounding this aspect of legality of NGO participation will 
support my main argument in this thesis, which is to propose that NGOs be allowed to 
voice Southern environmental concerns at global decision-making tables. Therefore I will 
                                                 
509 Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 100, p. 348 at P.357 
510 Lindblom A (2005), Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
p. 375, Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its First Meeting. 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/55/IMG/NR003255.pdf?OpenElement last 
visited on 20.04.2009  
511 Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its First Meeting. 
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512 Interntional Co-Operative Alliance, World Federation of Trade Unions and American Federation of 
Labour. Lindblom A. (2005), Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge Unitercity 
Press, p. 375 
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discuss the current international legal provisions in depth to find out where the boundary 
lines are for NGO participation in the international legal system.  For this purpose, I will 
first pay attention to the UN Charter provisions and the nature of the consultative status 
within the organisation. 
 
The existing legal framework  
 
The following are the four main ways that NGOs maintain formal cooperation with the UN 
within the existing legal format:513 those that obtain consultative status with ECOSOC, 
those that are accredited to particular UN conferences, those that establish relations with 
particular UN programmes or specialised agencies, and those that become associated with 
the UN Department of Public Information.514  Although NGOs are not treated as formal 
subjects within international law, these four methods offer considerable opportunities for 
participation.  
 
Among many progressive developments in NGO participation in the international legal 
system, the most commonly discussed and most influential, internationally agreed, 
provision is contained in Article 71, Chapter X of the UN Charter, which states:  
 
[T]he Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with 
nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. 
Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, 
                                                 
513 Ripinsky S. and Bossche P. V.(2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal 
Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, p. 19 
514 Ibid. 
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with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations 
concerned.515    
 
Some of the leading US citizen groups, such as the American Association of University 
Women, the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organization, and the 
National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, made an impact on the 
wording of the Charter.516 As a consequence, their efforts, which provided expert advisory 
support to the committee and raised public awareness, were significant in the drafting 
process.517 As a consequence, Article 71 was intended to ensure that their voices would be 
recognized and reflected in the international law provision in the UN Charter, which 
provides access for their participation.518  
 
The formation of Article 71 highlighted two very important factors concerning NGO 
accessibility to the UN.519  Firstly, the international community’s desire to make use of the 
potential of NGOs when states lack certain resources, such as expertise, finance, technical 
assistance, networking facilities and any other resource which states are often not able to 
provide. Secondly, the international community’s wish not to allow full access to NGOs in 
the international decision-making processes to avoid their being granted equal status with 
                                                 
515 UN Charter, Chapter 10, Economic and Social Council, Article 71. http://www.un-documents.net/ch-
10.htm ( Last visited on 09.02.2010) 
516 Waak P. (1995), Shaping a Sustainable Planet: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, vol.06, p. 345 at pp. 348-349  
517 Referring to John Humphrey, the first UN Director of the Human Rights Division, Charnovitz shows the 
greater impact of NGOs with regard to the human rights provisions in the United Nations Charter. Charnovitz 
S. (1997), Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, volume 18, p.183 at p. 252, Humphrey John P. Human Rights and the United Nations: A 
Great Adventure,  New York: Transnational Publishers, 1984  Waak P. (1995), Shaping a Sustainable Planet: 
The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and 
Policy, Volume 06, p. 345 at p.348,  
518 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p.191, Charnovitz S. (1997), Two Centuries of 
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, Michigan Journal of International Law, Volume 18, 
p.183 at pp: 250-252 
519 Economic and Social Council, Article 71. http://www.un-documents.net/ch-10.htm ( Last visited on 
09.02.2009) 
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state or international organisations. Article 71 also carefully selected the words 
‘consultative status’ to signify NGO’s level of access regarding decision-making, 
consequently, the Article only guarantees ‘consultative’ and not ‘participatory’ status.520  
As Willets observes: “The term consultative status was purposely chosen to indicate a 
secondary role – being able to give advice but not being part of the decision-making 
process”.521   
 
Later, however, several amendments were made in order to increase NGO’s influence 
within the consultative status framework, the three most important ones were:  ECOSOC 
Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of May, 1968522, Resolution 1993/80 of July, 1993523 and 
Resolution 1996/31 of July, 1996.524 In Part I of Resolution 1296, eleven principles were 
laid down that allowed NGOs to be heard, at a consultative level, in global governance 
within a structured format designed to accord with ECOSOC policies.525  However, the 
provision in 1968 was not very descriptive, since it narrowed down to NGOs with 
international standing only:   
 
The organization shall be of representative character and of recognized international 
standing; it shall represent a substantial proportion, and express the views of major sections 
of the population or of the organized persons within the particular field of its competence, 
                                                 
520 Later in this chapter I refer to some instances where NGOs have gone beyond the consultation status to 
participation status. Read for more information on this aspect : Willets Peter (2000), From “Consultative 
Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at he UN, Global 
Governance, volume 6, p.191 
521 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p.191  
522 E.S.C. Res. 1296, UN ESCOR, 44th Sess. Supp. No.1, E/Res./1296(1968) 
523 E.S.C. Res. 1993/80, UN ESCOR, 46th Sess., UN Doc. E/1993/80 (1993) 
524 E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, UN ESCOR, 46th Sess., UN Doc. E/1993/80 (1993) 
525 ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XIV) in 1968 
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covering, where possible, a substantial number of countries in different regions of the 
world.526 
 
The specification that an NGO should be of ‘recognized international standing’ was never 
going to favour national or local NGOs in the South. Under the 1968 resolution, therefore, 
national NGOs were not allowed to be used for consultative status; consequently, Southern 
NGOs were limited to their own national boundaries and the only opportunity they had to 
represent their views was through the international NGO to which they belonged.527  
During this period, grassroots NGOs largely trusted that “[…] established NGOs were 
unrepresentative of grassroots popular opinion.”528 However, this emphasis on 
‘international’ in NGOs in the late 1960s gradually changed, so that, by the late 1990s, the 
UN and many other intergovernmental organisations, were beginning to work more closely 
with national and regional NGOs.   
 
Later, as a result of the enormous impact made at UNCED in 1992, the NGOs worldwide 
showed they were capable of greater levels of cooperation, together with states, in 
international decision-making, consequently, the international community granted them 
higher status;, thus, both states and international organisations, became the beneficiaries of 
the greater accessibility that had been opened up for NGOs. 
 
Resolution 1996/31, which increased the capacity of the Council for ‘consultation with 
NGOs’ to ‘consultative status for NGOs’, led some commentators to believe that the NGO-
UN relationship was formalised and framed into a proper structure. It offered an 
                                                 
526 http://www.un-documents.net/1296.htm  (last visited on 05.04.2010) 
527 Para 9 of the Part I, ECOSOC resolution 1296 (XLIV) in 1968  
528 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp: 191-212 at p.194 
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opportunity to apply for expanded consultative status by international, regional, sub-
regional and national non-governmental organisations,529 a development that contrasted 
with the 1968 resolution whereby only international NGOs were considered to be suitable 
consultative organizations.530  The introduction of the Resolution 1996/31 states: 
[…]Recalling Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations  
… Confirming the need to take into account the full diversity of the non-governmental 
organizations at the national, regional and international levels … Acknowledging the breadth 
of non-governmental organizations' expertise and the capacity of non-governmental 
organizations to support the work of the United Nations …Taking into account the changes 
in the non-governmental sector, including the emergence of a large number of national and 
regional organizations … Calling upon the governing bodies of the relevant organizations, 
bodies and specialized agencies of the United Nations system to examine the principles and 
practices relating to their consultations with non-governmental organizations and to take 
action, as appropriate, to promote coherence in the light of the provisions of the present 
resolution […]531 
This provision provided a wider prospectus for national and local NGOs in comparison to 
the previous provision, which recognised only international NGOs for consultative status. 
Charnovitz observes three significant changes which resulted from the 1968 Resolution 
provisions being amended by the 1996/31 resolution.532 Firstly, the 1950 rule required the 
NGOs to be of “recognized standing” and “representing [a] substantial portion of 
                                                 
529 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31   
530 Para 4, Para 7, Para 9 of the Part I, ECOSOC resolution 1296 (XIV) in 1968 
531 http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm  (last visited on 05.04.2010) 
532 Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 100, p. 348 at p. 358, Charnovitz refers to ECOSOC Rule 1950, which 
implemented Article 71 of the UN Charter.  This was supersede later in 1968 by 1296 (XLIV) resolution.     
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organized persons within the particular field in which it operates”.533 However, the 
prevailing provision in 1996/31 dispenses with this two-part requirement, since an 
“organization shall be of recognized standing within the particular field of its competence 
or of a representative character”.534 Secondly, the preference of international NGOs in 
1950 has been now changed to national, regional and sub-regional.535  Third, the 1996/31 
resolution adopted a new requirement as NGOs with consultative status should “have a 
democratically adopted constitution”536, “possess appropriate mechanisms of 
accountability to its members” and “shall exercise effective control over its policies and 
actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and 
transparent decision-making processes”537 Charnovitz observes that this introduction of the 
language of accountability almost certainly happened as a consequence of debates 
regarding legitimacy in the contemporary political and legal discourse.  
 
Furthermore, the 1996/31 Resolution encouraged NGOs from developing countries, and 
countries with economies in transition, to establish closer relations with the UN.538 Under 
its provisions, NGOs from developing countries were encouraged to ‘participate’ in 
international conferences convened by the UN, and Paragraph 7 states that greater 
‘involvement’ of NGOs from countries with economies in transition should be encouraged.  
The Provisions in the 1996/31 Resolution were deliberately formed to attract NGOs from 
all over the world and it was emphasized in Para. 70 that the Secretary-General should 
make an effort to promote the aims and objectives of its resolution to every corner of the 
                                                 
533 Para.5 of the Review of consultative Arrangement with Non-governmental Organizations, ECOSOC 
resolution 288(X) in Feb. 27 1950,   Similar provision in 1968 is Para 4of the Part I, ECOSOC resolution 
1296 (XLIV) in 1968 
534 Para 9 of the ECOSOC 1996/31 resolution 
535 ECOSOC resolution 288(X) in Feb. 27 1950, Para 8,9 of Para 4,7,9 ECOSOC resolution 1296 (XLIV) in 
1968, Para 4,5,8 of the 1996/31 resolution 
536 Para 10 of the ECOSOC 1996/31 resolution 
537 Para 12 of the ECOSOC 1996/31 resolution 
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world.539 Therefore Southern NGOs now have much wider opportunities to become 
involved in the global negotiations in the existing international law context than prevailed 
in the previous period. 
 
This chapter will now explore the three categories of consultative status, which will inform 
the discussion regarding what type of relationships NGOs can build up within the UN, and 
what implications they will have on international decision-making.   
 
Consultative Status  
 
Consultative relationships can now be established between the UN and international, 
regional, sub-regional and national non-governmental organisations.540 In the case of 
national organisations, consultation with concerned member states is required and any 
NGO that applies for consultative status should attest that it has been officially registered 
with the appropriate authority for at least two years from the date of receipt of the 
application by the Secretariat.541 The 1996/31 Resolution also demonstrates its 
commitment to ensure that all NGOs awarded consultative status by ECOSOC should 
adhere to democratic, transparent accountable process within their institutional existence:  
 
The organization shall have a representative structure and possess appropriate mechanisms of 
accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and 
actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent 
decision-making processes. 542 
 
                                                 
539 Para 70, Part XI of the ECOSOC 1996/31 resolution 
540 Para 4 and 5 of the 1996/31 resolution 
541 Para 61 (h), Part IX of the of the  1996/31 resolution 
542 Para 12, Part I of the of the  1996/31 resolution 
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Under the existing legal framework of the 1996/31 ECOSOC Resolution, NGOs are 
divided into three categories of consultative status: general consultative, special 
consultative, and roster.543  To understand what rights and limitations are expressed in each 
category, a brief description of each status appears in the next section, because they will 
explain the limitations and privileges of each NGO when it participates in the global 
decision-making process,544 thereby informing the discussion regarding NGOs 
representing the South at global forums, which is the key theme of this thesis.   
 
General consultative status 
 
The establishment of general consultative status enhanced the ability of NGOs to influence 
UN agendas545 and it is organisations which have been accorded general consultative status 
that are mainly concerned with ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies. Therefore, these NGOs 
are required to demonstrate that they have substantive and sustained contributions to make 
by representing their concerns and in furthering UN objectives in international, economic 
and social cooperation.546 Paragraph 22 emphasizes that their representation should consist 
of major segments of society in many countries in different regions of the world.547 As at 
                                                 
543 Para 22,23,24 and 27, Part IV of the  1996/31 resolution 
544 Lindblom A.(2005), Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.374-382, Ripinsky Sergey and Bossche P. V.(2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A 
Legal Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, pp.24-28, Karns M.P., Mingst K.A., 
International Organizations : The political Processes of Global Governance, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2004, pp:211-248, Willetts P. (1995), Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations,  Willetts P. 
(ed.)(1995), The Conscience of the World : The Influence of the Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN 
System, C. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, pp.31-63, Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and 
International Law, American Journal of International Law, Volume 100, p. 348 
545 Para 22,23,24 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution., Ripinsky S. and Bossche P. V. (2007), NGO 
Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal Analysis, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, p. 25 
546 Para 22 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
547 Ibid. 
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1st September 2009, 138 NGOs were in general consultative status,548 some of the older of 
which, being members of the International Chamber of Commerce, were granted 
consultative status in 1946, and, in the case of the International Alliance of Women, in 
1947. Other NGOs obtained general consultative status fairly recently, for example, the 
Academic Council on the United Nations System qualified in 1996, the International 
Council of Environmental Law in 2000, the International Trade Union Confederation in 
2007 and the China NGO Network for International Exchanges in 2008.549  
 
NGOs with general consultative status enjoy a comprehensive list of rights and 
privileges,550 since, unlike the other two categories, they enjoy broader acceptance within 
the ECOSOC decision-making process.551  For instance, NGOs with any consultative 
status are informed of the provisional agenda of the ECOSOC, but only those with general 
consultative status can make proposals to its Council Committee.552 Whenever the 
substance of an agenda item that is proposed by an NGO with general consultative status is 
discussed, it is entitled to present an oral introductory statement to the Council.553  If 
further clarification is needed the President of the Council may invite the NGO, in the 
course of the discussion of the item, to provide additional statements.554 Authorized 
representatives of organisations with general consultative status may also sit as observers 
                                                 
548 E/2009/INF/4, List of non governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council as of 1 September 2009.  http://esango.un.org/paperless/content/E2009INF4.pdf (last visited 
on 13.09.2010) 
549 Ibid. 
550 Part IV of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution., Ripinsky Sergey and Bossche P.V. (2007), Regulatory 
Legitimacy of the role of NGOs in Global Governance: Legal Status and Accreditation in NGO Involvement 
in International Governance and Policy: Sources of Legitimacy, Vedder A. (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, pp. 135-172 at p.139-140  
551 Para 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 32 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution. 
552 Para  27 and 28 of the ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, Referring NGO section of the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 17 January 2006, Ripinsky & Bossche  state that right to propose items for the 
provisional agenda has almost never made use by the NGOs in practice.  Ripinsky S. and Bossche P.V. 
(2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal Analysis, British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, p. 26 
553 Para  32 (b)  of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
554 Para  32 (b)  of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
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at public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies as well as at public meetings of 
the commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council.555 Furthermore, NGOs with 
general consultative status can submit written statements, which are required to be on the 
subject area of their special competence and should not exceed of 2000 words, for 
circulation to the Members of the Council.556  
 
Analyzing the comprehensive set of rights and principles guiding the NGOs with general 
consultative status, in both the 1968 and 1996 resolutions, it is clear that they are still not 
entitled to be actual members of the decision-making processes of ECOSOC and they only 
have access for consultation.  Willetts notes that the difference between consultative 
participation and being a member of the Council is the inability of the NGO to cast a vote. 
Also, some of the rights given to NGOs with general consultative status, such as the right 
to propose items for the provisional agenda, have almost never been used in practice.557  
 
Special Consultative Status 
 
Special consultative status will be given to organisations with special competence in areas 
that only cover a few of the activities that come under the ECOSOC. 558  In relation to the 
NGOs with general consultative status, these organisations cover a more limited scope of 
subject area within ECOSOC.  By the time of the introduction of this provision in 1968, 
the expectation on NGOs with special consultative status was affected by the 
decolonization process.  Resolution 1296 (XLIV) emphasised some significant areas of 
international politics that occurred during the era immediately following the decolonization 
                                                 
555 Para 29 and 35 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
556 Para 30 and 31of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
557 Ripinsky S.and Bossche P. V. (2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal 
Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, p. 25 
558 Para 23 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution  
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period, when NGOs with special consultative status were encouraged to promote areas 
such as human rights, fundamental freedom and timely issues, such as combating 
colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination. 559   
 
As of 1st September 2009, 2,166 non-governmental organisations were in special 
consultative status;560 some of these are: the Women and Modern World Centre, granted 
consultative status in 2008, the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, granted status 
in 1973, AIDS Action, granted status in 2007, the Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Network, granted status in 2002, and the Association for the Protection of the 
Environment, granted consultative status in 1999.561 
  
The privileges enjoyed by NGOs with special consultative status are receipt of provisional 
agendas of the Council and the provisional agenda of sessions of commissions and other 
subsidiary organs of the Council, are communicated to NGOs with special consultative 
status562, the right to sit as observers at public meetings of the commissions and other 
subsidiary organs as well as at public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies563 
and the right to submit written statements, with a maximum limit of 500 words, to be 
circulated among the Council members. 
   
                                                 
559 Para 17, Part III of the resolution 1296 (XLIV) in 1968 states, Organizations accorded consultative status 
in category II because of their interest in the field of human rights should have a general international 
concern with this matter, not restricted to the interests of a particular group of persons, a single nationality of 
the situation in a single State or restricted group States. Special consideration shall be given to the 
applications of organizations in this field whose aims place stress on combating colonialism, apartheid, racial 
intolerance and other gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
560 E/2009/INF/4, List of non governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council as of 18 September 2008.  http://esango.un.org/paperless/content/E2009INF4.pdf  (last visited 
on 13.09.2010) 
561 E/2009/INF/4, List of non governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council as of 18 September 2008.  http://esango.un.org/paperless/content/E2009INF4.pdf  (last visited 
on 13.09.2010) 
562 Para 27, 33 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
563 Para 29, 35 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
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However, NGOs in special consultative status are not allowed to make oral statements at 
the meetings of the Council or propose items for the agenda of the Council, unlike NGOs 
with general consultative status.564 
 
Roster Status 
 
Paragraph 19 of Resolution 1296 (XLIV) 1968, and Paragraph 24 of Resolution 1996/31, 
1996 provided similar provisions for the status of roster. Roster status is awarded to NGOs 
that do not qualify under general or special consultative status, but may still be able to 
contribute to the work of the Council, or its subsidiary bodies, or other UN bodies, within 
their competence.565  NGOs in consultative status with a specialized agency or a United 
Nations body can also be included in the roster.566  
 
An NGO can be listed in the ECOSOC Roster in three ways: firstly, on the 
recommendation of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, secondly, by 
action of the Secretary-General and thirdly, by virtue of their consultative status with 
specialized agencies or other UN bodies567.  
 
As of 1st September 2009, 983 NGOs are listed under the category of Roster.568 Among 
these are Friends of the Earth, granted roster status in 1972, the Sierra Club, granted status 
                                                 
564 Under Para 28 and 34 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution, the  right to propose items of interest to the 
agenda of the Council is only granted to NGOs with the general consultation status. 
565 Para 24 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
566 Para 24 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
567 E/2009/INF/4, List of non governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council as of 1 September 2009.  http://esango.un.org/paperless/content/E2009INF4.pdf  (last visited 
on 13.09.2010) 
568 E/2009/INF/4, List of non governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and 
Social Council as of 1 September 2009. http://esango.un.org/paperless/content/E2009INF4.pdf  (last visited 
on 13.09.2010) 
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in 1973, the United Nations Association of the USA, granted status in 1996, and the Youth 
Enhancement Organization, granted status in 2005. 
 
The privileges enjoyed by NGOs listed in the Roster are: the provisional agenda of the 
Council and its subsidiary organs will be communicated to them569, the provisional agenda 
of sessions of commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council will be 
communicated to them570, they may have representatives present at public meetings of the 
Council and its subsidiary bodies if the discussed matters are within their field of 
competence571,they may submit written statements to the Council, however, only on 
invitation by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Council, or 
the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations572 and they may submit 
written statements to a subsidiary organ, however, only on the invitation of the  Secretary-
General or the subsidiary organ itself.573 
 
NGOs on the roster do not have the privilege of making proposals for the provisional 
agenda of the Council or it subsidiary organs.  It can be seen, therefore, that the NGOs with 
Roster category enjoy fewer rights compared to those with either general or special 
consultative status. 
 
The UN framework on consultative status of NGOs, which provides the primary basis for 
NGO participation in UN negotiations, has also has been guidance for many other 
international and regional provisions in different international documents on NGO 
participation. With the introduction of supplements to Article 71 of the Charter by various 
                                                 
569 Para 27 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
570 Para 33 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
571 Para 29 of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
572 Para 31(f) of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
573 Para 37(f) of the 1996/31 ECOSOC resolution 
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Resolution provisions, the participation space within the legal framework for NGOs 
gradually expanded and this was visible in most of the conferences taking place during and 
after the 1990s.  The regular presence and valuable contributions of NGO in these 
conferences demonstrate the necessity for broader participation in global governance to the 
extent where a standard procedure for accreditation for conferences was introduced.  This 
development increased the possibilities for the participation of NGOs in all UN 
conferences without them having to follow the same ECOSOC procedures.  Willetts 
observes this phenomenon thus: “[F]or the first time, it goes beyond ECOSOC’s own 
mandate and provides for all conferences convened by any organ of the UN”.574   
  
More than sixty years of applying Article 71 of the UN Charter, NGO participation 
gradually developed to the point where it now influences and guides many other 
institutions to recognise the importance of participation in global decision making.    
 
Other institutional and instrumental frameworks 
 
Although Article 71 is broadly considered to be the provider for NGOs of formal access to 
international decision-making fora, there are a number of other doors that provide access 
for participation.  Among these are environmental related institutions together with other 
issue-concerned organisations, although I do not wish to pursue these in much detail, since 
this thesis is based on environmental related instruments and their provisions only. 
Nevertheless, since they, too, contribute to the development of international law in this 
respect, a brief mention is important; amongst them are the World Trade Organization 
                                                 
574 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p.196 
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(WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).575  
 
The legal basis of the WTO is the WTO Agreement, which was established by the 
Marrakesh Agreement in 1995, is based on Article V: 2 of the Agreement, whereby the 
General Council is allowed to take appropriate measures for consultation and cooperation 
with NGOs.576 Article V of the Agreement, which covers “Relations with Other Parties”, 
has two sub articles: V:1 covers “effective cooperation with other intergovernmental 
organisations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO” and V:2 covers 
“consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organisations concerned with 
matters related to those of the WTO”. Use of the words in sub articles emphasise the 
weight given to NGOs by stating: “… consultation and cooperation with NGOs ...” 
 
The 1946 Constitution of the World Health Organization incorporates the legal foundation 
for NGO involvement within the WHO,577 Article 71 of which states that WHO “makes 
suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with international NGOs, and with 
the national NGOs with the consent of the concerned government.”578  Similarly, as will be 
discussed in the following section many intergovernmental institutions have now been 
opened up for NGO involvement in their governance processes, with some of the efforts to 
achieve this going back to an early period of contemporary international governance.  
                                                 
575 Ripinsky S. and Bossche P. V. (2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations: A Legal 
Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law.  
576 The V:2 provision was further expanded on 18 July 1996 when the General Council further clarified the 
framework for relations with NGOs by adopting a set of guidelines (WT/L/162) which "recognizes the role 
NGOs can play to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities". 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (last visited on 07.04.2010) 
577 WHO constitution was adopted by the International Health Conference in July, 1946 and entered into 
force in April, 1948. http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf (last visited on 10.04.2010) 
578 Article 71, Chapter XVI “Relations with Other Organizations” of the WTO Constitution in 1946. 
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf  (last visited on 10.04.2010 ) 
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Therefore the NGO contribution to global governance has been developed in parallel with 
many other intergovernmental initiatives. The next section, which will explore 
environmental related institutional provisions, which is the main focus in this discussion, 
will consider the provisions related to institutions and instruments that work on 
international environmental issues, since such decision-making institutions have often 
welcomed the innovative practices of the NGO community.    
 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) – NGO Co-operation 
 
The role of NGOs in the UN focuses mainly on areas such as human rights, human 
development and environment.  The importance of UNEP-NGO collaboration is referred to 
in the UNEP Governing Council decision adopted to enhance the civil society engagement 
in the work of the UNEP,579  which states: 
 
[Decides] To request the Executive Director to further develop, and review and revise as 
necessary the strategy for engaging civil society in the programme of activities of the United 
Nations Environment Programme, in consultation with Governments and civil society.  The 
strategy should provide clear direction to the secretariat to ensure that all programmes take 
into account opportunities for multi-stakeholder participation in design, implementation, 
monitoring of activities, and dissemination of outputs; […]
580
 
 
                                                 
579 The mandate of the United Nations Environment Programme deriving from Section IV of the Paragraph 5 
of the General Assembly resolution 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972 and further elaborated by Chapter 
28 of the Agenda 21 and rearticulated by the 1997 Nairobi 
Declaration,http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=287&ArticleID=1728&
l=en (last visited on 27.04.2010) 
580 Section 2, Chapter I of the Decision adopted by the United Nation Environment Programme Governing 
Council at its special session/global ministerial environment forum on 15th February 2002, Governing 
Council Decision SSVII.5 of 15th February 2002 on enhancing civil society engagement in the work of the 
United Nations Environment Programme. 
173 
 
 [Agrees] to make efforts to meaningfully consider the views of representatives of major 
groups and non-governmental organizations, including the private sector, giving them clear 
channels for providing Governments with their views, within the established rules and 
modalities of the United Nations system; […]
581
 
 
In 1972, the UNEP constitutive instrument, UN General Assembly Resolution 2997 
(XXVII) invited: 
 
[…] other intergovernmental and those non-governmental organizations that have an interest 
in the field of environment to lend their full support and collaboration to the United Nations 
with a view to achieving the largest possible degree of co-operation and co-ordination […]582   
 
Van den Bossche, in a broader analysis of this provision, states that it constitutes an 
implicit legal basis for UNEP-NGO engagement, although it does not provide sufficient 
legal base to establish a strong argument in comparison with the much wider legal 
foundation established by the ECOSOC provisions regarding NGO consultative status.583  
The UNEP provision does not directly establish specific arrangements nor does it provide a 
structured framework for the function and the nature of NGO participation.  However, ever 
since the GA. Res. 2997 (XXVII) was adopted, many NGOs worldwide have collaborated 
with the UNEP, which has created several alternative paths for them to participate within 
its institutional capacity. Consequently, NGOs participate in policy making processes as 
well as in implementing UNEP programmes some of which are detailed below.584   
 
                                                 
581 Ibid, Chapter II  
582 Para 5, Part IV of the GA. Res. 2997 (XXVII) in 15th December 1972 
583Bossche P.V. (2007) Regulatory Legitimacy of the role of NGOs in Global Governance : Legal Status and 
Accreditation, in NGO Involvement in International Governance and Policy : Sources of Legitimacy edited 
by Vedder A., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden.Boston, pp: 135-172 at  P. 144 
584 Ibid. 
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The UNEP document in 2004, ‘Natural Allies: UNEP and Civil Society’, regarding the 
implementation of its programme of work, addresses many areas,585 such as early warning 
assessment, policy development, the implementation of environment policy and law, 
communications, public information, and engaging business and industry in 
partnerships.586 All these areas of concern benefit from the greater expertise and 
networking capacity of NGOs, therefore, their participation in the implementation of 
UNEP’s programme of work is vital in every aspect.587  However, Ripinsky and Van den 
Bossche noted the lack of legal framework for such participation588 by pointing out that on 
one occasion UNEP referred directly to the ECOSOC rules for NGO participation in its 
programme. Nevertheless, they conclude that NGOs have been involved to a great extent 
in UNEP achieving its goals.589  
 
Van den Bossche identifies two main forms of NGO involvement in UNEP policy 
development:590 firstly, participating in Governing Council591 and Global Ministerial 
Environmental Forum;592 secondly, participating in the Global Civil Society Forum.  Rule 
69 of the Rules and Procedures of the Governing Council, which, in Rule 69 under the 
                                                 
585 Ripinsky and Bossche refer to UNEP document, ‘Modalities for Accredited International Non-
Governmental Organizations to UNEP to Submit Written Inputs into the Unedited Working Documents of 
the UNEP’s GC/GMEF and to Submit Written Statements to the GC/GMEF of UNEP.’ in Ripinsky Sergey 
and Bossche P.V. (2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal Analysis, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, p.121 
586 Natural Allies: UNEP and Civil Society(2004), UNEP Secretariat, Chapter 3,  p.25-26 
http://www.unep.org/PDF/Natural_Allies_en/Natural_Allies_english_full.pdf (last visited 29.04.2010) 
587 Ibid. 
588 Ripinsky S. and Bossche P.V. (2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal 
Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, p.121 
589 http://www.unep.org/PDF/Natural_Allies_en/Natural_Allies_english_full.pdf last visited on 29.04.2009 
590 Bossche P.V. (2007) Regulatory Legitimacy of the role of NGOs in Global Governance : Legal Status and 
Accreditation, in NGO Involvement in International Governance and Policy : Sources of Legitimacy edited 
by Vedder A., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden.Boston, pp: 135-172 at  P. 144 
591 The Governing Council is the supreme organ of UNEP.  It is composed of 58 Member States based on 
geographical representation, elected by the General Assembly.  The Governing Council reports to the GA 
through ECOSOC.  Para.1 of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII) ‘Institutional 
and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Co-operation’ 
592 Global Ministerial Environment Forum was formed in 1999.  It gathers annually to important policy 
issues in the field of environment. Para 6 of the  Resolution of the United Nations General assembly 53/242,  
‘Report of the Secretary General on Environmental and human settlements’ A/RES/53/242/ in 10 Aug. 1999 
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section on Observers of International Non-Governmental Organizations, sets up wider 
access to accredited NGOs in its decision-making processes by stating that “representatives 
of international non-governmental organisations may sit as observers at public meeting of 
the Governing Council and other subsidiary organs”.593 Under the same provision, NGOs 
can “make oral statements within the subject of their interest, upon the invitation of the 
Chairman and approval of the Governing Council or the concerned subsidiary organ”594 
and a written statement may also be provided by an accredited NGO to be circulated to the 
members of the Council and other subsidiary organs only if the said document is related to 
the agenda item of the Governing Council or other subsidiary organ.595 
 
I believe that broader involvement of NGOs in UNEP should be encouraged in order to 
make their more local, national and international initiatives within the UNEP heard which 
is important in terms of their ability to bring forward Southern concerns more vociferously 
at the negotiating tables.  The majority of Members from the South, together with the 
position of its headquarters in Nairobi, emphasises the Southern character of UNEP, even 
though these characteristics on their own don’t conclusively promote, or protect, Southern 
environmental concerns.  Consequently, UNEP has often been recognised as a common 
stage on which to lay down developing countries positions in the context of global 
governance, which means that UNEP has become a fine example of an institution that is 
updating its NGO participation rules according to the changing nature of international 
politics.   
 
                                                 
593 Rule 69(1) of the Rules and Procedures of the Governing Council of the UNEP in 1988 
http://www.unep.org/download_file.multilingual.asp?FileID=11 (last visited 24.04.2010) 
594 Ibid. 
595 Rule 69(2) of the Rules and Procedures of the Governing Council of the UNEP in 1988 
http://www.unep.org/download_file.multilingual.asp?FileID=11 (last visited 24.04.2010) 
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The acceptance of NGOs as principal partners in environmental decision-making was 
further enhanced by the introduction of Agenda 21, a programme of action for the 21st 
century.  The following section will analyse NGO participation in environmental 
instruments in this context.   
  
Agenda 21 
 
Another landmark provision that has broadened NGO participation in the international 
system is Chapter 23 of Agenda 21.596  The preamble to the section “Strengthening the 
Role of Major Groups” introduces NGOs as one of the key players in promoting 
sustainable development.  The aim of the cooperation between decision-making bodies and 
other groups is described as an agenda set up for “moving towards real social partnership 
in support of common efforts for sustainable development”597 thus Paragraph 23.2 
recognises the importance of broad public participation in decision-making for achieving 
sustainable development goals. The significance of NGOs participating in the decision-
making process, as well as providing access to the information related to their areas of 
work, is also emphasised.598   
 
In its approach to NGO participation, Agenda 21 shows a progressive way of incorporating 
NGO capacity in the global governance process and Chapter 27 builds a prominent basis 
by recognizing NGOs as social partners, which, according to Willetts, implies equal status 
                                                 
596 UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol..I-III), 12 August 1992, Agenda 21, Annex II of the Report of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, pars. 23.3,38.44 
597 UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol..I-III), 12 August 1992, Agenda 21, Para 23.4  
598 UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol..I-III), 12 August 1992, Agenda 21, Para 23.2. 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter23.htm  (last visited on 
13.09.2010) 
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between NGOs and States.599 In the Agenda, NGO partnership arrangements vary between 
international, national and local government organisations and partnership arrangements 
with other NGOs.600 Therefore all levels of governing bodies are encouraged to cooperate 
with NGOs in order to achieve sustainable development goals. This particular provision 
emphasises the necessary adjustment that is required because it upgrades NGO 
involvement in global governance from mere participation to partnerships. To further 
strengthen the partnership possibilities, Agenda 21 states that the UN and its governments, 
in consultation with NGOs, should take necessary actions “to review procedures and 
mechanisms for the involvement of these organizations at all levels from policy-making 
and decision-making to implementation”.601  However, the fullest cooperation of NGO 
participation throughout the decision-making process is vital in order to utilize their 
highest capacity as environmental decision-making authority.  It is important to mention 
that this commitment to establish partnership arrangements with NGOs and other 
institutions for the achievement of sustainable development is highlighted throughout 
Chapter 27 of Agenda 21.   
 
The reason for this progressive approach is primarily based on the argument that the 
resolution of environmental issues requires a global approach involving multidimensional 
governance frameworks and that sustainable development goals will not be attained unless 
governance structures cross the boundaries of strict international legal interpretation. 
Agenda 21, therefore, offers the prospect of future development for international 
                                                 
599 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p.206 
600 Para 27.4 of the Agenda 21emphasises the importance of fullest cooperation and communication between 
international organizations, national and local governments and non governmental organization in order to 
meet the targets of Agenda 21.  UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol..I-III), 12 August 1992, Agenda 21, Para 
23.2.  http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter23.htm (last accessed on 
13.09.2010) 
601 Para 27.6 of the Agenda 21. UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol..I-III), 12 August 1992, Agenda 21, Para 
23.2.  http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter23.htm (last accessed on 
13.09.2010) 
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governance structures by including NGOs as social.  As Willetts points out, Agenda 21 
gives a clear sense of political commitments to providing access for all groups.602   
 
The instrumental and institutional provisions in the environment field have inspired many 
efforts to widen NGO involvement in global governance, to which end the legal provisions 
covering environmental law and politics have reiterated the need for greater NGO 
involvement regarding the development of international environmental governance on the 
grounds that such involvement enriches the process with information, expertise, 
networking and resources.  However, some authors call NGOs ‘intellectual competitors’ to 
governments in policy making forums,603 the key legal argument against NGO 
participation being the absence of a ‘legal personality’, which means that, even though 
NGOs have proved their negotiating capacity in terms of research, technology and 
expertise, they are still not accepted as equal partners to governments.  However, as 
Willetts emphasises, it is superficial to believe that no power to vote means no power to 
negotiate.604  Today, NGOs participate in most of the crucial decision making panels, and 
they influence the decision making authorities whose votes finally decide outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The central issue that has been examined in this chapter is what potential NGOs can offer 
within the legal structure of the international system in the area of environmental 
governance. Because of the transnational nature of environmental issues, their initiatives 
have often made it possible for them to play significant roles in the decision-making 
                                                 
602 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p. 191 – 212 at p. 194 
603 Esty D. (1998), Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, 
Competition, or Exclusion, Journal of International economic Law, Volume 1, p. 123 
604 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements ” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at he UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, p. 191-2121 at p. 207 
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processes to the extent where they can participate, alongside governments, in voicing their 
various concerns. However, these non-state actors have not yet been offered complete 
access to the global decision-making fora that consist entirely of state parties,605 since, in 
many instances they are excluded from participating where the most crucial decisions are 
being taken.  A key reason for this exclusion is that the formal legal structures do not 
recognise their role as official participants.  Therefore the States, as privileged actors 
within the scope of international law, will always have greater privileges in governance 
than non-state actors.  
 
On the other hand, any attempts to enhance NGO participation will face many barriers 
within the existing legal structures of global governance.  As this chapter has shown, the 
absence of legal personality of NGOs obstructs their attempts to become established as full 
partners in governance. Moving towards wider participation in governance is a challenging 
task, since the rules and regulations on NGO involvement in international decision-making 
are still crafted by the States; consequently, NGO influence on the formation of the 
governing rules has often been minimal.  
 
Nonetheless, some scholars have expressed positive legal and political suggestions for 
enhancing access for NGOs.  Dupuy and Vierucci suggest NGOs will be granted some 
form of legal personality, such as the international legal personality granted by the ICJ to 
the United Nations in 1949,606  by arguing that, since the UN was recognised as having a 
legal personality in that it had been a ‘great necessity’ for the world community.   Dupuy, 
therefore, argues that the law needs to recognise NGOs in the same way, since it has 
                                                 
605 Ibid, p.192 
606 Dupuy and Vierucci refer reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,  ICJ 
Reports, 1949,pp.174ff.  Dupuy P. (2008), Conclusion: return on the legal status of NGOs and on the 
methodological problems which arise for legal scholarship in NGOs in International Law: Efficiency in 
Flexibility? edited by  Dupuy P and Vierucci L., Edward Elgar, p.208-209 
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become an equally ‘great necessity’ in today’s context.607 However, in presenting a 
different opinion, Lindblom states that: “… an international legal system based on states 
was accepted as a fact which is unlikely to be replaced by another system, such as 
cosmopolitan democracy, at any time in the nearer future”.608 But she does suggest, as of 
today, NGOs have at least a legitimate expectation, if not for a general right, to participate 
in international legal discourse.609 Willetts, by suggesting that NGOs are now increasingly 
playing a partnership role with the states in international negotiations,610 argues that the 
partnership role of NGOs is in evidence with the changing of the interstate system into a 
multiactor system both politically and legally.611 I therefore believe that NGOs, through 
their inexorable move towards wider participation as a result of their involvement in 
governance and transnational environmental issues have become crucial actors in 
contemporary global governance discourse.    
 
Another important issue on the subject of NGO participation in global governance is that 
the UN Charter authorizes only one institution – ECOSOC – to make arrangements for 
‘consultation and cooperation’ with NGOs.  The World Bank and the IMF, as the world’s 
financial institutions, do not have any legal provision for NGO participation within their 
constituent instruments, which means that most international institutions that have 
consultation, collaboration or accreditation relationship with NGOs, are guided by 
secondary regulations adopted by the governing bodies of such institutions.612  This lack of 
                                                 
607 Dupuy P. (2008), Conclusion: return on the legal status of NGOs and on the methodological problems 
which arise for legal scholarship in NGOs in International Law: Efficiency in Flexibility? edited by  Dupuy P 
and Vierucci L., Edward Elgar, p.209 
608 Lindblom A. (2005), Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 524 
609 Ibid, p.526 
610 Willets P. (2000), From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status of NGOs in 
Diplomacy at the UN, Global Governance, Volume 6, pp.191-212 
611 Ibid, p. 208 
612 Ripinsky S. and Bossche P.V. (2007), NGO Involvement in International Organizations : A Legal 
Analysis, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, p.207-222 
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recognition both as actors in global governance and in international legal discourse, 
motivates NGOs to seek alternative prospects in informal arrangements, such as by way of 
involvement in transnational networks. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 will explore the possibilities of NGO participation towards voicing 
Southern environmental concerns in the absence of state intervention in any effective 
international negotiation. It is my proposition that the increase in NGO participation could 
be used in order to narrow the political gap between North and South in global decision-
making.  Many Southern States are unable to meet the standards of international 
agreements for several reasons, which include the lack of finance and/or expertise or 
because of their different developmental priorities; as Karen T. Litfin states:  
 
Many “sovereign” Third World states even lack sufficient funds to send delegates to 
international treaty negotiations. Thus, a formalistic understanding of sovereignty as 
constitutional independence offers little insight in to the environment/sovereignty 
nexus, either in the Third World or elsewhere.
613 
 
In this sense, NGO participation might be considered to be an incentive for Southern 
governments to face up to the challenges of becoming involved in international decision-
making. However, the limit of NGO participation is formally decided by the legal 
boundaries, which are strictly maintained by traditional state-centred legal interpretations, 
as I mentioned earlier, certain legal definitions of NGOs are yet to be established. Under 
these circumstances the legal personality of NGOs should be redefined in order that the 
boundaries of their participation might be clarified.  It is also important to understand that 
                                                 
613 Litfin T.K. (1998), ‘The greening of Sovereignty: An Introduction’, in The greening of Sovereignty in 
World Politics edited by Litfin T.K. Cambridge, MA: THE MIT Press,, pp1-23 at p.7   
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the formal structures of governance are hugely influenced and challenged by 
multidimensional frameworks, which are becoming popular because of increasingly 
globalized input. An example of such forward-thinking governance might be transnational 
NGO networks, which make considerable impact on global environmental governance 
whilst not being official members of it.614  Therefore, perhaps those involved in 
formulating international legal frameworks need to be more flexible regarding 
multidimensional governance structures, in order to face up to the environmental 
challenges ahead.  
 
This chapter has emphasised the great need to seek alternative legal paths by which NGOs 
might articulate Southern environmental concerns more effectively. As Charnovitz 
observes: “[L]ooking ahead, I predict that NGOs will continue to inject competing facts 
and sentiments into public debate, and that inter governmental consultation with NGOs 
will help to achieve more englobing international law in the twenty-first century.”615 
 
Chapter 4, which will contain an analysis of a case study based on global forest 
negotiations, will explore the North-South dimension of interstate negotiations and what 
NGOs can offer in order to minimise the differences between the two groupings.   In so 
doing, it will examine Southern environmental concerns in relation to forests while 
considering the feasibility of NGOs voicing those concerns more effectively at global 
decision making fora. 
                                                 
614 Chapter 5 of this thesis will analyse transnational NGO networks in detail, pp: 240-294 
615 Charnovitz  S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 100, p. 348 at p. 372 
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4. Global Forest Negotiations: North-South Dimension 
and the Roles of NGOs 
 
 “In the final analysis the bargain was not struck. 
The South did not gain the concessions it wanted 
from the North, and the North did not extract any 
binding commitments from the South on tropical 
forest conservation.”616  
David Humphreys  
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have established that in an age of globalisation, when environmental 
problems are no longer considered to be mere national or local concerns, multilateral 
cooperation of the entire international community needs to remain committed towards 
finding sustainable solutions for environmental concerns of a global nature.  Achieving a 
common solution for contemporary environmental issues has become a highly challenging 
task in the context of the North-South dimension, where any common ground swings 
between two contradictory goals i.e. developmental and environmental protection.  The 
ability of Southern states to voice Southern environmental concerns at global decision 
making forums is hampered by many conceptual and practical constraints based on the 
various historical, political, economic and political factors that were explored in Chapter 1.  
Chapter 3 of the thesis, described the role of multidimensional framework of governance 
                                                 
616 Humphreys D. (1996), Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. London, p.103 
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with a particular emphasis on NGOs. It described the current legal standing of NGOs in 
global governance and explored the positive institutional approaches of environmental 
institutions towards their broader engagement in policy forums.    
 
The first section of this chapter will further explore the issues related to North-South 
dimension raised in Chapter 2 in the context of a case study on the global forest 
negotiations. It will also determine what insights might be gained from the Case Study 
(described below) in the areas of participation and policy-making. Among the key issues 
highlighted in this section will be the differences between North and South regarding the 
underlying causes of the forest problem. The aim, therefore, will be to examine how valid 
the theoretical constructs of events and situations, as described in the previous chapters, are 
in the context of the reality of the global UN institutions and to describe the role of NGOs 
in voicing the South’s concerns regarding global forest negotiations.  
 
This chapter will go on to assess the role of NGOs in representing Southern forest issues at 
the global level.  It argues that many barriers that the South suffers at global negotiations 
can be overcome by effective NGO contributions.  Issues, such as the lack of, a research 
base, expertise, technology, interpersonal negotiation skills, and transnational network 
facilities, have made it difficult for Southern countries to provide NGOs to represent them 
in vital global negotiations. Exploring the possible roles that NGOs might play in voicing 
Southern environmental concerns, therefore, is one of the key themes of this thesis. 
Because the forest debate interlinks with many other international regimes of global 
environmental governance, this discussion offers a broader understanding of both 
international law and the political background in order for NGOs to participate more 
effectively in global governance.   
185 
 
 
This chapter will also put forward the argument that the North-South dimension has always 
impacted on global forest negotiations and it will analyse how successful NGOs have been 
in raising the South’s concerns, as discussed in Chapter 3, about global forest negotiations.   
 
The Case Study 
 
There are several reasons for selecting forest negotiations as a Case Study in order to 
examine the North-South dimension of international environmental governance. Firstly, 
the forest negotiations are still in the process of developing a formal international law 
regime.  Much research involving certain elements of international law that need to be 
further developed has been, and is being, conducted617, therefore there are many issues 
that, when they are resolved, will contribute to the creation of new law.   
 
Secondly, because the aim of this thesis is to develop a strong argument for NGOs to voice 
Southern concerns in the process of forest negotiations, since they can provide invaluable 
information, a Case Study may be of benefit in the future development of international law. 
The main focus of the study, therefore, will be the potential contribution of NGOs towards 
the development of environmental policy, rather than of the implementation of a particular 
policy that has already been established. 
 
Thirdly, forest negotiations are a research area of great interest during a period when 
climate change is considered to be the most challenging environmental priority in the 
world.  As Barry Gardiner, a member of the UK parliament stated in 2009, “If the world is 
                                                 
617 Many of them explore issues related to a formal legal document on forests.  Humphreys D. (2006), 
Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance, Earthscan Publications Ltd. London, Dimitrov 
R. S. (2006), Science & International Environmental policy: Regimes and Nonregimes in Global 
Governance, Rowman & Littlefiels Publishers, Inc. 
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to solve the problem of climate change it must solve the problem of forest loss.”618   At the 
Bali negotiations states’ parties agreed to reduce carbon emission from deforestation and 
forest degradation (REDD) thereby emphasising the interconnectivity of two major issues 
– climate change and deforestation. Furthermore, forest issues are interlinked with 
biological diversity, which is another important international environmental concern. The 
argument put forward in this thesis, therefore, is that forest issues require strong 
international commitments from the global environmental governance authorities. 
 
Fourthly, forest negotiations offer a good platform from which to evaluate how seriously 
Southern environmental concerns are taken into account when an international legal forest 
regime is being developed. It will also indicate the impact Southern environmental 
concerns actually have at global decision making forums when such a regime is being 
developed.  
 
The Case Study that follows, therefore, will aim to fulfil two main objectives. Firstly, to 
identify North-South differences regarding the level of participation and policy 
implementation within the governance structure. Secondly, to assess the level of NGO 
participation in the governance structure in order to judge whether they might minimize the 
differences between North and South by ensuring that the voice of the South is effectively 
projected into the negotiations.   
                                                 
618 Commonwealth Forestry Association Newsletter, No. 44, March 2009, Commonwealth Foundation, p. 4 
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An Overview of International Forest Negotiations  
 
Forests  
 
Forests, mainly the tropical variety, concern many aspects of human and natural life on 
earth.619 They provide a range of human necessities from consumer items to rather 
nebulous entities such as national development and international trade.  Many studies have 
identified the four main functions of forests: (i) environmental, (ii) ecological, (iii) 
economic, and (iv) social – such as religious, spiritual and cultural.620 Environmental 
functions can be described as the potential for maintaining the natural cycle of nature. 
Tropical forests in particular fulfil ecological functions by maintaining biological diversity, 
while they have been good economic providers for many, since they produce a variety of 
consumer goods, including logging timber, which is a very important commercial aspect of 
forests. Finally, forests are the centre of attraction for dwellers and non-dwellers alike, 
since they provide different opportunities in terms of accommodation, religious practice 
and entertainment.621   
 
As a result of such broad usage, political forest negotiations encompass a wide array of 
diverse issues and concerns that cover many areas of global governance, which involve 
                                                 
619 Multi functionality of forest usage is mentioned in para b and c of the Preamble to The Forest Principles, 
1992.    
620 The categorization is mainly based upon the following literature; Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International 
Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and the Brazilian Amazon, International Books, 
Netherlands., Gale F. P. (1998), The Tropical Timber Trade Regime, Macmillan Press., Brown K. and Pearce 
D. W. (edited) (1994), The Causes of Tropical Deforestation: The economic and statistical analysis of 
factors giving rise to the loss of the tropical forests, UCL Press. 
621Rosendal  K.G. (2001), Overlapping International Regimes:  The Case of the Intergovernmental Forum on 
Forests (IFF) between Climate Change and Bio Diversity, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, Volume 1, pp:447-468 at p.449, Smouts M.C.(2003), Tropical Forests International 
Jungle: The Underside of Global Ecopolitics, Palgrave Macmillan ,Humphreys D. (1996), Forest Politics: 
The Evolution of International Cooperation, Earthscan Publications Ltd. London, pp. 2- 15, Kolk A. (1996), 
Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and the Brazilian 
Amazon, International Books, Netherlands, pp:68-72 
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numerous international actors from governments, international organisations, such as the 
World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), UNDP, and WTO  together 
with non-state actors, such as NGOs, and other relevant business representatives. Also, 
because forest issues interconnect with other international environmental matters, such as 
climate change, desertification and bio- diversity, forest related provisions have been 
included in numerous international conventions in many areas of international 
environmental law and governance.622 Consequently, decisions taken on the world’s forests 
potentially affect many other aspects of international decision making.   
 
The Evolution of the Forest Regime 
 
Whereas most other international environmental regimes are structured around a single 
legal convention and its subsequent protocols, there is no single formal legal authority for 
the forest regime. Therefore, an overview of forest negotiations covers a variety of events 
and instruments that that took place over several decades.  Global forest negotiations can 
be divided into three periods: (i) the period prior to UNCED  in 1992, which began with 
agreements about the international trade of tropical timber, (ii) the UNCED international 
negotiations, and (iii) the period following UNCED, i.e. the current negotiations period.623  
 
With the establishment of the FAO in 1946 several forest conservation and development 
initiatives were taken, including the establishment of the FAO Forestry Department.624 
Like many other environmental issues, forestry did not attract global attention until the 
                                                 
622 For example: Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Degradation(REDD) provisions under UNFCC 
discuss many forests related issues. http://www.un-redd.org/ (last accessed on 28.02.2011) Convention on 
Biological Diversity includes forests related issues from the perspective of biodiversity. 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/?a=cbd-03 (last accessed on 28.02.2011),  
623 Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and 
the Brazilian Amazon, International Books, Netherlands, pp:127-128 
624 Humphreys D. (1996), Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. London, p.32 
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1972 UNCHE Conference, which drew attention to the environmentally negative effects of 
industrialisation. At the same time, the developing country-front of the UN initiated a 
meeting in Founex in Switzerland, which led to the 1971 “Founex Report” on 
environmental degradation and the destruction of valuable forest.625 The report not only 
pointed out that the expansion of agriculture in developing countries caused the loss of vast 
area of tropical forest, but that environmental problems can arise as a result of 
underdevelopment and poverty.626 Therefore, many developing countries expressed their 
concern about new and additional financial and technological transfer from the North the 
South.627  In fact, the recognition of forests issues in the Founex Report shows that the 
North-South dimension has been part and parcel of forest debates since the early 
negotiation period. In the light of this, the report advocated “incorporating environmental 
considerations into development strategies as a way of avoiding making the same mistake 
that had been made by industrialised countries in the past.”628  
 
Many initiatives were taken in relation to forests during the 1970s, however, most post-
UNCHE forest-related legal principles were not directly derived from forest-related 
documents, but from other international legally-binding conventions.629 For instance, the 
1971 “Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance”630, which applied to 
marsh forests and mangroves, covered some aspects of forest conservation. The 1973 
                                                 
625 United Nations document, A/CONF.48/10, Annex I: II-3, 22 December 1971, 
http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Earth%20Summit%202012new/Publications%20and%20R
eports/founex%20report%201972.pdf (last accessed on 26.02.2011) 
626 Principle 1.4, Chapter 4, Founex Report, 1971 
627 Principle 4.17, Chapter 4, Founex Report, 1971 
628 Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and 
the Brazilian Amazon, International Books, Netherlands, p.129 
629 Smouts M.C. (2003), Tropical Forests International Jungle: The Underside of Global Ecopolitics, 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 132-133 
630 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat , adopted at 
Ramsar, Iran on 2 February 1971. 
http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=1-31-38^20708_4000_0__  (last 
visited on 01.09.2009) 
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“Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora”,631 
which covered many species of trees, made provisions that reflected the Northern 
“conservationist” approach, since they mainly focused on global forest protection and 
conservation. During this period, also, forests became a significant issue in other global 
governance aspects, for example: The 1972 UNESCO “Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage” included forests in its concern for 
world heritage.632  
 
A decade later, in 1985, at the United Nations Conference on Tropical Timber, the 
International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) was established to monitor tropical 
forestry.  Two years ago in 1983, the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), 
which reflected the increased global concern over tropical deforestation in developing 
countries, was created for maintaining environmental friendly timber trade activities (this 
was renegotiated in 1994 and 2006).633 Humphreys highlights two Articles in the 
Agreement in this regard.  Firstly, Article 1(b), which aims to ‘promote the expansion and 
diversification of international trade in tropical timber’. Secondly Article 1(h), which states 
that the ITTA promotes ‘the development of national policies aimed at sustainable 
utilization and conservation of tropical forests and their genetic resources, and at 
maintaining the ecological balance in the regions concerned’.634 He argues that these ITTA 
                                                 
631 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, signed at 
Washington D.C. on 3 March 1973 and amended at Bonn on 22 June 1979. 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml#texttop (last visited on 01.09.2009) 
632  Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Adopted at Paris on 
16 November 1972 http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf (last visited on 01.09.2010) 
633 United Nations International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994, TD/Timber.2/16, United Nations 
International Tropical Timber Agreement, 2006, TD/Timber.3/12, The agreements are available: 
http://www.itto.int/itta/ (last accessed on 08.12.2010) 
634 UN document TD/ TIMBER/  11 Rev.1, International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1983, p.8,Humphreys 
David (1996), Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation, Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
London, p.129 
191 
 
objectives represent a balance in the policies on forests between development and 
conservation.635 Weiss evaluates the effectiveness of Article 1(b) of the ITTA as follows:  
 
For the producer countries, (this addition to the 1983 treaty) was expected to offer 
opportunities to expand and receive technical transfers and financial assistance from 
consuming countries. Consuming countries, in turn, were to enjoy expanded and stable 
supplies of tropical timber as well as increased esteem in the eyes of domestic constituents 
and international organizations.
636 
 
During 1983 and 1994, the ITTA mainly focussed on the scope of the tropical timber trade 
and conservation; however, in 2006 it extended the scope of the previous two agreements 
to incorporate a new dimension on topical issues, which included forest law enforcement, 
illegal logging and non-timber products.637  Consequently, the ITTA’s current objectives 
are now much more diverse. Following the establishment of ITTA, in the mid-1980s global 
forest negotiations gradually moved towards the formulation of the global forestry treaty, 
accomplished at the beginning of the 1990s. Post-UNCED, global forest negotiations had 
been marked by several rounds of negotiations with the purpose of producing a formal 
legal regime, therefore, the discussions at UNCED in 1992 were mainly based on two 
documents – Chapter 11 (Forest Section) of Agenda 21, and the “Non-Legally Binding 
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, 
                                                 
635 Humphreys points out that these Articles, which stress the necessity for balance between development and 
conservation came out as a result of the influence of IUCN over formatting ITTA objectives.  IUCN 
emphasised that neither development nor conservation could be achieved in isolation. Humphreys D. (1996), 
Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation, Earthscan Publications Ltd. London,  p.56- 57 
636Weiss B.E. and  Harold J.K. (1998),  Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International 
Environmental Accords, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, p. 117 
637 Para (m) of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 2006, TD/TIMBER.3/12, 1st February 2006, 
United Nations Conference for the Negotiations of a Successor Agreement to the International Tropical 
Timber Agreement, 1994 
http://www.environmenthouse.ch/docspublications/reportsRoundtables/forests2006.pdf  (last accessed  on 
02.03.2011) 
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Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests” (the Forest 
Principles) a currently prevailing soft law created at the Rio summit in 1992.638 
 
After UNCED there followed International Policy Forum (IPF) proposals in 1997, 
International Forum on Forests (IFF) proposals in 2000 and a number of United Nations 
Forum on Forests (UNFF) resolutions made since 2002.639 During the post-Rio (1992) 
period, many commitments were made in global forest architecture. IPF/IFF proposals for 
action, the growth of regional criteria and indicator process for sustainable forest 
management and development of national forest programmes in many countries are 
indicative of the progress made since the 1992 UNCED conference.640.  
 
The UNFF was created with the goals of promoting “the management, conservation and 
sustainable development of the world’s forests, and to strengthen long-term political 
commitment to this end”.641 This was established under the aegis of ECOSOC to progress 
the tasks carried out under IPF and IFF.  However, Davenport and Wood note that the 
UNFF process was largely affected by the lack of engagement and consensus among 
members.642 Referring to UNFF-5 in 2005, they explained that the negotiations to initiate a 
legally binding forest convention failed as a result of the contradictory positions of the 
                                                 
638A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add.16,A/CONF.151/PC/WG.I/L.43 – Chapter 11 of the Agenda 21, 
A/CONF.151/PC/WG.I/CRP.14/Rev.2 – Forests Principles, Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International 
Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and the Brazilian Amazon, International Books, 
Netherlands, p.153 
639 For more information on these documents and institutions: Davenport D. S and Wood P. (2006), Finding 
the Way Forward the International Arrangement on Forests: UNFF-5,-6, and -7, RECIEL, Volume 15, Issue 
3. Humphreys D. (2006), Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. London,  Humphreys D. (1999), The Evolving Forest Regime, Global Environmental 
Change, Volume 9, pp: 251-254  
640 Steiner M. (2002), The Journey from Rio to Johannesburg: Ten Years of Forest Negotiations, Ten Years 
of Successes and  Failures, Golden Gate U.L.Review, Volume 32, p. 631 
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/7 (last accessed on 03.03.2011) 
641 ECOSOC Resolution E/2000/3, Economic and Social Council Official Records (2000), Supplement No 1, 
para. 11 
642 Davenport D. S and Wood P. (2006), Finding the Way Forward the International Arrangement on Forests: 
UNFF-5,-6, and -7, Review of European Community and International Law, Volume 15, Issue 3, p. 317 
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delegates.643  UNFF is criticised by Humphreys for the fundamental structure and internal 
weaknesses of its components, which are fragmented, and that systematic communication 
among these components is not happening.644  It appears, therefore, that progressive 
integration in these areas needs to be established in order that UNFF might achieve its 
forest management objectives.   
 
In addition to the above initiatives, a number of relatively recent international forest 
conventions have covered the issues from various different angles.645  Chapter 11 of the 
1992 “Agenda 21”646, the 1992 “Convention to Combat Desertification” (CCD)647, the 
1992 “Convention on Biological Diversity” (CBD)648 and the 1992 “United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change” (UNFCCC)649, which created provisions for 
combating desertification, which indirectly applies to some of the world’s big forests.  For 
example, Article 4(1) (d) of the UNFCCC provides a legal framework for the conservation 
of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, including forests.650 However, even though 
several provisions cover forest issues from many different aspects, the global governance 
system has not succeeded in creating a legally binding document that is totally committed 
to global forests.  
 
                                                 
643 Davenport D. S and Wood P. (2006), Finding the Way Forward the International Arrangement on Forests: 
UNFF-5,-6, and -7, Review of European Community and International Law, Volume 15, Issue 3, p. 317 
644 Humphreys D. (2006), Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. London. 
645 Humphreys D. (2006), Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. London, pp.190-191, Dimitrov R. S. (2006), Science & International Environmental policy: 
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This brief overview of forest negotiations concludes with a comment about the 
comprehensive significance of forests resources in the broad context of global 
environmental governance.  Recognition of the gravity of forest issues has led many 
intergovernmental initiatives to develop legal and political regimes to reverse deforestation 
and degradation.  However, in spite of these efforts, the widespread view among policy 
makers, scholars, researchers, and most others involved in the debate is that the world’s 
forests are still under immense threat.651  High consumption levels of industrialised 
countries and rapidly increasing demand of developing countries contribute to further 
damage to the forest, which will ultimately cause irrecoverable effects to the natural cycle 
of the world.  As the quotation above clearly emphasises, the North-South dimension has 
decisively impacted on negotiations about the challenge of deforestation and other forest 
degradation.   
 
The North considered forests, including their resource, to be a “global common” and it 
emphasises the importance of common responsibility in its approach to a global solution 
for the problem.  In contrast, the South stresses that the forests are sovereign national 
resources and emphasises common, but differentiated, responsibilities towards a 
solution.652  The following section, which will highlight the differences between the 
negotiation positions of North and South will conclude that intergovernmental efforts 
towards forests have largely failed due to the impact of the North-South dimension. 
Furthermore, it will argue that Southern states have failed to voice Southern forest 
concerns at a global level effectively. 
 
                                                 
651 Steiner M. (2002), The Journey from Rio to Johannesburg: Ten Years of Forest Negotiations, Ten Years 
of Successes and Failures,Golden Gate U.L.Rev.,Volume32  
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/7 (last accessed on 03.03.2011) 
652 Humphreys D. (1996), Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. London, p.98 
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North-South dimensions in Forest Negotiations 
 
Forest negotiations, which provide a valuable field of observation for North-South 
conflicts on global decision-making, are highly influenced by the North-South dimension 
regarding the development of a legal regime, or any other concrete solution, to the forest 
problem.  In the next section, the main obstacle for reaching a forest convention, which has 
largely been due to the contrasting position of developed and developing worlds on forest 
policies, will be analysed. The general Northern position is that forests are a natural 
common property that should be preserved to ensure that the world’s natural cycle is 
balanced, an argument that is based on the adverse effects of deforestation and on the many 
other potential environmental catastrophes, such as climate change and the threat to 
biological diversity.   
 
Conversely, the Southern position rests on the ideology of forests as properties within a 
territory that serves the purposes of conservation and development in that particular 
territory.   This argument is founded on the prevailing distrust of the South that the North’s 
global approach might lead to a state of “environmental colonialism”.653 Therefore the 
South strictly holds to the stand that forests are national properties that may be utilized 
according to each country’s national developmental priorities.  These distinctively different 
priorities and agendas, therefore, are the driving factors that have led North and South to 
take distinctly different paths in the forest debates.   
 
The argument of this thesis is that Southern states have previously encountered unfairness, 
inequity and injustice in global environmental negotiations. This Case Study will apply the 
                                                 
653 Agarwal A. and  Narain S. use this term in Agarwal A., Narain S. (1991), Global Warming in an Unequal 
World.  A Case of Environmental Colonialism, New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, Kolk A. 
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following three conditions as used by Najam to assess the nature of the collective South’s 
negotiations in the global environmental conferences in Stockholm (1972), Rio (1992) and 
Johannesburg (2002): Firstly, the negotiating position as determined by the fundamental 
basis of the South’s arguments secondly, the negotiating structure, which involves the 
basic structure of the particular decision-making forum, such as its agenda and the 
composition of its governing bodies, and finally, the substance of the negotiations, which 
includes an analysis of the South’s contribution based on the policy documents, norms and 
outcomes of the negotiation.654 In this study, therefore, the Southern perspective on the 
different stages of the international forest negotiation will be scrutinised in order to assess 
what level of influence the South has had over the global decision-making process. 
 
The South’s negotiating position 
 
Historically, the negotiating position of the developing countries in forest matters is shaped 
by four factors: (i) their preoccupation with economic growth, (ii) fear of the high costs of 
environmental protection, (iii) the sovereignty claim over forests, and (iv) the general 
distrust of the environmental policies of industrialised countries.655 Each of these positions, 
adopted by the South, have had an impact on the nature of its contribution to the 
negotiations because of the severe effect they have had on their countries’ poverty 
eradication and developmental goals. As Porter et al stated in 2000, “for most developing 
countries, economic growth, employment, and overcoming poverty have been the 
dominant concerns.”656 The following discussion on the South’s negotiating position 
display two important features: (i) the South’s representation as one group – the G77, and, 
                                                 
654 Najam A. (2005), A tale of three cities: Developing Countries in Global Environmental Negotiations in 
Global Challenges: Furthering the Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development edited byKallhauge 
A.C., Sjostedt G., Corell E. , Green Leaf Publishing Ltd., pp.124-143 at p.124-125 
655 Porter G. et al (2000), Global Environmental Politics, Third Edition, Westview Press, P.178 
656 Ibid, P.178-179 
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(ii) the sovereign ownership of forests – the South’s main ideology.  The following section 
will explore these two aspects of the South’s negotiating position. 
   
One of the key issues that reflect the North-South dimension concern the two competing 
claims for forest ownership: (i) the North’s belief that forests are a “global common” and 
(ii) national sovereignty. This chapter will analyse these two claims in the context of the 
North-South dimension.   
 
The debate as to whether forests are a part of the “global commons”, or whether they are 
“national property”, was illustrated in 1992 by Hurrell: 
 
Deforestation raises particularly difficult issues because of the fact that the forests are wholly 
located within a particular country […] and that their preservation or destruction lies within 
the sovereign jurisdiction of […] state.  This raises important question as to whether and to 
what extent rainforests are in fact part of the ‘global commons’ and represent a collective 
good.
657   
 
Defining the forest as ‘a natural resource that can be recognized as a common heritage of 
mankind’ can lead to a global authority over forests.  In contrast, defining it as ‘belonging 
to a sovereign land within territorial boundaries’ can give rise to the belief that they fall 
under national jurisdiction.658  Many Northern countries identify forest issues as matters of 
global concern, while many developing countries argue that it is their sovereign right to 
                                                 
657 Hurrell A. (1992), Brazil and the International Politics of Amazonian Deforestation in The International 
Politics of the Environment edited by Herrell Andrew and Kingsbury Benedict,  Oxford University Press, p. 
401 
658 For in depth analysis on sovereignty and environment debate read Ltfin K. T. (1998) (edited) The 
Greening of Sovereignty in World Politic, The MIT Press, London. 
198 
 
make decisions over their own forests.659  As Hurrell explains, ownership claims of forests 
either as a global common or as state property can be argued both ways, depending on 
what environmental issue is being debated.  As he states: 
 
Thus the use of CFCs, or the burning of fossil fuels, has a direct impact on the atmosphere, 
which clearly is a global common and provides collective goods from which all benefit. 
Tropical forests, like the ozone layer or the atmosphere provide benefits for all and are in this 
sense a collective good.  They are therefore characteristic of commons in terms of the 
functions that they perform.  On the other hand, unlike the ozone layer, the oceans, or 
Antarctica, forests are located firmly within particular sovereign states and do not share the 
typical characteristic of collective goods: indivisible and non-excludability.660  
 
These parallel themes of a problem either being global or centred within a national 
boundary, should be separated from each other in order to eliminate further confusion. At 
the end of 1980s, as with many other environmental issues, forests, because of increasing 
awareness about the timber trade and the alarming rate of deforestation, became a global 
issue.661 Explaining the rapid increase in global attention, Smouts wrote:  
 
In addition to the loss of economically valuable timber resources and the destruction of 
environments and habitats on which many populations and their cultures depend, the 
destruction of tropical rain forests began to imply the extinction of millions of living species 
                                                 
659 I will analyse the principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference in relation to the forest ownership later in this 
chapter.  Smouts M.C. (2003), Tropical Forests International Jungle: The Underside of Global Ecopolitics, 
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660 Hurrell A. (1992), Brazil and the International Politics of Amazonian Deforestation, The International 
Politics of the Environment edited by Hurrell Andrew and Kingsbury Benedict, Oxford University Press, p. 
401 
661 Smouts M.C. (2003), Tropical Forests International Jungle: The Underside of Global Ecopolitics, 
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lost forever to medicine, agriculture, industry, and … to our contemplation.  The issue had 
become global.662  
 
As soon as forests became a global political issue, they became a concern for international 
negotiation. More often than not international negotiations lead to global political, 
economic and legal implementations that require adjustments in national and worldwide 
practices.663 The question here is when an issue located within national boundaries – hence 
subject to state sovereignty – becomes a global concern, who holds the authority to make 
the relevant laws and led to the establishment of different positions regarding proprietorial 
status.  As has been previously stated, the developed North stands for the “global common” 
forest argument and the developing South, through G77, for “sovereign status”, for fear of 
opening their boundaries to global governance.664  The South’s position was clearly 
highlighted in the forest negotiations at the 1992 UNCED, when the G77 opposed the 
developed countries’ call for a global forest convention on grounds of the sovereignty 
principle, which emphasises that the international authorities cannot make legally binding 
rules with regard to resources located within a specific territory.665  
 
At present, under the concept of sovereignty, international law establishes national 
ownership. Also, since the very early stages of their independence in the 1960s, the 
sovereign right over natural resources was established in international law resulting from 
the developing countries involvement in General Assembly Resolution 1803 XVII (1962) 
                                                 
662 Ibid, p. 46  
663 Ibid, p. 26 
664 Levin K. et al(2008), The climate regime as a global forest governance: can reduced emissions from 
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recommended the sovereign right of every state over its natural resources.666 The 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974, again reaffirmed permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources.667   These international legal provisions were assured 
by the 1972 Stockholm Principle 21.668 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.
669  
These sovereign rights were confirmed in the same words in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio 
UNCED Declaration. 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.670  
However, the sovereign right over natural resources established by the Stockholm 
declaration was further expanded by the Rio Declaration as ‘to exploit their own resources 
                                                 
666 Boyle A. and Birnie P. (2002), International Law and the Environment, second edition, Oxford University 
Press, p. 138. 
667 This issue is discussed in Chapter 1 in much detail, pp: 36-44 
668 Principle 21, Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in 1972.  
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503 (last accessed 
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669 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in 
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670 Principle 02 of the Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
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pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies.’671 Humphreys refers to a 
G77 spokesperson’s comments at the Rio conference when emphasising the firm position 
of the developing countries: ‘We cannot accept the application of such concepts as “global 
commons” or the “common heritage of mankind” with regard to the territorial domain of 
developing countries.’672 The negotiation position of the South, therefore, has been 
founded on the recognition of forests as that belonging within sovereign boundaries of 
states and that any international negotiations should be implemented according to the 
priorities of each state’s national environmental and developmental policies.  
 
As explained in Chapter 1 and 2, the position of the South in international negotiations is 
often represented collectively as the G77 since, in spite of differences in economic and 
political power amongst themselves. The member states share many common issues in 
relation to environment, it is therefore sensible for them to come together as one group at 
international negotiations.673 However, more recently, the growing disparity among 
different groupings within G77 has become widely discussed under the topic of climate 
change.674 The rapidly industrialising G77 countries, such as Brazil, India and China, are 
reaching their developmental goals more quickly than others in the group, while others, 
such as the G77 OPEC countries, with their influence on the global oil market, affected not 
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672 Humphreys D. (2006), Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance, Earthscan 
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developments and Future Directions, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 8, pp:113-127  
202 
 
only developed countries but, to an even greater extent, their fellow G77 members.675 Also, 
during negotiations on desertification, the conflicting agendas of African and non-African 
members greatly affected G77’s united position.676 However, as Miller notes, in spite of 
differences in economic and political power, common-property resource issues allow the 
developing countries to exercise some influence in environmental regime formation.677  As 
Najam explains:  
 
The real surprise has been that despite these differences the countries of the South have so 
constantly stuck together on so many issues, very often even on those where they had 
different interests, and that even when they chose to pursue their differentiated interests in 
global negotiations they nearly always did so within the framework of the G77.
678  
 
The representation of the South as one group is significant in many environmental 
negotiations, consequently, international forest negotiations provide an important example 
from which to analyse the Southern position in international environmental negotiations in 
general, and the different dimensions of the G77’s representations.  The fundamental 
guiding position of the G77 was the common wish to secure national sovereignty and 
economic development within an international forest regime.  To this end, it has exercised 
                                                 
675 Barnett Jon (2008), The Worst of Friends: OPEC and G77 in Climate Change Regime, Global 
Environmental Politics, Volume, Issue 4, pp. 1-8 
676 Agarwal A. et al (eds.) (1999), Green Politics:  Global Environmental Negotiations I, New Delhi: Centre 
for Science and Environment 
677 Miller M.(1995), The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, Open University Press., p.137, For a 
similar position: Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International Organizations, NGOs and the Brazilian Amazon, 
International Books, p. 38-39 
678 Najam A. (2005), A tale of three cities: Developing Countries in Global Environmental Negotiations in 
Global Challenges: Furthering the Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development edited by Kallhauge 
A.C., Sjostedt G., Corell E., Green Leaf Publishing Ltd., Porter G. and Brown J.W. (1996), Global 
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its considerable bargaining powers over forests resources owned by the South.679 As 
Humpreys states:   
 
The UNCED forest negotiations saw North and South engaged almost entirely in a 
distributive-positional bargaining game.  The South, aware of the high value attached to 
forest conservation in Northern societies, tried to shift the jurisdictional responsibilities of 
the North with respect to finance and technology.  The objective was to realise relative gains 
for the G77.680 
 
The G77 strategy had been used previously in global negotiations on ozone and climate 
regimes, and Humphreys recognised its bargaining strategy as a “veto coalition” 
recognisable in a situation where the cooperation of a particular group of countries is 
decisive in a negotiation if it possesses the power to block the regime creation.681  He 
further explains that, if a state identifies that a certain regime creation threatens its 
interests, then that state may engage with a group of other countries that have a collective 
interest in the matter to form a veto coalition.682 Porter and Brown also identify that “veto 
coalition” could play a vital role in the formation of a global regime.683  The veto coalition, 
as part of the bargaining process, can either strengthen or weaken the negotiation process.  
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The Southern position on forest issues reflects the power to use the veto coalition, since the 
South possesses a far greater proportion of the world’s rainforest.  As a consequence, the 
North realises that, in order to minimise the environmental threat created as a result of 
deforestation, the cooperation of the South is essential. In her analysis of three 
environmental regimes – ozone layer protection, biodiversity and hazardous waste –Miller 
utilizes this concept in regard to how the South uses its bargaining power to influence 
crucial global decision making authorities where common-property resources are in 
contention.684   Humphreys further explores this issue in relation to forest issues, noting 
that the South possesses important material capabilities in its tropical forests, either 
directly, such as goods produced from timber, or indirectly, such as carbon sinks.685  
Regarding the power of the South to use its “veto coalition” in forest negotiations,  
Humphreys explains that mere economic capabilities of one party does not guarantee 
bargaining strength when the other party possesses a much more critical factor, such as is 
the case with tropical forests in the developing countries.686  It is in this context, therefore, 
that the South bargained the ownership of tropical forest cover into positions of economic 
and political stability within their individual territories. Consequently, the G77 has proved 
to be the point of reference upon which the Southern countries gathered in order to contest 
the North’s demands in the global forest negotiation process. 
 
The Southern position, therefore, has been moulded by its sovereignty claims over forests 
ownership and by its representation as a collective under G77.  The discussion now moves 
on to analyse how far the South can influence the negotiating structures of the forests 
discourse. 
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Southern Impact on the Negotiating Structure of Forest Negotiations  
 
The main focus of this section is an analysis of the impact of Southern participation in the 
structures of forest negotiations based on negotiating agendas, arenas, forums, and the 
composition of the decision making panels.687 The South has succeeded in impacting 
significantly on the structure and context of global environmental negotiations in 
general.688 With the representation of G77 the South moved forward from its mere 
presence in the 1972 Stockholm conference to its meaningful participation in the decision-
making process in environmental governance in both the 1992 Rio and 2002 Johannesburg 
conferences.689  However, this thesis argues that, for historical, financial, technological and 
political reasons, the Southern states do not make their influence felt as effectively as they 
should.   
 
The Southern position on the actual negotiating structures are central to the next section of 
this chapter because the extent of its impact on decision making has been shaped by the 
G77 negotiation position, as described above, in that its environmental concerns have been 
linked to their developmental concerns and claims of sovereignty against the North’s 
“global commons” claims.  The G77 Chairperson, a position that rotates annually between 
the three geographical sub-groups of Asia, Africa and South America, serves as the 
spokesperson for all the Southern states – a position that is significant for the structure of 
the negotiations because it reflects the strength of the Southern voice.690  Equal distribution 
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688 Ibid. 
689 Ibid. 
690 Recently Abdulla M. Alsaidi, head of delegation of the republic of Yemen made a statement on behalf of 
the Group of 77 and China at the Sixteenth Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC in Cancun, Mexico, 29th 
November 2010.   http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=101129b (last accessed on 20.12.2010) 
206 
 
of the Chairpersonship of G77, therefore, is an important element in maintaining unity; 
however, this unity has become increasingly challenged by the growth in diversity of the 
countries concerned.691  
 
It is important now to revisit the various stages of forest negotiations in order to explain 
how the gradual development of the South has impacted on the structure of forest 
negotiations over the years. As noted above, Global forestry concerns had emerged with 
the establishment of the FAO in 1945, within which the North, through its pioneering 
activities, and with the strong support of the US, established a Forestry Division.  In 1947, 
the Director-General of the FAO, Sir John Boyd Orr, reported that:  
 
[…] There is a story of the shocked surprise of the late President Roosevelt, flying to Tehran, 
upon realizing that the bare waste of rocks below his plane was all that remained of 
Lebanon's cedars and the one-time heart of the biblical land of milk and honey. The 
impression bit deep and was an added reason for the United State’s firm belief that the 
projected Food and Agriculture Organisation should have a strong forestry division.692 
 
Therefore, during the early years of forest negotiations, the agenda and structure of the 
Forest Division was decided by the North, whose contribution in its initiation was 
significant. This also led to the North’s continuous influence on so many of the earlier 
FAO forest programmes and structures, many of which were directed at managing the 
timber industries of the UK, the US, Canada, Germany and other industrialised 
                                                 
691 Kasa S. et al (2008), The Group of 77 in the International Climate Change Negotiations: Recent 
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countries.693 As a consequence, the decisions taken by Northern states had a huge impact 
on African and Asian forests, where the changes in the South had considerable economic 
and trade costs to the North.    
 
The Northern attitude towards Southern forests was expressed in an article by Aubreville,  
published in 1947 by the FAO in Unasylva – a journal on forest related issues – who found 
that there would be serious economic consequences globally, as well as locally, as a result 
of  deforestation in Africa. His main concern, however, was for the threat to the timber 
industry in industrial countries.694 The primary cause for forest clearing, Aubreville’s 
stated, was the ‘primitive, nomadic method of agriculture [that] has been practiced by all 
native populations.695  Other causes he cited were an increase in the density of population 
and intensive commercial crop cultivation, which were the consequence of developmental 
activities in Africa and other parts of the South.  Therefore, during the early period of 
forest governance, there were signs of Northern domination over Southern forests in the 
form of forest conservation.  In his article, Aubreville suggested:   
 
As a beginning, we believe that, within the framework of the international agencies, an office 
for the protection of African soils and forests could first usefully be entrusted with the study 
of all these problems; later this office would become well-qualified to promote policies of 
protection which should be adhered to by all governments. It would also become the agency 
empowered to make recommendations and suggest measures which should be adopted, and 
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to keep under observation the evolution of a continent which at present seems doomed to 
become unproductive grassland or even a desert.
696  
 
It is important to note here that the author’s suggestions on forest governance do not 
include the participation of the national or local community in the decision making 
process. This could be because, at the time, most African countries were still the colonies 
of major European countries, and they did not gain their independence until the mid-
1960s.697 This quotation is a classic example of Northern influence on the global forest 
structure in its early stages and reflects its methods of identifying the issues, defining its 
causes and suggesting solutions, without involving, or even consulting, the ‘locals’.  
 
Following the establishment of the FAO’s Forest Department in 1947, the disproportionate 
impact of the North over forest issues continued until the beginning of 1970s, when the 
NIEO revealed the South’s disquiet about the exclusively Northern impact on global forest 
issues. This was strongly emphasised at the Stockholm conference, which ultimately 
shaped Principle 21 which reasserted a state’s sovereign authority over its natural 
resources.   
 
The 1972 Stockholm Conference was influenced by the ‘Founex Report’ (1972), which, in 
expressing the Southern position on environmental matters, emphasised that when the 
North claims that development is a cause of environmental problems, the South’s view is 
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that many of the problems were caused by underdevelopment and poverty.698 The outcome 
of the Stockholm Convention was that Southern environmental concerns changed the 
theme of global discussions from environmental protection to sustainable development, a 
trend that was carried throughout negotiations, with particular attention being given to the 
sovereign authority over forests within the territorial boundaries.699  
 
As has been noted earlier, during the earlier discussions, the South did not play so 
prominent a part due to a combination of, (i) a lack of awareness, (ii) the non-availability 
of research facilities, which meant that most of the first-hand research was carried out by 
the developed countries, and (iii) it was engaged either with independence movements or 
the rebuilding of their countries after long years of imperialism.700   
 
At the beginning of 1980s, indications of deforestation became apparent and several 
alarming findings from surveys701 published in the late 1970s and early 1980s revived the 
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700 Karlsson S. (2002), The North-South Knowledge Divide-Consequences for Global Environmental 
Governance in Strengthening Global Environmental Governance: Options and Opportunities edited by Esty 
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701 Many of these surveys are criticized for lack of reliable methodologies.  Most of the surveys are based on 
data gathered from remote sensing techniques. Therefore inaccuracy in data and lack of prominent 
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Causes of Tropical Deforestation: The economic and statistical analysis of factors giving rise to the loss of 
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The economic and statistical analysis of factors giving rise to the loss of the tropical forests edited by Brown 
K. and Pearce D.W.UCL Press, pp:106-130, Smouts M.C. (2003), Tropical Forests International Jungle: The 
Underside of Global Ecopolitics, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.28-29 
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international discussion on forests and the search for global solutions.702   One of the first 
estimates of the rate of deforestation was given in a 1976 FAO report published in 
Unasylva and a widely used estimate was published in 1980 by FAO and UNEP.703  In 
1990, the FAO initiated a new assessment of tropical forests – ‘Forest Resources 
Assessment 1990: Tropical Countries’ – one of several assessments that demonstrated the 
scale and significance of deforestation and its consequences, which led the world 
community to agree to the formation of a permanent institution on forests.704   
 
The conflict of interests between North and South appeared again in the context of a 
permanent institution and it affected the agenda. An analysis of the chronology of global 
forest issues and events reveals several tides of official eagerness to create global forest 
conventions that have increased from time to time then diminished because of strong 
Southern disapproval since the South’s effect on the forest agenda often prioritizes 
development related issues by requesting additional financial and technical support.705 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, disagreement between North and South over conservation versus 
development has been visible in all the various stages of forest negotiations.  
   
The North-South conflict regarding organisational agendas clearly shows in the 
membership of the ITTO, which divides into producer and consumer countries, since most 
                                                 
702 According to United Nations; deforestation is occurring when ‘a forest is cleared to give way to another 
use of land’ and forest degradation is occurring ‘when the species diversity and biomass are significantly 
reduced through, for instance, unsustainable forms of forest utilization’ UN document A/CONF.151/PC/27, 
‘Conservation and Development of Forests: Progress Report by the Secretary-General of the Conference’, 5 
February 1991, para 6, p.8. referred by Humphreys D. (1996), Forest Politics: The Evolution of International 
Cooperation, Earthscan Publications Ltd. London, p.1 
703 Sommer A. (1976), Attempt at an Assessment of the World’s Tropical Moist Forests, Unasylva, An 
International review of Forestry and Forest Products, Volume 28, 1976 II-III, The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations: refers by Smouts M.C. (2003), Tropical Forests International Jungle: 
The Underside of Global Ecopolitics, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.28-29, Tropical Forest Resources 1980, Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1981(Rome) 
704 Forest Resources Assessment 1990: Tropical Countries: Forestry Paper 112, Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 1993 (Rome) 
705Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and 
the Brazilian Amazon, International Books, Netherlands,  pp:153-159 
211 
 
producers members are from the South and most consumers from the North. Gale, 
however, produces two examples that contradict this rationale; he argues that, although 
some countries are listed as either consumers or producers, they could still belong to the 
opposite category.706  For instance, he says that, although Australia is listed as a consumer 
country, it has a considerable amount of forest cover, while Thailand, which is listed as a 
producer, is very close to becoming a consumer. Therefore it would seem that the ITTO 
membership is categorised more along the lines of developing and developed country, not 
on what they actually own by way of tropical forest cover. 
 
The division of South and North into producing and consuming countries, though, was 
clearly shown in ITTO Council Sessions between 1987 and 1994 when, following 
tradition, the G77 spokesperson for the “producing-country coalition” raised, on many 
occasions, the popular sovereignty claim of the South.707 Gale saw it thus: 
 
[…] These economic and political interests helped determine the composition of national 
delegations to the ITTO, which both reflected and refracted an interpretation of the ‘national 
interest’ grounded in a developmentalist ‘paradigm.’ This developmentalist interpretation 
privileged the utilization of tropical rainforests by sovereign states in the pursuit of national 
economic development and, in so doing, helped cement producing-country governments 
together in a cohesive global coalition.
708    
 
The common political and economic interests formed by the South into one coalition to 
negotiate for a fair, equal and just share in the timber trade, therefore, clashed with the 
developed countries “consuming-country coalition”, led by the US, the UK, the 
                                                 
706 Gale Fred P. (1998), The Tropical Timber Trade Regime, Macmillan Press., p. 81 
707 Ibid, p. 105 
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Netherlands and Japan.709 For several reasons, the consumer-country coalition were not as 
dependent on the timber trade as were the producing-country coalition, since, to a greater 
extent, they were politically and economically independent, therefore they were not as 
heavily affected by changes in the trade.  To demonstrate this, Gale draws on the example 
of Japan, which, while it was the largest tropical timber importing country, it was not 
entirely dependent on the timber trade since it had several options to counteract supply 
short-falls and price rises.710   
 
During the negotiations, the consumer country coalition was not always driven by a 
common agenda. There were sub-groups, such as the European Community (EC, now the 
European Union) driven by different interests within the major category.  Gale saw the 
position of the EC – in the context of ITTO – as a factor that created complications for the 
organisational structure of the consumer-country coalition and he pointed out that the 
position and unity of the EC varied on certain matters.711  For example, on commodity 
matters, the EC preferred to speak with one voice through their official representative, 
whereas, on development assistance matters, each EC country presented its own individual 
position.712 Added to this, the UK and the US dominated discussions through their 
spokespersons’ positions.  Consequently, the many divisions in the consumer-country 
coalition resulted in the producing countries being more influential regarding the making 
of the ITTO agenda; thus, together with its claim to sovereignty over the forests, the South 
was able to influence an agenda biased towards development strategies.713 
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The significant role of G77 in creating forest negotiation structures was highlighted in the 
forest negotiations at UNCED (1992), where the main agenda relating to a forest 
convention was initiated by the North and opposed by the South.714  As a consequence, the 
North’s prime demand to globalise forest issues through an internationally binding 
convention was nullified and replaced by a ‘Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement 
of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable 
Development of All Types of Forests’, popularly known as the “Forest Principles”.715  
 
The first paragraph of the Forest Principles reflected the South’s influence on the agenda – 
‘[T]he subject of forests is related to the entire range of environmental and development 
issues and opportunities, including the right to socio-economic development on a 
sustainable basis.’716  Furthermore, Principle 2 (a) provided for a wide scope for 
developmental concerns: 
 
States have the sovereign and inalienable right to utilize, manage and develop their forests in 
accordance with their development needs and level of socio-economic development and on 
the basis of national policies consistent with sustainable development and legislation, 
including the conversion of such areas for other uses within the overall socio-economic 
development plan and based on rational land-use policies.
717 
 
                                                 
714 A/CONF.151/6/Rev.I: preamble (g), (d)/ para.8(d), Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International 
Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and the Brazilian Amazon, International Books, 
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A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), 14 August 1992, UNCED. 
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716 Preamble of the ‘Non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the 
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14 August 1992, UNCED. 
717 Principle 2 (a)‘Non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles for a global consensus on the 
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Following the 1992 Rio Conference, agendas and structures of forest negotiations were 
guided mostly by these Forest Principles. The Southern impact on negotiations, therefore, 
which had been considerable during the Convention, continued in the same vein thereafter.  
As Najam states ‘[T]he impact that the South has had on the framing and structure of 
global environmental negotiations has also had a slow but perceptible impact on the actual 
results of these negotiations.’718  An analysis of the Southern influence on the agendas and 
structure of forest negotiations suggests that Najam’s statement is valid. Therefore, 
although its impact on forest negotiations was not very effective in 1945 when the FAO 
was furnished with a forestry division, the South gradually enhanced its influence to a 
remarkable level. However, as in any other environmental negotiation, it also needs strong 
research and expertise, state-of-the-art technology and adequate financial resources in 
order to build on its capacity to influence negotiating structures. Unfortunately, many of 
these necessities are still to be met, which may result in it once again being marginalised in 
the global decision-making forums. The following section will explore the South’s impact 
on the substance of the global forest negotiations in order to develop further the argument 
that its level of influence is in effective  
                    
Southern Impact on the Substance of the Negotiations  
 
The substance of the negotiations will be examined this section in order to assess the 
impact made by the South on forest negotiations by an exploration of the relevant policy 
documents, norms, regimes and decisions.719  As has been previously explained the main 
theme of the forest negotiations has swung between conservation and usage for 
                                                 
718 Najam A. (2005), A tale of three cities: Developing Countries in Global Environmental Negotiations in 
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developmental reasons, consequently, the substance of the negotiations involves a 
commitment to both these crucial aspects.   
 
The negotiation substance of forest debates has been greatly shaped by the deep-rooted 
North-South division, with the Southern perspective being shaped by two principal 
concerns – the sovereignty claim over natural resources and the NIEO demands for 
additional financial and technical support, over the North’s single concern – deforestation. 
Consequently, the South attempted to strike a global bargain with the North over its 
tropical forest resources.720 As early as the 1980s, these different priorities had also 
appeared as the substance of tropical timber negotiations. The ITTA (renegotiated in 1994 
and 2006), which will now be explored in terms of the South’s impact on the negotiation 
substance and regulations.   
 
The International Tropical Timber Agreements 
Humphreys identified three norms that were reflected in the 1983 ITTA, which he 
described as the three global norms of neoliberalism.721  
 
First, the sovereignty of the producing members over their forest resources is asserted.  
Second, an objective of the Agreement is ‘the expansion and diversification of international 
trade in tropical timber’. And third, industrial development was explicitly endorsed; the 
Agreement was principally a commodity agreement that aimed at encouraging ‘further 
                                                 
720 Humphreys D. (1996) Hegemonic Ideology and the International Tropical timber Organization in The 
Environment and International Relations edited by Vogler J. and Imber M.(edited) Routledge Publishers, 
p.217 
721 Ibid, p.221 
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processing of tropical timber in producing member countries with a view to promoting their 
industrialisation’.
722 
 
The objectives of the Agreement clearly reflected the different negotiating priorities of the 
North and the South. The South’s principal argument of sovereignty over natural resources 
was incorporated into the Agreement’s objectives, which reflected the considerable impact 
it had over the negotiation’s substance.  Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the ITTA, 1983, 
describes the objectives of the Agreement, which, at the beginning of the first paragraph, 
ensured the sovereignty of the producing states over tropical forest:  
 
[…] for the benefit of both producing and consuming members and bearing in mind the 
sovereignty of producing members over their natural resources, the objectives of the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as "this Agreement") 
are [:..]
723 
 
Therefore the Southern perspective of state sovereignty was recognised and agreed by all 
member states.  A similar approach was adopted at the ITTA in 1994:  
 
Recognizing the sovereignty of members over their natural resources, as defined in Principle 
1 (a) of the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global 
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of 
Forests, the objectives of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 (hereinafter 
referred to as "this Agreement") are: […]
724 
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However, the importance given to the recognition of state sovereignty over natural 
resources within the objective section changed in ITTA, 2006. In that Agreement, the 
member states only included the recognition of state sovereignty over tropical forests 
within its Preamble, which was less emphatic than the 1983 and 1994 Agreements. Both 
previous Agreements had emphasised state sovereignty over forest resources, which, 
couched as it was within an Article, had formed a separate issue.  Also, the provision in 
ITTA 2006, by including both sovereignty rights and responsibilities over a state’s natural 
resources, demonstrated the limitation of the sovereignty claim, as may be seen in 
Paragraph (d) of the ITTA, 2006:  
 
Recognizing that states have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies and have the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of 
areas beyond the national jurisdiction […] 725    
 
This paragraph, therefore, explicitly recognises not only a right but also a responsibility, 
regarding a state’s natural resources.726 As a consequence, the latest provision on state 
sovereignty over the forest resources, limits, to a certain extent, the broader, and sole, 
authority granted in the previous provisions in 1983 and 1994. Paragraph (d) of the 
Preamble, therefore, signalled a distancing from the consistent Southern claim that a state 
not only has sovereign authority, but also a responsibility to ensure that other countries are 
not affected by activities within its jurisdiction. In the next section, negotiations of the 
Forest Principles will be analysed to assess the South’s impact on their substance. 
                                                 
725 Para d, Preamble of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 2006  
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218 
 
 
Forest Principles at UNCED (1992)  
 
By investigating the substance of the Forest Principles and the UNCED negotiations 
process it is possible to show how far North and South claims have been represented in 
forest policies.727    The negotiation process was hotly debated between the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in the North and the “G77 
with China” in the South728, whose main concern was whether the negotiating document on 
forests should result in a legally binding convention, or a non-legally binding document, 
with technology transfer and additional financial assistance as its secondary concerns.  
 
Principally, the G77 was strictly opposed to a forest convention on the grounds that it 
would threaten national sovereignty over natural resources and it was anxious to prevent 
any legal requirement that would allow national policies on forests to be determined from 
outside.729 The Northern claims on forests, however, were neatly formed around the 
acceptance of forests as a ‘global common’, which demanded all countries to be bound by 
a unique set of legal principles, therefore they advocated a legally binding global 
convention on forests with the aim to place forest conservation in a better global regulatory 
framework.730  After several rounds of long and intensive debate, UNCED concluded with 
a ‘Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on 
                                                 
727 Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and 
the Brazilian Amazon, International Books, Netherlands,pp. 153-160, Humphreys David (1996), Forest 
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728 Dimitrov R.S. (2006), Science & International Environmental policy: Regimes and Nonregimes in Global 
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729 Humphreys D. (2001), Forest Negotiations at the United Nations:  Explaining Cooperation and Discord, 
Forest Policy and Economics, Volume 3, pp:125-135 at p. 127  
730 Humphreys D. (1996), Forest Politics: The Evolution of International Cooperation, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. London, pp.122-124 
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the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests’, 
more commonly known as The “Forests Principles”.731  
 
Several provisions in these principles demonstrate the Southern influence on the 
negotiations substance. For instance, Paragraph (g) of the Preamble states, ‘forests are 
essential to economic development and the maintenance of all forms of life’732, which 
reflects the Southern perspective of forests as a potential source to overcome 
underdevelopment.  Another instance lies in Principle 1(a) whereby state sovereignty 
ensures the right to forest usage and which also emphasises the state’s responsibility to 
prevent damage to other states, or other areas outside its territory.733 Yet another instance 
appears in Principle 2(a) whereby a state has a sovereign right to exploit its own resources 
in accordance with its development priorities and policies.734 Principle 2(a), however, 
includes a wider sustainable development framework on which the sovereignty right is 
based:   
 
States have the sovereign and inalienable right to utilize, manage and develop their forests in 
accordance with their development needs and level of socio-economic development and on 
the basis of national policies consistent with sustainable development and legislation, 
                                                 
731 Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, 
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, United Nations Documents, 
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including the conversion of such areas for other uses within the overall socio-economic 
development plan and based on rational land-use policies.
735 
 
Although this provision reaffirms a state’s sovereignty over its resources, in the latter part 
it is coupled with “sustainable development and conservation” policies, which 
demonstrates a clear attempt to limit Southern authority by including international 
conservation principles, which lie at the heart of the Northern agenda. Even though several 
provisions in the Forest Principles enshrine the Southern claims of sovereignty, it is hard to 
deny the inclusion of some decisive provisions that reflect a Northern influence.  One such 
instance was when the Northern OECD countries succeeded in deleting a provision that 
referred to their responsibility for the historical of forests in their own countries, as well as 
in tropical forests in developing countries, for their “industrial development” during the 
colonial period.736 Also, the North used its financial and political power against the 
Southern insistence on debt relief, additional financial resources and the transfer of 
technology. Furthermore, the North refused any major commitment of financial resources 
to maintain the negotiations. Kolk describes the Northern and Southern positions at the 
forest negotiation table as follows:   
 
Although the South largely succeeded in closing ranks (especially when typical North-South 
issues were involved) and avoiding unwanted environmental regulatory agreements, it did 
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not obtain major concessions from the North on international economic reforms, trade, debt, 
transfer of technology or financial resources. 737  
 
During the UNCED forest negotiations, therefore, the North largely ignored the fact that, 
without the support of the South, no global environmental problem could be addressed.  
The South, however, brought some of the NIEO agendas back to the table, such as the 
transfer of additional financial and technological resources for forest protection from the 
industrial countries to the developing countries.  According to Kolk, many elements of 
financial resources impacted upon the North-South issues of contention thus: “the 
calculations of environmental costs and how these should be divided between North and 
South, the financing of the future transfer of funds, and the control over and management 
of these financial resources”.738 However, an overall assessment on the negotiations shows 
that the South still suffered from a lack of effective participation and the many restrictions 
they faced at the negotiation table will be analysed more comprehensively later in this 
chapter. The 1991 South Centre reported that the negotiation process had to be more 
balanced between the two bargaining positions in that the North needed to make firm 
financial commitments in order to demand from the South a commitment to environmental 
conservation: 
 
[…] engaging in more balanced negotiations between the North and the South, and it could 
yield results that the developing countries have been seeking for some time.  Global action 
on the environment cannot succeed without the full participation and collaboration of the 
South.  Indeed, UNCED is an international conference where the North is seeking 
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environmental concessions from the South, and where South can make such concessions in 
return for firm commitments by the North to restructure global economic relations.
739  
 
Consequently, at the UNCED in 1992 a compromise was found between the conflicting 
positions of North and South in that a less authoritative international document was 
produced than would have been produced out of a Forest Convention.  Therefore, at the 
second Preparatory Committee meeting in April-March, 1991, “it was decided that, in view 
of the ‘special situation and needs of developing countries’, the minimum goal would be a 
‘non-legally binding authoritative statement of principles’ for all types of forest”, which 
amounted to soft, rather than hard, law.740  
  
Although the South’s impact throughout the negotiations on the structure and substance of 
the global forest negotiations shows a gradual progress, nevertheless, it has not been very 
effective in furthering its concerns at the global level.  As has been demonstrated, at the 
outset of the international forest discourse, the North held the preponderance of power and 
exercised the greatest influence when the forest instruments and institutions were created, 
consequently, due to their financial and political strength, they rendered the South 
unwilling to bring their own forest issues to the table. The following section will explore 
the constraints on the South that prevents it from effective participation.  
                                                 
739 South Centre, 1991, Environment and Development.  Towards a Common Strategy for the South in the 
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What is lacking in Southern Participation? 
 
As has been explained throughout this chapter, certain elements of effective participation 
have been absent in the South’s campaign. However, the reasons for this cannot be 
discussed in isolation since they need to be recognized in the context of the North-South 
dimension in environmental negotiations.  Therefore, this specific Case Study on forest 
negotiation coincides with the broader argument of this thesis, that the South faces certain 
difficulties when it participates in global negotiations, not only politically and financially, 
but also in other miscellaneous respects.  Most importantly, the North-South divide is not 
only based on development and under-development, but also on the absence of power to 
influence the decision-making process, the lack of competence to include its own interests 
in the global law-making process.  As Adil Najam explains: 
 
The popular view of the North-South divide as a binary distinction between ‘haves’ and 
‘have nots’ is a shorthand, and not untrue, way of understanding the concept.  However, one 
must remember that what the South wishes to ‘have’ is not simply economic development, 
but a say in the political decision that affect its destiny. 741 
 
Therefore, incorporating the vision of the South within the global environmental discourse 
needs to be accomplished in a series of economic, social and political initiatives.  The 
South’s role in global forest negotiations suggests that such initiatives need to be 
considered.  It is recognised that an inadequate knowledge base of scientific research data 
is a key difficulty for the South in voicing its concerns effectively. Since updated data and 
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relevant information is a principal factor that predicates the much stronger negotiating 
position of the North, which dominates resources, research and scientific output; also, 
according to Karlsson, ninety-four percent of indexed scientific literature is contributed by 
OECD countries.742 As Gutman also notes, the North carries out almost all basic research 
and analysis on environmental change, and often it does not take into account its relevance 
to the South. Using the global warming debate as an example, he states that several studies 
have indicated that most Northern studies overstate Southern emissions and responsibilities 
and understate the potential costs of reducing energy consumption in the South.743 A 
similar understanding of the problem is expressed by Gupta, who states that, in the climate 
change debate, the relatively small amount of domestic environmental research severely 
handicaps the Southern negotiators by compelling them to rely on foreign researchers744:   
 
[…] some scientific controversies indicate that (foreign) researchers may have selected 
certain research questions, assumptions, methods and theories in their research and the 
choice in favour of these tools has (perhaps inadvertently) led to results that tend to favour 
industrialised countries […] To the extent that developing countries will always be behind in 
the research on problems signalled by industrialised countries, there will be structural 
imbalance in knowledge which will affect the negotiation process.
745
  
 
                                                 
742 Karlsson S. (2002), The North-South Knowledge Divide-Consequences for Global Environmental 
Governance in Strengthening Global Environmental Governance: Options and Opportunities edited by Esty 
D.C. and M. Ivanova, New Haven CT, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. 
743 Gutman P. (1994), Developing Countries and International environmental Negotiations: The Risks of 
Poorly Informed Choices, Society and Natural Resources, Volume 7, Issue 4,  pp. 389-397,  
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Although this observation is based on climate change, it is relevant to any environmental 
issue, including forests.  Self-evidently, therefore, knowledge about forest resources is 
absolutely salient to policy making both locally and globally.  The research findings on 
forest biodiversity and ecosystem services, for example, have a major influence on 
decision making authorities and organisations.746 As Gulbrandsen explains, “whereas a few 
decades ago science was primarily used to increase productivity and yield knowledge 
about the environmental effects of forestry [it] is now seen as salient and relevant to 
policy-making.”747 Developing countries face various hindrances that prevent them from 
broadening their research base on forests, since they are often not to be found as a main 
priority item within the primary development goals; therefore Southern countries do not 
necessarily dedicate large financial resources on forests related research748.  Asadi further 
emphasises the impact of poverty and under development issues on Southern forest 
development programmes: 
 
[…] many societies in the developing community, grappling with endemic, dehumanizing 
poverty and mired in the vicious circle of underdevelopment, are hardly in a position to 
formulate, much less execute, a national forest programme as part and parcel of a 
comprehensive national development strategy and programme.
749 
 
When the national priorities focus more on developmental agendas forest programmes do 
not catch the attention of national policy makers; consequently, the South’s forest data 
research base is relatively lower, and less significant, than the North’s.   
                                                 
746 Gulbrandsen L. H. (2008), The Role of Science in Environmental Governance: Competing Knowledge 
Producers in Swedish and Norwegian Forestry, Global Environmental Politics, Volume 8, Issue 2, p.99 at p. 
111 
747 Ibid 
748 Asadi B. (2008), International Forest Deliberations, Processes and Civil Society: An Historical Account 
(1992-2007), International Forestry Review, Volume 10, Issue 4, p. 666 
749 Ibid. 
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Therefore, many international environmental index and standards have been estimated and 
established on the Northern scientific data base.  One such instance is the 1990 the World 
Resources Institute (WRI), a US based think tank, published a ranking of countries on the 
basis of their contribution to the greenhouse effect; according to the World Report 
1990/91, it ranked China, India and Brazil – three major developing countries – among the 
greatest contributors to world carbon dioxide emissions. 750   This finding was contested on 
the grounds of Northern bias in the scientific data analysis.751 In this instance, arbitrariness 
in the analysis of data occurred because a greater emphasis had been given to “global 
warming on vegetation, deforestation and livestock, rather than of fossil fuel emissions”.752 
Such iniquitous preferences accorded to specific factors that are most commonly found in 
the South demonstrates further the North-South divide.  In addition to this, the WRI 
considered 1987 deforestation figures for Brazil while, for most other countries, 1980 
deforestation figures were used.753  Thus, the criteria it used to estimate greenhouse gas 
emissions attest the nature of the impact by North and South differences in approaching the 
global decision making forums.  Agarwal and Narain point out that, as a result of Northern 
based research and scientific data, a situation of environmental colonialism is created in 
global governance, since many international negotiations and documents base their 
positions on figures and data contributed by Northern based research centres.754  The 
precedent set by such a WRI report may also lead to the publication of contradictory data. 
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Among other dilemmas that developing countries face in forest negotiations is the lack of 
technological resources for gathering, recording and maintaining data, since some of the 
highly sophisticated application of technology is still a far distant goal for most.755 In his 
examination of the forest research base in India, Pandey points out that developing 
countries do not have access to state of the art computer applications that speedily store 
accurate information and data. Satellite data collection and remote sensing technology have 
also become a method of rapidly recording forest data in the North, all of which needs to 
be introduced to the South. However, numerous infrastructure restrictions such as lack of 
availability of the internet, poor condition of telecommunication facilities prevent the 
implementation of modern technology in developing countries, consequently, the lack of 
technology remains a drawback for the South’s forest negotiators.756  
 
The size and the makeup of the delegation in international negotiations is another 
disadvantage faced by developing countries, since they are likely to be represented by a 
single government official, a diplomat or a politician, who is required to cover almost all 
areas of the negotiation. On the other hand, industrialised countries are more likely to be 
represented by a team of specialists for each aspect of the negotiation, for instance experts 
from the scientific, industrial, economic, legal and political disciplines.757 A recent news 
article on the BBC (7th September, 2009) reveals that even sending a government delegate 
to an international negotiation is beyond the agenda of some developing countries.758  
                                                 
755 Pandey D. (2008), India’s Forest Resource Base, International Forestry Review, Volume10, Issue 2, p.116 
756 For an analysis on remote sensing technology and its application as a source of forest information read:  
Foody M.G. et al  (2003), Predictive Relations of Tropical Forest Biomass from Landsat TM data and their 
Transferability between Regions, Remote Sensing of Environment, Volume 85, pp: 463-474 
757 Miller M. (1995), The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, Open University Press., p. 80, 
Najam A. (2005), Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to 
Participation to Engagement, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, pp. 303-321 
758British Broadcasting Corporation news on Monday, 7th September 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8243091.stm (last accessed 22.09.2011 )  
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Maldivian President, Mohamed Nasheed, issued a statement recently stating that his 
country does not wish to participate in a Climate Change Summit because his government 
cannot afford to pay the travel expenses; however, they would be willing to send a 
delegation if the costs were covered – a situation that clearly shows the sorts of financial 
constraints faced by some Southern countries.759   This lack of exposure to research and 
decision making bodies resulting in further communication and negotiation barriers, 
creates yet another disadvantage for the South.  Given the above disadvantages, it is 
essential that are included in the negotiation process.  
 
A number of reforms have been introduced in global environmental governance in 
response to growing concerns about equitable participation of North and South in the 
decision making process. Dombrowski states that “some of these initiatives are intended to 
increase the transparency of international organisations, changes to formal governance 
structures to give more voting rights to Southern governments, and a marked increased 
level of engagement with civil society actors.”760 In this regard, the following section will 
explore the possibility of introducing multidimensional governance strategies to represent 
Southern forest concerns.  As was pointed out in the analysis in Chapter 3, NGOs can play 
a significant role in environmental negotiations towards strengthening the Southern 
negotiating position, because, as Lisowski states, there are many positive outcomes of 
NGO participation in environmental negotiations:  
 
International environmental negotiations are distinguished from most other multilateral 
negotiations by a particularly constructive relationship between negotiations and non-
                                                 
759 British Broadcasting Corporation news on Monday, 7th September 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8243091.stm (last accessed 22.09.2011 ) 
760 Dombrowski K. (2010), Filling the Gap? An Analysis of Non-Governmental Organizations Responses to 
Participation and Representation Deficits in Global Climate Governance, International Environmental 
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governmental organizations (NGOs). Negotiators generally recognize the benefit of engaging 
NGOs, as representatives of key stakeholders, in such negotiations: if properly managed, 
NGO participation can help optimize the international response to a particular environmental 
danger and enhance the transparency of the intergovernmental process.761  
 
It is interesting to examine whether NGO participation in forest negotiations has witnessed 
similar positive outcomes as Lisowski suggests here in the more general context of 
international environmental negotiations, since the key idea of NGO participation, as 
proposed in this thesis, is their capacity to voice Southern environmental concerns at a 
global level.  The following section, therefore, will examine the possibility of NGOs 
representing the South in forest negotiations.  In doing so some ideas about the role of 
NGOs in the climate change negotiations will be presented. 
 
The Prospect of NGOs Representing the Southern Voice 
 
NGOs have been actively engaging in forest negotiations since the 1980s following the 
alarming rate of deforestation reported worldwide stimulated global interests and put 
pressure on national and international decision-making bodies to treat forests as a high 
priority.762 NGO involvement in global forest discourses widens the spectrum of issues 
tackled, from the social, political and economic perspectives of forest usage. They can 
contest such diverse matters as deforestation, reforestation, sustainable management, socio-
                                                 
761 Lisowski M. (2005), How NGOs Use their Facilitative Negotiating  Power and Bargaining Assets to 
Effect International Environmental Negotiations, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Volume 16, pp: 361-383 at p. 
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762 Asadi B. (2008), International Forest Deliberations, Processes and Civil Society: An Historical Account 
(1992-2007), International Forestry Review, Volume 10, Issue 4, p. 657, Humphreys D. (2004), Redefining 
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economic power conflicts in internationally funded projects, and concerns of indigenous 
and local communities whose livelihoods are mainly dependent on the forests.763  
 
The main theme of this section, therefore, is to explore the nature of NGO involvement in 
voicing Southern environmental concerns at global forest negotiations.  Many biologically 
diverse forests are found in the South where governments need to prioritise land usage, 
whether for agriculture, development projects, timber production or for purposes of 
conservation. NGOs promote both the conservation of biological diversity in global 
decision-making forums and, at the local level, help to minimise the damage created to 
forests from economical usage.764 According to Humphreys, they have successfully 
represented ecological and human dimension of forests usage.765 Karsenty also states that 
biological diversity is among NGO’s highest priority; consequently, when their 
participation is observed over time it appears clear that they mainly represent the 
conservation agenda.766   
 
In the late 1970s, when intervention by NGOs in forest related issues began, their activities 
were guided by principles of forest conservation. At an intergovernmental meeting held 
prior to the formal timber negotiations, the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) it was argued that the ITTA should recognise the importance of forest 
                                                 
763Ibid, p.52 
764 Among these economical instruments for forest conservation Karsenty recognises three instruments; 
namely, conservation easements, tradable development rights, conservation concessions.  Karsenty A. 
(2007), Questioning Rent for Development Swaps: New Market-Based Instruments for biodiversity 
acquisition and the land-use issues in tropical countries, International Forestry Review, Volume 9, Number 1, 
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conservation and tropical forest development.767 The influence of this IUCN argument is 
reflected in Article 1(h) in the ITTA, 1983, which states that parties to the Agreement 
should aim at the “sustainable utilization of and conservation of tropical forests and their 
genetic resources, and at maintaining the ecological balance in the regions concerned.”768 
The conservation concerns of the NGOs were welcomed by the consumer countries, most 
of which being developed countries.  Therefore, from the beginning of the forest 
negotiations, developed countries and NGOs worked together to put forward their demands 
in relation to conservation, while the timber producing countries, as previously stated, 
wanted the ITTA to reflect Southern developmental priorities.  
 
As a consequence of the NGO bias towards conservation, the Southern states were not 
pleased and their displeasure was emphasised when Malaysia and Indonesia expressed 
their objection to a proposal drafted by the NGO Friends of the Earth which was presented 
by the UK delegates on timber labelling.769  Although the objection to the proposal was 
unsuccessful, the South made the same argument, albeit in another form, when the NGO 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) proposed that a Forest Stewardship Council should 
administer a timber certification system, which would be an independent voluntary 
certification system. The objective of the WWF’s proposal, which was supported by the 
UK and other consumer countries, was to encourage the timber trade to adopt sustainable 
processes.  It can be argued, therefore, that this form of NGO participation in forest debates 
                                                 
767 Humphreys D. (2004), Redefining the Issues: NGO Influence on International Forest Negotiations, Global 
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aligns them closely with the North. In circumstances such as this, as Chapter 2 of this 
thesis argues, the South is often under-represented in global environmental matters, which 
gives emphasis to the claim that the governance system lacks equity and justice.  It also 
brings into question how fairly decision-making rights are distributed between North and 
South and whether the South is under- represented in the final outcome of global 
negotiations.770     
 
This thesis argues, within this context, that NGOs could be potential advocates for the 
South in forest negotiations in order to counter-balance the aspects, described above, where 
it is lacking.  If properly recruited and organised, therefore, NGOs can help optimize the 
Southern environmental concerns about global environmental governance. The focus of 
this argument is based primarily on NGOs’ greater transparency in the negotiation process, 
their wider access to negotiators and documentation, their facilitative negotiating powers, 
research strengths and expertise in seizing transnational networking opportunities.771  It is 
the want of each of these factors that has led, directly or indirectly, to the marginalisation 
of Southern states from the global decision-making process. It is the strong contention of 
this thesis, therefore, that NGOs should be encouraged to voice the South’s environmental 
concerns at global forums.  
 
Regarding the assets of NGOs, Dombrowski states: 
 
By highlighting the need for formal representation structures that give sufficient voice to 
particular affected and vulnerable countries, by drawing attention to issues that are of 
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particular concern to these countries and by providing practical support and expertise to 
certain delegations, the NGOs are to some extent seeking to address obstacles to the effective 
representation by governments of their citizens in international forums.
772  
 
As can be seen from the above section, compared to the resources and expertise of most 
developing countries, many international environmental NGOs possess significant 
technological expertise, scientific research facilities, financial resources and networking 
opportunities, which are precisely what developing countries often lack at international 
negotiations. As stated above, many NGOs are richer in research and expertise than many 
Southern countries, as Lisowski explains in his analysis of NGO’s impact in the Climate 
Change negotiations:  
 
ENGOs [Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations] bring experts of all kinds to the 
negotiations, including international lawyers, economists, atmospheric scientists, and carbon 
sinks experts.  These individuals analyse negotiating texts and proposals on an on-going 
basis.  Their views are then personally conveyed to negotiators, and occasionally distributed 
in hardcopy or used in ECO articles.  Over time, certain individuals and organizations gain 
reputations for providing accurate, useful information.
773 
 
It is clear that research base and expertise that NGOs possess are vital in environmental 
negotiations.  This is one quality that should be utilised by the South to support their voice 
at global level. 
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As previously discussed, negotiations at UNCED were highly polarised, with 
representatives of both parties showing more concern for defending their own positions, 
rather than searching for common ground. Consequently, NGOs, as “third parties”, had a 
fair chance of becoming actively involved in the negotiations. As Humphreys states: 
“NGOs were able to exploit the intergovernmental differences by lobbing different 
delegations on different issues, depending on the preferences of individual delegations.”774 
However, at UNCED, the roles played by NGOs were recognised in different ways – some 
were seen as important sources of expertise and some were invited to join official 
delegation as members or observers.775  Asadi points out the significance of NGO 
influence as follows: 
 
They (NGOs) managed to make “combating deforestation” an important element in [the] Rio 
process, and finally succeeded, along with their powerful allies in the intergovernmental 
body (both developed and developing) to translate it into Chapter II of Agenda 21 and the 
“Forest Principles”.
776  
 
The ensuing “Forest Principles” attest to the active and engaging role of NGOs in the 
UNCED negotiations. With a similar emphasis on NGO participation on forest 
negotiations, the Report of the World Commission on Forests and Sustainable 
Development in 1993, stressed the importance of developing new civil society institutions 
to improve governance and accountability issues related to forest governance777. Asadi 
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believes that such a recommendation, though not fully implemented, has had a positive 
impact on civil society engagement in the process.778  
 
Since the implementation of Agenda 21 (1992), which recommended the involvement of 
NGOs in “policy design, decision-making, implementation and evaluation”, the 
significance of NGO participation has been widely accepted in all environmental 
negotiations.779 A broader engagement of NGOs in forest issues could also be perceived at 
the “Forest Principles” negotiations at UNCED (1992) relating to UNFCCC and CBD (the 
Convention on Biological Diversity).  
   
As discussed in previously, NGO participation could affect international negotiations in 
terms of both substance and procedure.780 The substance of forest negotiations has been 
shaped by contributions of NGOs in providing research and information, which has helped 
to craft their context.781 Such well-established international NGOs as the WWF, the IUCN, 
the International Institute for the Environment and Development (IIED), Friends of the 
Earth and the World Resources Institute (WRI) were among the pioneering NGOs that 
helped to design the format of the ITTA, and other forest related agreements and 
documents.782  Hence, the strength of NGO research data can be used to make up for the 
South’s lack of expertise and research information.   
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782 WRI’s mission was to research ways of satisfying human needs without depleting natural resources and 
provoking irreversible changes in the environment.  It soon established itself as a top-level centre of expertise 
and it reputedly acts as a research unit for World Bank referred in Smouts M. (2003), Tropical Forests 
International Jungle: The Underside of Global Ecopolitics, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 226, In 2008 IIED 
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Many insights gathered from the Climate Change negotiations can be transferred into 
forest negotiations.  Dombrowski analyses one such instances when a detailed draft design 
for a Copenhagen treaty, submitted by a group of environmental NGOs, emphasised that 
the governance structure of the proposed Copenhagen Climate Facility “should reflect a 
democratic decision-making structure with an equitable and balanced representation, 
ensuring significant representation from developing countries”. They also stressed the 
importance of hearing the voice of the most vulnerable countries, since they were the most 
likely to be impacted by its consequences.783 The efforts made by NGOs to strengthen the 
Southern position in climate change could be a precedent for the NGO involvement in 
forest negotiations. 
 
A further advantage of NGOs representing the Southern voice is that they can reach 
broader audiences and raise public and official awareness better than governments can.784 
They can also exchange information from the ground to global levels more effectively, 
since improvements in information technology allow for wider and cheaper 
communications with other NGOs.785 NGO’s negotiations are mostly conducted outside 
the formal procedural structures by maintaining e-mail lists that enable them to gather and 
disseminate information from local to global levels world-wide in order to promote their 
                                                                                                                                                    
and global processes.  IIED information support the bottom-up decision making process within global 
partnerships on forests. The full IIED report and summary can be found at : www.iied.org (last accessed on 
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campaigns.  Because of the lack of similar net-works and resources, developing countries 
are left far behind in crucial aspects of negotiation procedures, which adds further to the 
contention of this thesis that NGOs can offer a better service to the South than their 
collective representatives can.786 
 
The support of NGOs in representing the South might, therefore, might well address the 
difficulties that its delegations face in the negotiations process. As mentioned earlier, a 
number of developing countries cannot afford to send expert delegates to international 
negotiation, so, because most transnational NGOs have branches in the cities where regular 
international environmental negotiations take place, they are ideally placed to provide 
representation.  Also, the NGOs are rich in expertise in various different areas of 
environment governance, which means that they can provide their services, often by one 
expert covering more than one area.   
 
Furthermore, NGO involvement in negotiation procedures makes the process much more 
flexible, since their network structures and diversity of expertise offer more effective and 
authoritative modes of participation. As Zoe Pearson explains in relation to the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court:  
 
[…] These NGOs recognized that a combined effort by a coalition of NGOs with diverse 
interests and capacities was more likely to be able to maintain relationships with a large 
group of states and to contribute their expertise to all parts of the complex negotiations.
787 
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255 
238 
 
 
As Yamin states, environmental NGOs are capable of “work at multiple levels of 
governance across national boundaries […]”.788  Some environmental NGO networks have 
enforced mechanisms to ensure the Southern voice is sufficiently heard at decision making 
forums. Climate Action Network (CAN), for example, has appointed a designated 
“Southern Capacity Programme Coordinator” to ensure that Southern concerns are heard 
on the global network.789 
 
This thesis will develop further the argument in the next chapter for NGO participation in 
order to effectively voice the concerns of the South in global forest negotiations.   
 
Conclusion 
  
This chapter on forest negotiations developed two principal arguments regarding 
negotiation positions, structures and substance – the first being “conservation”, i.e. the 
recognition of forests as “global commons”, championed by the North, and the, 
“development”, i.e. the recognition of forests as “national properties”, championed by the 
South. The evidence suggests that, even though the South has partly established its claim, 
the decision makers have not been completely won over due to the dominant influence of 
the politically and economically powerful North. As a consequence, therefore, negotiations 
are still fundamentally affected by the North-South dimension, which raises grave concerns 
about the Southern position not being effectively voiced at the global level.  
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Secondly, since the South has largely failed to influence the negotiation process, the other 
aim of this chapter, which was to analyse the potential assistance NGOs might give to the 
South, was to consider how much more effective its case might be if it were to be enhanced 
at the global negotiations table by NGO participation.  NGOs have contributed to 
significant changes in terms of shaping the international forest agenda, however, there are 
still many areas in which they can contribute to make Southern participation more 
effective.   
 
Research and expertise, interpersonal management, transnational networking opportunities 
and communication skills are some of the areas that have been discussed in this chapter to 
indicate those areas where NGOs can strengthen the negotiation abilities of the South.  The 
current literature mainly highlights NGOs’ contributions in terms of the general 
development of the international forest regime, which has primarily concentrated on such 
areas as deforestation, illegal logging, developing the forest related research base and 
providing scientific expertise in forest protection. What is absent in the available literature, 
though, is a debate about the prospect of NGOs participation in voicing Southern 
environmental concerns. This thesis, therefore, argues strongly for future research to be 
focussed on the most effective way by which NGOs are enabled to voice Southern forest 
concerns at the global governance level.  
 
The constructive participation of NGOs could minimise the many practical barriers that 
have held the South for so long at the margins of global forest decision-making. As this 
chapter has shown, through their well-established and diverse experiences, expertise and 
capacity, together with their transnational communications networks, NGOs should be 
240 
 
enabled to play crucial roles in achieving a much more equitable status for the South in 
global forests negotiation.790 
 
Since NGO enhances the substantive and procedural aspects of negotiations by the 
mobilisation of additional resources in terms of information, finance and expertise, in the 
next chapter, this thesis will develop an argument for transnational NGO network 
collaborations, consisting of both Southern and Northern NGOs, in order to broadcast 
Southern environmental concerns more broadly and effectively.  It is in this context, 
therefore, that the next chapter will argue that transnational NGO networks should be 
aimed at addressing the obstacles, described in this chapter, in order for the South to 
participate more effectively in global environmental governance.  
                                                 
790 Agenda 21, United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development: 1992, Chapter 27.3 The document 
is available on http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_27.shtml (last accessed on 20.12.2010) 
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5. A Vision for More Balanced Environmental 
Governance: NGO Responses to North-South 
Inequities in Global Environmental Governance 
 
 
“Modern networks are not conveyer belts of liberal ideas, but 
vehicles for communicative and political exchange, with the 
potential for mutual transformation of participants.”791  
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 
 
Introduction: “Borrowing Power to Fill the Gap”?792 
 
As the Case Study on global forest negotiations in the previous chapter illustrated, finding 
the most effective way of enhancing Southern capacity to voice environmental concerns 
has proven to be a challenge in global environmental governance.  This chapter will inform 
the current debate about the participatory inequalities experienced by Southern countries 
that have not yet overcome the barriers created as a result of the inequitable 
intergovernmental arrangements emanating from the North-South division in decision-
making forums. It suggests alternative arrangements negotiated by a transnational NGO 
network that will be in a better position to offer a variety of different options to traditional 
intergovernmental methods. 
                                                 
791 Keck M. and Sikkink K. (1999), Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics, 
UNESCO, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp: 89-101 at p. 100 
792 “Borrowing power” and “filling the gap” are two terms used to indicate the NGO representation of voices 
that are not heard at global governance respectively in Betzold C. (2010), ‘Borrowing Power’ to Influence 
International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate Change Regime, 1990-1997 online published in  
http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1603_1456.pdf (last accessed on 08.03.2011), and in Dombrowski 
K. (2010), Filling the Gap? An Analysis of Non-Governmental Organizations Responses to Participation and 
Representation Deficits in Global Climate Governance, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 
10, pp: 397-410. 
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Such a network provides for a multidimensional phenomenon that will encompass local, 
national, and supranational systems of environmental governance, which is particularly 
important for this thesis as it explores the possibility of transnational NGOs voicing the 
developing countries claims and concerns in global environmental negotiations.  In 
addition to this, the thesis argues for the development of a greater vision in order to 
enhance the legitimacy of NGO participation. Because its basis relies on principles of 
equity, fairness and justice in global governance, it has explored the different dimensions 
of NGO networks giving close regard to their ability to establish legitimate representation 
of Southern environmental claims. 
 
This thesis, therefore, contributes to the current literature in two ways: firstly, it suggests 
that transnational NGO networks are more effective alternatives to traditional state-centric 
representation and participation, which have proved deficient in global environmental 
governance. Secondly, this thesis supports transnational NGO networks in strategies that 
include members from both North and South in order to achieve greater collaboration. 
Such strategies are particularly important in areas such as technical information, scientific 
research and expertise, where the South has so often been marginalised when it has come 
to influencing global decision making.793 
 
The approach of this thesis differs from current transnational NGO networks literature, 
which mostly takes the view that by importing external global environmental values states 
                                                 
793 Betzold C. (2010), ‘Borrowing Power’ to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate 
Change Regime, 1990-1997 online published in  http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1603_1456.pdf 
(last accessed on 08.03.2011) 
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should be forced to implement certain international environmental standards.794 This thesis, 
however, takes the opposite view – that by focusing mainly on bringing Southern states’ 
internal environmental concerns into global forums, the decision-makers will hear their 
concerns more clearly than they do at present.  
 
The discussion begins with an insight into three different categories of international 
governance that have expressed Southern environmental concerns at global decision–
making forums. Firstly, the centuries old ‘state-centric’ category, whereby states 
participate in intergovernmental negotiations individually; this is the most common form 
of representation in the global decision-making process and it has been practiced by many 
international organizations, such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The second category is the ‘inter-state coalition’, which voices 
environmental concerns more effectively than individual states in the first category795; an 
example is the G77 at the 1992 Rio Summit.796 Thirdly, the ‘alternative multidimensional’ 
category consisting of transnational NGO networks; examples of these are the Rainforest 
Action Network (RAN) and the Climate Action Network (CAN). 
 
This chapter will reiterate Chapters 1 and 2 regarding the inequalities being experienced by 
the South in the North-South dimension within current decision- making negotiations. It 
will identify four specific areas where the South is required to ‘borrow power’ in order to 
                                                 
794 Eccleston B. (1996), Does North-South Collaboration Enhance NGO Influence on Deforestation policies 
in Malaysia and Indonesia in NGOs and Environmental Policies Asia and Africa edited by Potter D, Franck 
Class: London. 
795 For historical analysis of state coalitions and G77 read: William M. (1991), Third World cooperation: the 
group of 77 in UNCTAD, Printer Publishers Ltd. London. 
796 Najam A.(2005), Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance:  From contestation to 
Participation to Engagement, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, pp.303-321 
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exert its influence.797 In addition, it will revisit the arguments made in Chapter 3 regarding 
the roles of NGOs representing the Southern voice, and these will be developed further in 
order to take into account the dynamics of proliferating transnational NGO networks, 
which are better equipped to meet today’s ongoing demands. This chapter will also make 
the point that transnational NGO networks are sufficiently flexible to accommodate new 
strategies in order to address the numerous issues faced by the South when negotiating 
with their better equipped Northern partners. As Princen and Finger observe, that they will 
make a positive impact in global decision-making where North-South differences currently 
paralyze the effort of states to reach a united goal.  The arguments of this thesis are based 
on the following statement made by Princen and Finger:  
 
Environmental NGOs gain influence by building assets based on legitimacy, transparency, 
and transnationalism, assets that, in the environmental realm, states, intergovernmental 
organizations, and profit-making organizations are hard-pressed to match.
798 
 
As they suggest, transnational environmental NGOs are capable of playing a leading role 
in global negotiations, it is, therefore, imperative that their capacities are utilised in the 
many international forums where, previously, the Southern countries have failed to 
represent their most crucial issues for environmental governance. The utility of this 
strategy, however, depends on how far NGO networks can effectively address Southern 
concerns. The following discussion identifies four issues as Southern concerns for the 
purpose of this thesis.   
                                                 
797 Betzold C. (2010), ‘Borrowing Power’ to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate 
Change Regime, 1990-1997 online published in  http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1603_1456.pdf 
(last accessed on 08.03.2011) 
798 Princen, T. and Finger, M. (1994), Environmental NGOs in World Politics, Routledge, London. P.36 
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Southern Environmental Concerns 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the four main constraints on Southern participation 
that suggest an urgent need for transnational NGO networks to voice the South’s 
environmental concerns more effectively at global decision–making forums. 799  
 
Linking environmental protection with development.  
 
The environment and natural resources play a key part in any development process.  
Tackling forest degradation and deforestation, water, air, sound, soil and atmospheric 
pollution, together with increasing urbanisation, are a few of the commitments to the 
environment made by a state to increase the developmental indices of a certain area.800 
Because the environment and its natural resources are limited throughout the world, 
protection agendas often emphasise the need for a certain level of sacrifice in industrial and 
other development processes. The South, however, contests the magnitude of development 
that could be reached within a certain period of time might be subjected to decrease as a 
result of environmental protection standards. This has led, on many occasions, to G77 
contesting the linkage between development and environmental protection.801   
 
                                                 
799 Williams M. (1993), Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: the role of the environmental agenda, 
Third World Quarterly, Volume 14, Number 1, pp: 7-29 at p. 20 
800 Kolk A. (1996), Forests in International Environmental Politics: International Organizations, NGOs and 
the Brazilian Amazon, International Books, Netherlands., Gale Fred P. (1998), The Tropical Timber Trade 
Regime, Macmillan Press., Brown K. and Pearce D. W. (edited) (1994), The Causes of Tropical 
Deforestation: The economic and statistical analysis of factors giving rise to the loss of the tropical forests, 
UCL Press. 
801 Kasa S., Gullberg A. and Heggelund G. (2008) , The Group of 77 in the International climate 
negotiations: recent Developments and Future Directions, International Environmental Agreements Volume 
8, 113-127 
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The perception that responsibility for the current environment threat lies with the 
industrialised countries. 
 Following on from the first point, the South often stresses the ‘common but differentiated’ 
responsibilities principle in environmental negotiations, the foundation of which is that the 
historical responsibility rightly lies with the North for its environmental exploitation of 
natural resources for the purposes of industrial development. The Southern position in 
environmental negotiations, therefore, depends heavily on the historical interpretation of 
the present environmental catastrophe.802 
 
The South’s claim for additional financial resources in order to establish 
environmental programmes in its own countries.
803   
According to the ‘common but differentiated’ principle the North is bound to provide 
additional financial resources for the environmental cost of development in the South.804 
Many Southern states are highly indebted and they have to fulfil other, more basic, 
developmental priorities. Therefore, unless the Northern states provide sufficient financial 
resources to implement and maintain sustainable environmental standards, even the most 
important global environmental issue will be given lower priority nationally. 
                                                 
802 French D. (2000), Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of 
Differentiated Responsibilities.  International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 49, pp: 35-60 
803 The Founex Report on Development and Environment in 1971, 
http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Earth%20Summit%202012new/Publications%20and%20R
eports/founex%20report%201972.pdf last accessed on (06.04.2011),  The Challenge to the South: The Report 
of the South Commission, 1990, Oxford University Press.  
804 Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice: A North-South Dimension, Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd. 
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The provision of technological assistance and research expertise to the South is 
regularly mentioned at environmental negotiations.   
 
The Case Study on forests showed that the South’s representation has been a considerable 
failure in two respects:805 (i) the low standards of research capacity, and (ii) an under-
developed technological capacity – both burning issues that have led to its marginalisation. 
Because many developing countries’ environmental projects require a large capacity of 
technological and research expertise for their successful implementation, without a bank of 
updated research evidence contributing to them, this has become highly challenging. 
Consequently, equal emphasis has been placed on the provision of technological and 
research assistance as it has on the need for additional financial resources.  
 
These four issues, which appear at the top of the list of the South’s global environmental 
negotiations, have been basic elements in the quest for equitable, fair and just treatment in 
decision-making over the past few decades of global environmental discourse.  Various 
mechanisms have been set up to address its claims by its furtherance of inter-state Southern 
coalitions and non-state collaborations.  The next section, therefore, will deal with the 
different mechanisms that have been utilised to voice the South’s environmental and social 
concerns and how far these methods have achieved their intended goals. 
                                                 
805 Chapter 4 of this thesis, pp. 181-236 
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The Story of Success and Failure: the Role of Southern States at 
the Global Environmental Governance level 
 
State-to-State Negotiation 
 
As Chapter 1 and 2 have argued, the ‘state-centric’ and ‘states only’ systems of 
intergovernmental governing methods have reinforced the under-representation of the 
South at decision-making global forums, both directly and indirectly. For example: the two 
most politically and financially powerful global institutions, the Security Council and the 
Bretton Woods institutions, follow decision-making procedures that result in inequality 
among member states because of (a) the veto power of the permanent members in the 
Security Council, and (b) the weighted voting system in the World Bank and the IMF, both 
of which were explained in Chapters 1 and 2. To reiterate – five permanent members have 
veto power in the UN Security Council, the majority of which represent the North.806  
Therefore, as was argued in Chapter 1, the sovereign equality of all UN member states is 
weakened by the veto powers in the Security Council. Thus, as was argued in Chapter 1, 
since the number of votes for each member state is decided on the basis of its share to the 
World Bank fund, the key global financial institution is largely influenced by the North.807 
Currently, global governance structures present a significant challenge to the principles of 
equity, fairness and justice in global inter-state negotiations. Chapter 4 established the 
argument that the global forest negotiations are heavily impact by the North-South 
dimension, which has ultimately resulted in a lack of success in bringing the states into an 
agreement on forests issues, consequently, few Southern forest issues have been 
adequately voiced at inter-state negotiations.  Chapter 2 analysed the role of the Global 
                                                 
806 Chapter 1 of this thesis, p. 32 
807 Chapter 1 of this thesis, p. 27   
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Environment Facility (GEF) in environmental governance and concluded that its 
governance structures were dominated by the World Bank, which was one of its three 
implementing agencies.808  
 
This thesis recognises that because the North instigated many of the global institutional 
structures in the aftermath of the Second World War, the South remains at the periphery of 
most decision-making processes. Also, its negotiating position at inter-state negotiations 
has been weakened by a number of miscellaneous factors, some of which have been 
identified in previous chapters, such as the lack of resources, the participation of small 
delegations due to poor financial resources, the low level of expertise and a weak research 
base, the under-development of both information technology and general technology. 
Consequently, the South – particularly in forest negotiations – has also been marginalised 
due to the lack of forest-based scientific research and expertise.  Without properly 
developed data and research, therefore, the South has not been able to voice its concerns 
accurately.809 As mentioned above, the size of national delegations to global negotiations is 
another issue that creates a vacuum in Southern contributions. Many Northern countries 
send technical experts, diplomats with negotiating experience, high-level government 
officials and international lawyers to cover the different issues under discussion. 
Conversely, though, the South cannot afford such an entourage and, on many occasions, 
they will only send their resident diplomat whose efforts will seldom meet their needs.810  
As P.S. Chasek states: 
 
                                                 
808 Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp.111-118 
809 Chapter 4 of this thesis, pp. 222-226 
810 Chapter 4 of this thesis, p.226 reference to the Maldivian president’s statement on unavailability of  
sufficient funds for to send a delegation to climate talks. 
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[…] if the negotiations are taking place in Geneva, it is most cost-effective to use someone 
from the UN mission in Geneva.  The fact that this person may have no institutional memory 
of the negotiations (especially if prior sessions have taken place in New York, Nairobi, Bonn 
or elsewhere), no in-depth knowledge of the issue under negotiation and no working 
relationship with the key negotiators from other countries cannot be considered important if 
there is no other choice.  As a result, these people may be able to keep their country’s chair 
warm, but rarely have an impact on the negotiations.
811   
 
Therefore the participation of small delegations at negotiations is more likely to hinder 
effective Southern participation in global environmental negotiations, which means that 
Southern states remain less influential and effective in negotiating global debates.812 
Therefore, finding the most effective way to enhance Southern capacity in environmental 
negotiations remains a challenge.  In order to reduce this deficit in financial, political and 
other capacities, the South has experimented with the idea of being presented as a united 
group by forming a coalition for important occasions in global political history.    
 
South-South coalitions – “the Alliance of the Powerless” 
 
Because individual efforts by Southern states have failed to effectively influence global 
decision-making forums, their chosen alternative has been to form coalitions to voice their 
concerns, many of which have been initiated over the past few years.813 In explaining the 
rational and motivation behind the Southern coalitions, Williams notes: 
                                                 
811 Chasek P.S. (2001), NGOs and State Capacity in International Environmental Negotiations: The 
Experience of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law, Volume 10, Number 2, pp: 168-176 atP.169 
812 Najam A. (2005), Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance:  From contestation to 
Participation to Engagement, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, pp.303-321, Williams M. 
(1993), Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: The Role of Environmental Agenda, Third World 
Quarterly, Volume14, Number 1 
813 Forman S. and Segaar D. (2006), New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of 
Multilateralism, Global Governance, Volume 12, pp. 205-225 at p. 209, Williams M. (1993), Re-articulating 
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The unity of the developing countries arises, in the first place, from the inability of these 
states to exert significant influence on the world events.  The global power structure is 
dominated by the advanced industrial countries.  Taking any of the conventionally accepted 
indices of power, i.e. political, economic, military, cultural or ideological, the leading 
Western nations emerge as the dominant states in international politics. For the most part, 
Third World decision-makers feel marginalized by, and in, the global dominance system.  
The material weakness and an inability to influence policy making provides a powerful 
stimulus for the establishment of an alliance of [the] powerless.814 
 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the G77 and the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) were 
among the pioneer alliances formed to address the North-South division. The NAM, which 
had been established in 1961 to present a ‘neutral front’ in the East-West division of the 
Cold War815, eventually expended its mandate to include such issues as “independence and 
sovereign equality; decolonisation and anti-racism; economic and social development; 
economic equality between states including sovereignty over natural resources…”816 G77 
was established in 1964 as a response to demands in the structure of the international 
economy; its mandate, however, was designed according to the industrial countries’ 
economic principles.817 In calling for a New International Economic Order under the 
banner of G77, though, the South gradually began to question the equality, fairness and 
justice of the international system and its practice within the North-South dimension.818 
                                                                                                                                                    
the Third World Coalition: The Role of Environmental Agenda, Third World Quarterly, Volume14, Number 
1, p.9 
814 Williams M. (1993), Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: The Role of Environmental Agenda, 
Third World Quarterly, Volume14, Number 1, p.9 
815Ibid, p.12 
816 Ibid, p.11 
817 For historical analysis of state coalitions and G77 read: Williams M. (1991), Third World cooperation: the 
group of 77 in UNCTAD, Printer Publishers Ltd. London 
818 Najam A. (2005), Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance:  From contestation to 
Participation to Engagement, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, p. 305 
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The G77 and NAM, therefore, came to voice the Southern concerns from political, 
economic and other perspectives at global negotiations, thus providing the weaker states 
with an ability to voice their concerns.   
 
So far, however, these collaborations have not completely succeeded in this aim, and 
Chapter 1 presents some of the reasons why.819  One such is the growing diversity of the 
coalitions themselves, since the economic interests of some of their members are quite 
distinct from others, a situation that creates different factions, which, ultimately, make it 
difficult for compromises to be found in the bargaining positions – a difficulty that 
threatens their unity and reduces the effectiveness of their bargaining positions against 
Northern groups.820  Also, it is not only Southern state’s economic interests that are 
incompatible, but also their political, social and cultural differences sometimes impact their 
unity.821 
 
Nevertheless, these coalitions have proven that they are stronger in their approach to 
negotiations than single states.  However, even though they have succeeded with some 
outcomes, the stability of the group is threatened not only for economic interests, as 
described above, but also by increasing globalisation, which has produced political, 
cultural and geographical differences.822 Consequently, the Southern parties should look 
for more efficient partners in order to voice their environmental concerns.  To this end, this 
chapter will argue that a multidimensional approach to global negotiations would offer a 
far more efficient, timely and practical alternative to the prevailing single dimensional 
system.   
                                                 
819 Chapter 1 of this thesis, pp: 48-54 
820 Williams M. (1993), Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: The Role of Environmental Agenda, 
Third World Quarterly, Volume14, Number 1, p.10 
821 Chapter 1 of this thesis, p. 52 
822 Chapter 1 of this thesis, P. 52-53 
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A proposition to minimise Southern participation deficit in 
global environmental governance 
 
While individual states and state coalitions are not strong enough to voice Southern 
environmental concerns at global environmental negotiations, NGOs provide diverse 
options in order to fill the gap. 823  As Bramble and Porter explain: 
 
The environmental aspects of all these topics are central to government negotiations that 
could lead to sustainable forms of development.  NGOs do not always agree on these tough 
issues that are central to North-South co-operation.  But the dialogue and negotiations among 
NGOs themselves offer a path for international problem-solving that may be a good 
alternative to the often-paralysed intergovernmental forums.824 
 
When states largely fail, they suggest that, in order to contest transnational environmental 
political discourse, NGOs are considered to be a strong influence in most negotiations.825 
As has already been described, global governance in the twentieth century involved 
multiple actors interacting with each other alongside traditional state actors. However, 
changes in global governance now question traditional state-centred negotiation strategies, 
which have been shown to be ineffective; this suggests the adoption of new strategies 
rather than a repetition of old ones.826 This need for alternative mechanisms is particularly 
                                                 
823 The term filling the gap is used in Dombrowski K. (2010), Filling the Gap? An Analysis of Non-
Governmental Organizations Responses to Participation and Representation Deficits in Global Climate 
Governance, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 10, pp: 397-410 
824 Bramble Barbara J. and Porter Gareth (1992), Non-Governmental Organizations and the Making of US 
International Environmental Policy, in The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and 
Institutions, edited by Hurrell A. and Kingsbury B., Claredon Press, Oxford, p. 322. 
825 Charnovitz S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 100, pp:348-372 at p.348 
826 Williams M. (1993), Re-articulating the Third World Coalition: The Role of Environmental Agenda, 
Third World Quarterly, Volume14, Number 1, p.7 
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important in the environment field because “environmental problems are increasingly 
escaping the control of individual states and international institutions have often been too 
weak to step into the breach”.827  A further concern of intergovernmental governing 
patterns today is that they need to handle more complex, urgent, global and transnational 
issues than at the time when most intergovernmental institutions arrangements were being 
established.828  Certainly, in the environmental arena, there is a demand for governance 
that can cross boundaries to address issues that do not impact on one particular state or 
community only. Consequently, adverse environmental crises have pushed the world 
towards multilateral systems of governance by bypassing traditional modes.  
 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, although there is a great debate about the validity of the 
participation of NGOs in law and policy making, their presence has been highly noticeable 
in all the important international legal and political negotiations. Charnovitz interestingly 
points out their influence in the field of international law, as follows: 
 
 Nongovernmental organizations … have exerted a profound influence on the scope and 
dictates of international law.  [They] have fostered treaties, promoted the creation of new 
international organization (IOs), and lobbied in national capitals to gain consent to stronger 
international rules.  A decade ago, Antonio Donini, writing about the United Nations, 
declared that “the Temple of States would be a rather dull place without nongovernmental 
organizations”. His observation was apt and is suggestive of a more general thesis: had 
NGOs never existed, international law would have a less vital role in human progress.829 
                                                 
827 Bodansky D. (1999), The Legitimacy of International Governance: A coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?, American Journal of International Law, Volume 93, pp. 596-624 at p.623 
828 Forman S. and Segaar D. (2006), New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of 
Multilateralism, Global Governance, Volume 12, pp. 205-225, Williams M. (1993), Re-articulating the Third 
World Coalition: The Role of Environmental Agenda, Third World Quarterly, Volume14, Number 1, pp:7-29 
829 Charnovitz S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume 100, pp:348-372 at p.348 
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According to Charnovitz, NGOs have played a significant role in shaping international 
law; elaborating on this point, the versatile character of NGOs is also visible in the human 
rights, humanitarian and environmental areas of international law and politics. Many 
fruitful negotiations, conventions and institutions have been established where profound 
contributions have been forthcoming from NGOs throughout the proceedings; for instance, 
on many occasions during climate change negotiations, the interests of small island states 
have been facilitated by environmental NGOs, and there have been times when their 
experts have been accredited as advisors to small island states delegations.830  Another 
example was at the 1989 Basel Convention on trade in toxic wastes, which was furnished 
with findings and data provided by Greenpeace and the Centre for Science and the 
Environment in New Delhi, Greenpeace both advised Southern states regarding negotiating 
strategies and distributed relevant information.831 As may be seen from these examples, 
NGO influence on the creation of international environmental agreements has been 
significant by providing assistance to Southern states. Chapter 3, therefore, argued strongly 
for their wider participation in global negotiations. 
 
Also discussed in much detail in Chapter 3 was NGO involvement in global governance in 
terms of the UN ECOSOC framework, whereby Article 71 of the UN Charter provided 
them with the necessary format for consultative status within ECOSOC. Although this 
                                                 
830 Hans H., Magnus J. (2009), Look Who’s Talking! Second Thoughts about NGOs as Representing Civil 
Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 44, Issue 4, pp: 429-448, Chasek P.S. (2001), NGOs 
and State Capacity in International Environmental Negotiations: The Experience of the Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Number 2, pp: 
168-176 at p.171, Chasek refers to the representation of Jacob Werksman of FIELD and Ian Fry formerly of 
Greenpeace, who represented several Pacific small islands states at climate change negotiations 
831Betsill M. and Bulkeley H. (2004), Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance:  the 
Cities for Climate Protection Programme, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 48, pp: 471-193 at p. 473, 
Chasek P.S. (2001), NGOs and State Capacity in International Environmental Negotiations: The Experience 
of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 
Volume 10, Number 2, pp: 168-176 at p.171 
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formal framework was defined in the Charter, the current practice of NGOs in the field of 
international law and policymaking is far more diverse, which Pearson explains as “the 
ways in which NGOs participate in international law are growing more quickly than the 
structures in which they seek to act are changing.”832 As a result of the diverse and 
complex nature by which NGOs are involved in global governance, they have set up 
interesting ‘creative’ structures outside the ‘official framework’ of UN Charter Article 71, 
which have been formed into transnational networks, which increasingly offer alternatives 
to the traditional state-based governing formats.833  
 
The current chapter, therefore, will explore the suitability of the structures of NGOs to 
represent Southern environmental concerns; it will also outline the key elements of a 
framework for transnational NGO networks by discussing and analysing what they are, 
how they work, why they emerge and what conditions need to be fulfilled for them to 
achieve their goals.  This chapter will also argue that, because transnational NGO networks 
are more diverse, highly technical, cross-border by nature, and have flexible working 
structures, than any individual government agency can be, they are capable of voicing 
Southern environmental concerns at global environmental negotiations. 
 
Transnational NGO Networks 
 
The participation of NGOs in global governance has taken place in many different forms. 
When the broader categories of NGO participation in global forums are analysed, they 
indicate a wide spectrum of methods. The involvement of NGOs in global environmental 
negotiations can be divided into three major categories: (i)  NGOs in their individual 
                                                 
832 Pearson  Z. (2006), Non Governmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing 
Landscapes of International Law, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 39, Number 2, pp:243-284 at 
p. 249 
833 Ibid, p. 250 
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capacity that have a network of national and local members (ii) NGOs operating under a 
particular major international environmental NGO, and (iii) NGOs in transnational 
network forms.834  The diversity of NGO participation depends on the different contexts in 
which they operate, such as the matters discussed, the different priorities and the global 
significance of the issues raised, their complexity and their geographical context.  
 
International environmental NGOs 
In some circumstances, NGOs act in their individual capacities upon their own 
environmental agendas. For instance, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FOE) and WWF – 
well-known international environmental NGOs – generally conduct their environmental 
campaigns independently from each other by using diverse methods to promote them. In 
his summary of a number of Greenpeace campaigns in 2001, Mate states: 
Greenpeace campaigns aim to weave together scientific and technical research, moral and 
philosophical discourse, public outreach and information dissemination, non-violent direct 
actions and confrontations, media and public communication strategies, national policy 
advocacy, policy advocacy at meetings, corporate campaigning, and market interventions 
which combine technological innovations, collaboration with environmentally responsible 
companies, coupled with consumer advocacy.835 
  
This observation describes the broad and complex nature of some international NGOs that 
are involved in transnational decision-making structures, whose methods often impact on 
                                                 
834 Keck M. and Sikkink K. (1999), Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics, 
International Social Sciences Journal, Volume 51, p. 89-101, Doherty B. (2006), Friends of the Earth 
International:  Negotiating a Transnational Identity, Environmental Politics, Volume 15, Number 05, pp:860-
880 
835 Mate J. (2001), Making a Difference:  A Case Study of the Greenpeace Ozone Campaign, Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 190-198 at p. 192 
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local, national and international decision-making forums.836 From time to time these 
organisations operate within certain environmental parameters, such as saving an extinct 
species, promoting climate change awareness, preventing deforestation or protecting 
biological diversity.837 As well as country-specific concerns, they are also involved with 
more international environmental issues.838  
 
For instance, international environmental NGOs influence many dimensions of the 
environmental decision-making panels, again at local, national and international levels839, 
the IUCN, as a knowledge-based network organisation, explains its wider representation 
and influence over all levels of governance, thus.840  
 
The World Conservation Union supports and develops cutting-edge conservation science; 
implements this research in field projects around the world; and then links both research and 
results to local, national, regional and global policy by convening dialogues between 
governments, civil society and the private sector.
841  
 
International NGOs also cover many different aspects of a specific environmental regime.  
For example, all the major NGOs show immense interests in climate change regimes and 
they often work independently, using different strategies to contribute to the same cause.  
                                                 
836 Scherrer Y.M. (2009), Environmental Conservation NGOs and Sustainable Development, Journal of 
Business Ethics, Volume 85, Issue 3, pp:555-571, Doherty B. (2006), Friends of the Earth International:  
Negotiating a Transnational Identity, Environmental Politics, Volume 15, Number 05, pp:860-880, Mate J. 
(2001), Making a Difference:  A Case Study of the Greenpeace Ozone Campaign, Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 190-198 
837 http://www.worldwildlife.org/home.html, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/, 
http://www.foe.co.uk/what_we_do/about_us/friends_earth_values_beliefs.html (last accessed on 16.06.2010) 
838 http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/ , http://www.foei.org/ (last accessed on 16.03.2011) 
839 Lisowski M. (2005), How NGOs Use Their Facilitative Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets to 
Affect International Environmental Negotiations, Diplomacy and Statecraft,  Volume 16, pp: 361-383,  
840 Scherrer Y.M. (2009), Environmental Conservation NGOs and Sustainable Development, Journal of 
Business Ethics, Volume 85, Issue 3, pp:555-571at p. 567 
841 www.iucn.org/en/about/index.htm (last accessed on 17.01.2011) refers by Scherrer Y.M. (2009), 
Environmental conservation NGOs and Sustainable Development, pp:555-571 
259 
 
In 2011, Friends of the Earth was campaigning for a strong and fair international climate 
agreement, while, simultaneously, Greenpeace was advocating for climate solutions that 
would help development without damaging the planet and WWF was assessing the 
potential climate risks to vulnerable species.842 
 
Collective members of major NGOs  
This is a network of several national and local NGOs working in collaboration with one 
major transnational NGO. For example, the Greenpeace Ozone campaign was carried out 
by many national Greenpeace members.843 Also, as Doherty recognises, the transnational 
Friends of the Earth maintains a network relationship with its national groups from both 
North and South.844 In this sort of case, with diverse actors representing different cultures, 
languages, social and developmental backgrounds, a serious clash of values could ensue 
within the group.  Therefore, such networks need to be able to respond to certain group 
diversity challenges; this will be analysed in more detail later in this chapter.845  
These collective environmental NGOs operate world-wide through their grassroots 
member organisations. Although these have limited resources in their local operations 
they, nevertheless, have contributed to global decision making meaningfully and 
constructively as a result of being a part of a major organisation. Indeed, some Northern 
partner organisations extend support to their Southern counterparts in order to strengthen 
their capacities in the areas of research, statistics, resources and environmental 
                                                 
842 http://www.worldwildlife.org/home.html, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/, 
http://www.foe.co.uk/what_we_do/about_us/friends_earth_values_beliefs.html (last accessed on 11.02.2011) 
843 Mate J. (2001), Making a Difference:  A Case Study of the Greenpeace Ozone Campaign, Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 190-198 
844 Doherty B. (2006), Friends of the Earth International:  Negotiating a Transnational Identity, 
Environmental Politics, Volume 15, Number 05, pp:860-880 at p.862 
845 Ibid. 
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campaigning.846 NGO networking, therefore, plays a significant part in this thesis, which 
advocates as wide a range of NGOs as possible in order that the Southern voice may be 
heard more clearly in global decision-making forums.   
 
Transnational NGO Networks 
In a slightly different dimension to above-mentioned collective NGOs, a transnational 
NGO network participates in a global context in the form of a united group that is 
described either as a network, a coalition or collaboration. The difference between 
collective groups of NGOs operating under a major transnational NGOs and the 
transnational NGO network is the way the organisations are structured.  The collective 
groups described in the previous section are organised within a governance framework 
determined by a major NGO, such as Greenpeace, whose members work in different 
countries to its agenda. Transnational networks such as CAN are “forms of organizations 
characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and 
exchange”, many NGOs, therefore, agree to form a network in order to tackle a particular 
environmental catastrophe.847  A transnational environmental NGO network may consist of 
a number of major transnational NGOs, such as CAN, which has yet other transnational 
NGOs, i.e. Greenpeace, the WWF and FOE among its members.848 These decentralised 
networks share common goals and often work according to a specified set of rules.849  
 
                                                 
846 Doherty refers to an instance when Friends of the Earth France group helped Friends of the Earth 
Cameroon group monitor illegal logging in Doherty B. (2006), Friends of the Earth International:  
Negotiating a Transnational Identity, Environmental Politics, Volume 15, Number 05, p. 866 
847 Doherty B. (2006), Friends of the Earth International:  Negotiating a Transnational Identity, 
Environmental Politics, Volume 15, Number 05, pp. 860-880 at p. 862, Keck M. and Sikkink K. (1998), 
Activists Beyond Boarders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Cornell University Press, p. 8 
 
848 Alock F. (2008), Conflicts and Coalition Within and Across the ENGO Community, Global 
Environmental Politics, Volume 8, Number 4, pp:66-91 at pp. 81-82 
849 Duwe M. (2001), The Climate Action Network:  A glance behind the Curtains of a Transnational NGO 
Network, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 
177-189 at p. 179 
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Transnational NGO networks are increasingly establishing their position as important 
elements in environmental negotiation processes. CAN, for instance, is working as a 
network of transnational NGOs towards achieving common climate standards by bringing 
out concerns of the North and the South. Also, during the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court, NGOs, operating as the ‘Coalition for an International Criminal Court’, 
coordinated NGO participation throughout the negotiations.850 Another example is the 
‘Rain Forest Action Network’, which consists of sixty environmental and human rights 
NGOs worldwide and is involved in awareness-raising, sharing information and 
campaigning against all matters relating to deforestation.851 
 
Charnovitz observes that when NGOs form networks, or federations, in different countries, 
they create ‘transnationalism’, which serves to strengthen NGOs in intergovernmental 
forums; also, according to De Mars, NGO networks facilitate the transnational movement 
of norms, resources, political responsibility and information.852  Over the past two decades, 
NGO networks have also had a noticeable impact on issues of international trade and 
development, human rights, environmentalism and humanitarianism.853 Keck and Sikkink 
(1999) see the nature of transnational networks as, “a transnational advocacy network 
[that] includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by 
shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services”. 
                                                 
850 Pearson Z. (2006), Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing 
Landscape of International Law, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 39, Number 2, pp:243-284 at 
p.255  
851 http://ran.org/content/our-mission-and-history (last access 16.06.2010) 
852 Charnovitz S. (2006), Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law, Volume100, p.348. De Mars W. (2005), NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards 
in World Politics, Pluto Press at pp: 50-61 
853 Doherty B. (2006), Friends of the Earth International:  Negotiating a Transnational Identity, 
Environmental Politics, Volume 15, Number 05, pp:860-880, Pearson Z. (2006), Non-Governmental 
Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscape of International Law, Cornell 
International Law Journal, Volume 39, Number 2, p.243-284, Rutherford K. R. (2000), The Evolving Arms 
Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines, World Politics, 
Volume 53. Number 1, p. 74-114 
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They also believe that opportunities for network operations have increased over the past 
few decades due to the advancement of information technology and cheaper and more 
efficient air travel”. 854 
 
This thesis focuses mainly on the two latter categories of NGO participation in global 
environmental governance – that is (i) the network of national and local member NGOs 
working under a particular major international NGO, and (ii) transnational NGO network 
collaborations, which should exhibit certain qualities in order to promote Southern global 
concerns. Hudson describes these qualities as: 
 
[…] sets of interconnected nodes that are flexible and dynamic. They possess these qualities 
because networks are open structures that can expand without limit, integrating new nodes as 
long as they are able to communicate with the network sharing values and goals […]  In 
contrast to hierarchies and markets, networks are relatively flat organizational forms that are 
based upon trust, cooperation, loyalty and reciprocity between the constituent parts, rather 
than the vertical command structures of hierarchies, or market-based exchange […]  
Similarly, […] ‘[n]etworks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal 
and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange’ […].855 
 
The non-sovereignty nature of transnational network make them more flexible 
communicators that can cast their voices beyond territorial boundaries and bring the most 
marginalised Southern voices to the decision-making forums by developing effective 
yardsticks to measure legitimacy.  Many researchers have examined the various aspects of 
                                                 
854 Keck M. and Sikkink K. (1999), Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics, 
International Social Sciences Journal, Volume 51, p. 89-101 at p. 89 and Keck M. and Sikkink K. (1998), 
Activists Beyond Boarders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, London: Cornell University Press, 
p. 2 
855 Hudson A. (2001), NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks: from ‘legitimacy’ to ’political 
responsibility’?, Global Networks, Volume 1, Number 4, pp: 331-352 at p.334 
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transnational networks, which have opposed the hegemonic Northern influences in a wide 
range of global decision-making forums for a few decades.856  Peter Evans, who believes 
that such networks could link disregarded Southern communities into more powerful 
global networks, points out that they are capable of “shift[ing] power by connecting under-
privileged Third World groups and communities to political actors and areas that can affect 
decisions in hegemonic global networks”.857 However, the main thrust of this thesis is 
mainly directed at the strategic use of transnational NGO networks in order to gather 
information and conduct campaigns to assist Southern states deficiencies at the governance 
of powerful global organisations.858 
 
In summary, therefore, this thesis argues that flexible, cooperative, reciprocal, non-
hierarchical and non-sovereign transnational NGO networks are best suited to represent the 
South in global decision-making forums. Such networks work in two dimensions: (i) they 
influence states to take action on certain national and local political issues, thereby 
ensuring that international environmental principles and concerns are correctly addressed – 
an “outside-in” approach, and (ii) they impact on global decision-making forums in such a 
way as to further the international political agenda – an “inside-out” approach. The second 
dimension will be the focus of this chapter, while the negotiating methods of transnational 
                                                 
856 Duwe M. (2001), The Climate Action Network:  A Glance Behind the Curtains of a Transnational NGO 
Network, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 
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264 
 
NGO networks in voicing Southern environmental concerns where the states themselves 
have largely failed, will be the central focus of this thesis.859  
 
The nature of the organisation of transnational NGO networks will be analysed next in 
order to understand their capacity to make an impact on global environmental governance.  
Their approach to international issues can be recognised in two dimensions: agenda setting 
and Influence. 
  
Important Aspects of the Involvement of Transnational Networks  
Agenda setting 
 
A broad analysis of NGO networks shows a wide-range of involvement in the international 
political process. They approach international issues by agenda setting and norm creation, 
in that they focus on issues in their global political context.860  Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
note: “Networks generate attention to new issues and help set agendas when they provoke 
media attention, debates, hearings, and meetings on issues that previously had not been a 
matter of public debate or at intergovernmental forums.”861  
 
Rutherford explained the process by which a transnational NGO network introduced the 
landmine issue into the international political agenda as having been achieved in the 
following two interrelated stages. Firstly, by initiating discussions, it planted the issue onto 
                                                 
859 Eccleston B. (1996), Does north-South Collaboration Enhance NGO Influence on Deforestation policies 
in Malaysia and Indonesia in NGOs and Environmental Policies Asia and Africa edited by Potter D, Franck 
Class: London. 
860 Rutherford K. R. (2000), The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in 
Banning Antipersonnel Landmines, World Politics, Volume 53, Number 1, p. 74-114 
861Keck M. and Sikkink K. (1998), Activists Beyond Boarders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 
London: Cornell University Press, Rutherford K. R. (2000), The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: 
Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines, World Politics, Volume 53. Number 
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the agenda by emphasising the devastating human consequences of landmines, and, 
secondly, it transformed the norm into a powerful instrument by helping to articulate and 
codify the ban in international law.862  In order to succeed in introducing an issue such as 
this onto the international agenda, NGO networks use various strategies, including the 
extensive use of information technology and media, research statistics and by recruiting 
high profile public figures such as Diana, Princess of Wales in the landmine ban 
campaign.863 In this way, NGO networks have been able to introduce new political agendas 
of intergovernmental forums to bear on areas of lesser priority.  
 
Influence 
 
A picture of global decision-making forums, from a developing countries’ perspective, is 
often not a positive one because global decision-making processes are often poorly 
informed about Southern environmental concerns due to their low level of influence, the 
reasons for which, such as historical, political and economic factors, have been discussed 
comprehensively in previous chapters.  As Najam stated in 2005: 
 
[…] the South remains a key but reluctant actor in global environmental policy whose ability 
to influence global environmental processes has remained severely constrained by its self-
perception of marginalization and its capacity-limitations.
864 
 
Given this, how far transnational NGO networks are capable of representing Southern 
concerns at global governance forums, thereby influencing the decision-making process, is 
                                                 
862 Rutherford K. R. (2000), The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in 
Banning Antipersonnel Landmines, World Politics, Volume 53. Number 1, p. 74-114 at p. 77 
863 Ibid, p. 87 
864 Najam A.(2005), Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance:  From contestation to 
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a primary concern of this thesis. These networks use many ways to influence international 
decision-making forums, such as information dissemination, lobbying, research and 
advocacy when they represent governments at the various forums. In order to influence 
state delegations, industry representatives and delegations from the various international 
organizations, they engage with numerous scientific and policy issues.865 The major NGOs, 
in particular, are able to introduce high levels of expertise and scientifically proven data 
gleaned from a broad research base in order to influence decision making.  These issues 
will be analysed further in relation to the practice of transnational networks in the climate 
change regime in the following section. 
 
How do transnational environmental networks work?   
 
Alongside the main objective of this chapter, networks that represent the South at a global 
level should be able to identify with its broad environmental concerns. Keck and Sikkink’s 
recognition of networks as “communicative structures”866 serves to highlight the principal 
goal of this research. De Mars, also, recognizes them as being “communicative” by 
identifying four crucial factors that are present in any type of NGO network that “can 
move along its relational channels: normative frames, material resources, political 
responsibility, and information. In other words, NGO networks are normative, distributive, 
obligative, and communicative”.867 The interpretation of networks as communicative 
structures includes the wider spectrum in which they are engaged, in that they are 
                                                 
865 Scherrer Y.M. (2009), Environmental conservation NGOs and Sustainable Development, Journal of 
Business Ethics, Volume 85, Issue 3, pp:555-571, Betzold C. (2010), ‘Borrowing Power’ to Influence 
International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate Change Regime, 1990-1997 online published in  
http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1603_1456.pdf (last accessed on 08.03.2011, Dombrowski K. 
(2010), Filling the Gap? An Analysis of Non-Governmental Organizations Responses to Participation and 
Representation Deficits in Global Climate Governance, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 
10, pp: 397-410 
866 Keck M. and Sikkink K. (1998), Activists beyond Boarders: Advocacy Networks in  International Politics, 
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867 De Mars W. (2005), NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics, Pluto Press at 
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information exchanges whereby they “bring new ideas, norms and discourses into policy 
debates [and] promote norm implementation [and] monitoring compliance with regional 
and international standards”.868 This perception of networks as “communicative structures” 
illustrates the process by which the marginalized Southern concerns could become part of 
the international arena where decisions that affect them are taken.   
 
This chapter will now draw on examples of transnational NGO’s responses in certain 
aspects of the climate change regime in order to show how well they respond to 
“participation inequalities” in global environmental governance. The following discussion 
shows that transnational NGO networks can successfully influence global decision making 
processes and outcomes by supporting demands for equal Southern participation.  
 
Transnational NGO Networks Representing Southern Concerns in Climate 
Change Negotiations 
 
At present, climate change has become the largest global environmental issue that raises 
many issues on equity, fairness and justice claims in relation to the North-South 
dimension.869  The relevance of the climate change issue in terms of North-South divisions 
may be analysed in the following three dimensions. Firstly, Southern states are the least 
responsible for the creation of climate change, which is more generally attributed to the 
North’s emissions of greenhouse gases during industrialisation, secondly, the South did not 
benefit economically from the processes that emitted those gases, and thirdly, the South is 
the most environmentally vulnerable as a result of climate change, since it has the least 
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International Social Science Journal, Volume 51, p. 89-101 at p. 90 
869 Anand R. (2004), International Environmental Justice: North-South Dimension, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
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capacity to face its challenges.870 Consequently, it is important to understand that both the 
costs and benefits of climate change are unequally distributed between North and South. 
The following is an argument about how meaningful contributions of transnational NGO 
networks may help to mitigate the differences in participation in international climate 
change forums.   
 
Recently, some scholars have expressed positive views regarding NGOs representing the 
South in climate change governance.871 In 2010, Betzold stated that low-power parties, 
such as AOSIS (the Association of Small Island States), can exert influence by “borrowing 
power” – that is by drawing on external power sources, such as NGOs.872 Dombrowski 
argues that transnational NGOs have responded to representation inequalities by proposing 
more equitable forms of representation.873 The following discussion draws upon instances 
where transnational NGOs support demands for principles of equity, fairness and justice in 
climate change decision making procedures.   
 
The primary criterion to check on equal distribution of representation among member 
states is the voting system, in which, following the adoption of the UN method of 
distributing votes, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) apply a 
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one-country-one-vote arrangement.874  However, the equal distribution of votes alone does 
not ensure equality in decision-making powers.  As this thesis argues in Chapters 1 and 2, 
even within the formal structures of equal representation, Southern claims are marginalised 
due to North/South power politics. 875 For example, even though the one-country-one-vote 
mechanism applies, Southern states remain at the periphery because of, amongst other 
things, their outdated, hence invalid, research input.876 In response to this disparity of 
resources, however, a group of transnational NGOs submitted a draft design to the 2009 
Copenhagen Treaty in which they stressed the importance of forming democratic decision-
making structures with an equitable and balanced regional representation to safeguard 
equal representation of Southern concerns.877  The group further emphasised that “securing 
the representation of the most vulnerable countries should be a priority, as they will be 
most impacted by unchecked climate change”.878  In Article 2(3) of the draft proposal the 
group states clearly states about the importance of application of common but 
differentiated responsibilities in Climate Change negotiations: 
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Effort sharing to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and pursuant to the shared 
vision of this Article and that of the Kyoto Protocol should be based on the criteria of 
responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate and take into account the principles of 
common but differentiated responsibility and respective capability, equity, fairness and 
consider that economic and social development, poverty eradication and adaptation to 
climate change are the top priorities for developing countries.879 
 
It is important that transnational NGOs should voice Southern concerns since it lacks the 
financial and technological means to mitigate any adverse impact as a result of the change.  
This thesis contends, therefore, that when transnational NGOs effectively represent 
Southern concerns they strengthen its bargaining position, which is Betzold’s concept of 
“borrowing power” whereby even weak actors negotiate with strong actors successfully 
and often obtain sizable results. 880 
 
A very significant instance of where a transnational NGO network represented Southern 
concerns was when CAN-International, a network coalition of more than 550 NGOs 
worldwide, emphasised that equity, fairness and justice principles should be observed in 
relation to future financial mechanisms by stating its case in a position paper on principles 
for climate finance under the UNFCCC Framework Convention.881   This chapter will pay 
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attention to few of the arguments taken from the above-mentioned position paper. Firstly, 
CAN insisted on adherence to the following principles: 
 
Funding must be substantial and adequate to meet the scale of needs identified by developing 
countries and should be based on the UNFCCC principles of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” and respective capabilities […] The financial mechanism must also support 
technical assistance for building developing countries’ capacity to access larger pools of 
financing, in accordance with self-identified development priorities.
882 
 
CAN’s claim here reflects the arguments made in Chapter 2 of this thesis whereby  
common, but differentiated, responsibilities were recognised as an international 
environmental law principle that would ensure principles of equity, fairness and justice 
within the governance process.883 CAN further mentions the necessity for capacity building 
in developing countries as well as the importance of providing technical assistance.  This 
thesis, in the above section on Southern Environmental Concerns, identifies the lack of 
technical expertise as one of the issues that hampers effective Southern participation,884 
thus CAN voices one of the vital aspects of the North-South dimension by including the 
provision of technical assistance to the South.  
 
CAN was also able to guide the climate debate in a positive direction by including 
provisions for equitable representation: 
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884 Chapter 5 of this thesis, p.250 
272 
 
 Equitable representation in political decision-making processes is essential to ensure a just 
outcome. Representative governance, based on the model of the Adaptation Fund Board, 
must include majority of non-Annex 1 countries with specific and significant representation 
of most vulnerable developing countries.
885 
 
In this way, CAN developed its argument on the grounds of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”; it also emphasised that a majority of developing countries should make 
up the decision-making bodies of any proposed financial mechanism. Earlier in this section 
it was argued that Southern states are the least capable of facing climate change challenges, 
therefore, with this proposal CAN demonstrated that equitable representation plays a key 
role in mitigating North-South governance inequalities. 
 
Apart from supporting Southern concerns through documentation, transnational NGOs 
provide expertise services to assist in several areas of negotiations, such as by providing 
scientific information, technical facilities and legal advice.886 For instance, they furnished 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) with scientific knowledge regarding climate 
change,887 to the point where, as Betzold argues that their delegates became “fluent in 
climate speak”.888 Consequently, not only was the NGO contribution immensely important, 
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886 Betzold C. (2010), ‘Borrowing Power’ to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate 
Change Regime, 1990-1997, p.8 published online:  http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1603_1456.pdf 
(last accessed on 08.03.2011) 
887 Duwe M.(2001), The Climate Action Network:  A Glance Behind the Curtains of a Transnational NGO 
Network, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 
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since updated scientific information and data play a crucial role in any climate negotiation, 
it left an educative legacy that would stand AOSIS in good stead for future negotiations.889  
 
The lack of legal expertise and negotiation skills are other areas where Southern states 
have fallen short in global governance forums.  However, there are now transnational 
NGOs, whose expertise is international law, who will provide them with legal advice.  For 
instance, AOSIS was supported by the Foundation for International Environmental Law 
and Development whereby they provided the appropriate legal facilities.890 Transnational 
NGO’s highly experienced legal experts are much more confident and aware of 
international legal procedures than are states’ delegates who might have no expertise that 
particular field. As Betzold explains, “The expertise and knowledge that these [NGO’s] 
lawyers brought with them were important assets, and clearly contributed to the prominent 
role of AOSIS, for, as one interviewee explains: `they had something to say, [and] they 
could present it well'”.891 
 
The preceding analysis on the role of transnational NGO networks in climate regime 
illustrate how Southern concerned are effectively voiced at global forums and the ability of 
transnational NGOs to strengthen the participation of the South by providing the required 
facilities. Thus transnational network collaborations enrich global environmental 
governance, however, as Duwe emphasized in 2001, the confrontation of different 
organizations can become both gift and burden, since they also have their limitations, as 
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this chapter goes on to describe.892  This chapter will also analyse, in depth, the literature 
from Matthias Duwe on the Climate Action Network (CAN), Brian Doherty on Friends of 
the Earth International (FOIE) and Zoe Pearson on the Coalition for an International 
Criminal Court (CICC) in order to explore how the different and diverse organisations 
might converge and collaborate as transnational networks, since it is highly important to 
establish whether “transnational networks themselves have to deal with North-South 
conflicts.893 
 
Challenges to Overcome in NGO Networks Format  
 
Transnational NGO networks, by creating effective mechanisms and influencing the 
agendas and negotiations of global governance on behalf of Southern global environmental 
concerns, shed light on the key component of this thesis, which argues the necessity of 
utilising the most effective methods of communication in order to operate where interstate 
efforts have largely failed. However, there remain a number of challenges that need to be 
negotiated whenever a collaboration of different groups with distinctly different 
characteristics, priorities and interests, try to achieve a common agenda.  This section bases 
its analysis on two major issues. Firstly, how to overcome diversity problems. The 
transnational networks include actors from different backgrounds who work in different 
contexts; they will also possess different capacities, therefore the first challenge derives 
from their diversity. Following this, the accountability or legitimacy of the NGOs will be 
analysed. As mentioned in Chapter 3, international law and governance policies are not 
entirely clear regarding NGO participation in the global decision making process because 
the traditional and formal governance structures have still not been made wide enough to 
                                                 
892 Duwe M.(2001), The Climate Action Network:  A Glance Behind the Curtains of a Transnational NGO 
Network, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 
177-189 at p. 177 
893 Ibid. 
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allow for it.  At the end of this section, therefore, this thesis will argue the necessity to 
develop unconventional legitimacy criteria in order to handle the increasingly progressive 
multidimensional governance structures. 
 
Diversity among groups 
 
Transnational NGO networks consist of NGOs that have been created within different 
contexts; diversity, in terms of geographical origination, issue priorities, the nature of their 
involvement in negotiations, plus many more, therefore, is inevitable. Hinchberger 
identified four such categories within the NGO groups that participated in UNCED in 
1992: Firstly, environment versus development, secondly, large versus small, thirdly, 
North versus South, and fourthly, lobbyists versus activists.894 Chapter 2 of this thesis 
elaborated on the differences on priority issues between states in inter-state negotiations, 
where the impact made by the North-South division was recognised, as it has been 
throughout this thesis, as a major barrier for reaching common positions. It is, therefore, 
important to discuss to what extent these issues can threaten the unity of the group and 
what implications they have on the negotiation structures. Keck and Sikkink explain this 
as: 
… [by influencing] discourse, procedures, and policy, activists may engage and become part 
of larger policy communities [where] group actors work on an issue from a variety of 
institutional and value perspectives.  Transnational advocacy networks must also be 
understood as political spaces, in which differently situated actors negotiate – formally or 
informally – the social, cultural, and political meaning of their joint enterprise.
895 
 
                                                 
894 Hinchberger B. (1993), Non-Governmental Organizations: The Third Force in the Third World, Green 
Globe Year Book, Volume 45. 
895 Keck M.E. and Sikkink (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 
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As may be seen, therefore, the political interests and values of different groups in a 
network can sometimes be a challenge to the unity of the network. A common claim by 
Southern NGO groups in networks is the North-South dimension that operates within 
them. Such differences could be in relation to financial strength, the level of expertise and 
technology, or political, cultural and social conditions.896 Many scholars, in different case 
studies, have analysed the diversity within the networks.  For instance, Doherty discusses 
North-South issues, inequalities of language and resources and differences among 
members in a network working for Friends of the Earth International (FOEI)897 and Duwe 
of the CAN points out the differences in the North-South dimension and the size of the 
NGO’s research and resource funding.898 Although a different subject matter, Pearson’s in 
depth analysis on the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) presents useful 
guidance for this thesis towards understanding certain challenges in relation to diversity 
within the network. Her findings were mainly based on political interests, resources and 
funding capacities, expertise, and the size of the NGOs.899  
 
Doherty’s case study on FOEI engages in a detailed discussion on the North-South 
differences within the network that ultimately caused disagreements over agenda setting, 
representation and policy making of FOEI.900 Contrasting the FOEI network with two 
                                                 
896 Pearson  Z. (2006), Non Governmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing 
Landscapes of International Law, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 39, Number 2, pp:243-284 at 
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897 Doherty B. (2006), Friends of the Earth International:  Negotiating a Transnational Identity, 
Environmental Politics, Volume 15, Number 05, pp:860-880 
898 Duwe M. (2001), The Climate Action Network:  A glance behind the Curtains of a Transnational NGO 
Network, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 
177-189 
899 Pearson  Z. (2006), Non Governmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing 
Landscapes of International Law, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 39, Number 2, pp:243-284 at 
pp:259-264 
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other transnational environmental NGOs – WWF and Greenpeace – Doherty argues that 
the FOEI maintains environmental justice as a central theme of their governance 
structures.901 By drawing examples from equal voting system and the FOEI‘s Southern-
driven working agenda, he demonstrates its commitment to “address environmental issues 
through a critique of social and political inequality.”902 In a statement on its website, they 
express their representation for social justice issues: 
 
We are the world’s largest grassroots environmental network and we campaign on today’s 
most urgent environmental and social issues. We challenge the current model of economic 
and corporate globalization, and promote solutions that will help to create environmentally 
sustainable and socially just societies.
903 
 
However, in the history of FOEI, there are instances where it was criticised by its Southern 
members for failing to ensure that Southern concerns were represented sufficiently in its 
agenda.  One significant instance was when Accion Ecologica (AE) in Ecuador left the 
FOEI in 2002, they expressed their dissatisfaction over the Northern dominance in its 
representation at the WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002.904  Doherty notes that, according to 
AE, “[the] Southern branches of FOEI were weakened and their agendas ‘invisibilised’ by 
the Northern agenda; also that representatives of the FOEI groups from South Africa, 
Nigeria and Uruguay supported many of the arguments.”905 Transnational NGO networks, 
therefore, should seriously consider the challenges posed by the North-South dimension 
right down to its fundamental base and functional system. Duwe, in his analysis on CAN, 
states that the North-South dimension influences its functions and framework in terms of 
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priorities and positions as well as in its access to funding.906 Another weakness in the 
system is that, because the number of NGOs participating for the North is higher than the 
number participating for the South, an imbalance in the decision making process has been 
created. In addition, CAN is a network that consists of various major transnational NGOs, 
which carry their own North-South issues with them into the decision making forums. As 
Doherty states, FOEI is a member of CAN and its own North–South concerns will impact 
on its responses in CAN.907   
 
Although the North–South dimension is the obvious key reason for diversity among the 
members of a network, many other differences appear within it. Pearson identifies these as 
political interests and funding and resources within the CICC,908 which means that working 
towards achieving a common goal is very complicated.  Furthermore, a common stand 
from within the network can be influenced by the numerous religious and gender issues of 
its members.909 Its diversity depends on the size of its member organisations, as Duwe 
explains in the context of CAN, many small NGOs depend on the funding facilities coming 
from well-established major NGOs, which affect the independence of small NGOs.910 
Transnational NGO networks within both Northern and Southern NGOs, therefore, often 
struggle with the problem of diversity. However, many Southern NGOs are small with 
limited financial strength, whereas the well-established major NGOs tend to be from the 
North and these are mainly concerned with environmental protection.  Because the major 
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NGOs that facilitate grassroots projects, usually in the South, work together with much 
smaller local NGOs, local agendas and functions are very often subverted.  Ultimately, 
therefore, governance systems are largely controlled by the North.  As Duwe explains, the 
smaller NGOs often fear for their survival and they struggle to be independent in their 
bargaining position at the network against the major NGOs.911   
 
Although the diversity of members within a network is a challenge to the functioning of 
the transnational networks, sometimes it can enrich the decision-making process by 
offering a broader representation of the issues. In her discourse on the importance of the 
diversity of NGOs in the context of the CICC, Pearson states: 
 
NGO and state representatives alike were aware of the importance of the presence of 
diversity of NGOs, particularly in terms of geographical representation, in order to ensure 
broad-based global support for the International Criminal Court, and to promote the 
recognition that the issues in the ICC negotiations were of worldwide relevance, rather than 
solely concerning “western” issues and values.
912  
 
Consequently, it is important for transnational NGO networks to receive the benefit of 
different perspectives on their issues of concern, therefore, the input of small Southern 
NGOs will furnish them with useful information in order that they might frame a well-
balanced, common agenda in the same way that the presence of major NGOs makes the 
network a powerful actor in a global political context.   
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Nevertheless, as has been mentioned earlier, while diversity enriches the transnational 
identity of NGO networks, the differences among them create complications for 
developing a common-action plan; therefore, it is important that they understand what 
actions and methods need to be avoided, or minimised.  For example, North-South 
dimensions, or other differences, could be avoided by the application of proper governance 
strategies, such as voting mechanisms, agenda setting and an adherence to the principles of 
equity, fairness and justice in their procedures, since it has been recognised that their 
absence results in an imbalance of power.913  For instance, FOEI, which has seventy-six 
national member groups, guarantees an “equal vote [system] irrespective of the size of its 
membership or financial contribution to the Federation”, which means that formal 
participation in decision-making is equitable.914 As discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2, 
the World Bank’s ‘weighted’ voting system marginalises Southern participants that lack 
financial strength, therefore, when FOIE national member groups use their voting power at 
its Biennial General Meeting, where the really important decisions are taken, equal voting 
system could be considered appropriate for a transnational NGO network to apply in order 
to articulate the Southern voice in global forums. In this way, relatively small Southern 
NGOs will secure a place at the decision-making tables, at least, if it is formally 
guaranteed by a network’s governance structures.  
 
However, voting rights alone will not necessarily achieve equal participation unless the 
infrastructure and other resources are forthcoming from the group. A lack of financial 
resources to carry out environmental research, to implement particular environmental 
standards, to access sufficient funds, and to acquire human resources and technology, is 
vital. Duwe, in his research on CAN – the global network of NGOs – states: 
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Most of the interviewees saw a North-South divide within the CAN, some foremost in 
different priorities and objectives, others just in numbers of representation at meetings.  The 
main reason for the latter was found in a  lack of funding, which not only made it more 
difficult to travel,  but also leads to a lack of human resources, as staff are occupied with 
other duties, salaries are low and financial insecurities obstruct long-term planning.
915    
 
If the differences remain within a network, what ultimately happens is similar to the North-
South dimension in an interstate context.  In his observations on the necessity to map the 
differences within a network, Duwe concludes:  
 
Therefore, CAN is geographically misrepresented at conferences, and differences, for 
example in priorities, are ignored out, as Northern NGOs come to dominate the agenda and 
the process, as they are greater in number and stronger in institutional capacity.
916 
 
It is this thesis’s contention that mechanisms and facilities should be developed within 
NGO networks to enhance the participation of Southern groups both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  This means that they should be able to send many members, say, to represent 
FOEI, which should include not only representatives, but participants with high levels of 
scientific expertise and relevant technical knowledge in order to debate the matters in 
discussion. Doherty refers to the FOEI representation at WSSD meetings when he states 
that sometimes FOEI was overrepresented by Northern groups as they are able to send 
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several staff917, he also stated that in the meetings  where decisions were made on 
consensus and not on voting, the domination of the North in FOEI was clear. Other issues, 
such as language barriers and limited access to information technology, also reduced the 
effectiveness of Southern participation.918  
 
In order to mitigate the differences emanating from the North-South division, together with 
other issues of concern, FOEI formed a Network Process Team organised on a regional 
basis, which was charged with checking how it should face the challenges of political 
diversity within the network.919 Because funding facilities need to be maintained by 
transnational NGO networks in order to encourage the Southern NGO participation, Duwe 
suggested creating a trust fund, to be administered within the UNFCC, made up from fixed 
annual membership contributions, which would facilitate more equitable developing 
country participation.920 Other transnational NGO networks might also be encouraged to 
apply similar methods into their governance system, in order that the smaller NGOs might 
enjoy equal participation in decision-making processes.    
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Legitimacy and accountability of NGOs 
 
It is important that, in their participation, transnational networks reflect legitimacy and 
accountability especially where Southern interests are at stake. Referring to the 
Background Paper for the Cardoso Report of June 2004 on “We the Peoples: Civil Society, 
the United Nations and Global Governance”, Bossche states: 
 
“‘well handled’ involvement of NGOs in the policy deliberation and international 
decision-making processes of international organisations ‘enhances the quality of 
decision-making, increases ownership of the decisions, improves the accountability 
and transparency of the of the process and enriches outcomes through a variety of 
views and experiences’”.921 
 
Although the idea that NGOs enrich the legitimacy debate of global governance processes 
as expressed in the Background Paper, one of the greatest challenges that transnational 
NGO networks face is legitimacy and accountability in relation to their own participation 
in global politics, and this is particularly relevant for those that voice Southern concerns 
because legitimacy and accountability concepts are deeply rooted in the North-South 
discourse.922 
 
                                                 
921 We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance (New York: UN 2004), also 
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Vedder argues that “Legitimacy is the state or quality of being legitimate.”923 Legitimacy 
ensures that the actors in international decision making processes should conform to the 
relevant rules while accountability of transnational networks, questions how NGOs are 
accountable to their constituencies?”924 To whom are transnational NGO networks 
accountable? Can they be held responsible for their actions? Perhaps logic suggests that the 
members of an organisation should be held responsible for its decisions and undertakings 
under the concept of accountability. However, trying to analyse the activities of networks 
in terms of their legitimacy and accountability is a highly challenging task, since the 
concepts of ‘legitimacy and accountability’ are historically defined in context of state-
centric governance; consequently, ‘legitimacy literature’ often focuses on inter-state 
decision making processes and procedures.925   
 
In order to establish the context in which the legitimacy concept may be incorporated into 
the governance system, this section will analyse briefly the legitimacy discussion 
generally. In identifying several bases of legitimacy that are very much central to the state-
centric governance system, Bodansky (1999) believes that decision–making authorities 
should act according to the principles of democracy and law – which is the category of 
‘legal legitimacy.’926  His next category concerns transparency and public participation in 
the actual decision-making process, and his final category is ‘expert legitimacy’, which 
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means that decision-making should be based on the ‘best-proven scientific evidence’.927 
These criteria are designed to judge the authorities of states whose representation is based 
on democratic elections, hence state officials should be guided by rules and norms that are 
perceived to be legitimate.  Questions are raised about the basis for NGO representation, 
because they lack the link with a necessary constituency.  There is also debate about how 
NGOs might be regulated and what mechanisms they use to influence global 
negotiations.928  
 
Transnational NGOs, therefore, cannot be regarded as democratically elected in the same 
way as governments, since their validity is derived from completely different sources, 
therefore their representation at global forums creates a number of legitimacy and 
accountability issues.929 Chinkin states that: 
 
NGOs are often non-democratic, self-appointed, may consist of only a handful of people, and 
determine their own agendas and priorities with a missionary-like or elitist zeal. Their own 
decision–making process may not be transparent and are often concealed behind a deluge of 
information. They do not have to address the full range of opinions concerns. The other side 
of the coin of representation is accountability. NGOs are acquiring a measure of international 
legal personality through procedural rights of access and standing, but their accountability 
has barely been addressed.930  
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Contemporary international law and politics deal with multidimensional governance 
systems in which NGOs present their arguments at global decision making forums 
alongside states and other international organisations. However, NGOs do not base their 
representations formally and democratically, as do states and other international 
organisations, instead they base them on alternative claims, which will be dealt in detail 
below.931  
 
In the search for different legitimacy criteria to be applied to NGO participation in global 
governance, it would be interesting to explore whether the legal framework of NGOs 
constitutes legitimate participation.932 Vedder et al argue that, although legality of NGO 
participation can contribute to legitimacy, “it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for legitimacy.933 Van den Bossche recognises conformity to the legal rules 
constitutes regulatory dimension of legitimacy.  He explains the regulatory dimension in 
the context of legal rules that affirm their participation in the international decision-making 
process by dividing the legal rules into two categories:  (i) the rules defining the legal 
status of NGOs in certain international organisations, and (ii) the substantive and 
procedural rules for international organisations regarding NGO accreditation.934  With 
reference to the provisions in international organisations, such as the UN, UNCTAD, 
WHO, ILO, van den Bossche argues that their main instruments provide explicit legal 
bases for NGO participation in the decision-making process.935 However, although 
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legality/regulatory legitimacy implies a basis for legitimacy in terms of NGO participation, 
Bossche concludes that “there is still considerable room for improvement of the regulatory 
legitimacy of NGO involvement in international organisations”. 936  
 
In comparison to the legitimate basis of states and international organisations as discussed 
in Chapter 3, it seems clear that the legitimacy and accountability status of NGOs in terms 
of their participation in global governance is questionable within the current framework. 
Therefore, because of the unique nature of NGO representation many efforts have been 
made to find different criteria than those that offer traditional legitimacy in order to 
evaluate environmental NGO representation in international governance. Princen and 
Finger, for instance, describe four such criteria: (i) the cultural validity of the social values 
espoused, (ii) an association with universal goals, (iii) the acquisition of reputations for 
specialist or grounded knowledge, and (iv) representation of important constituencies’.937 
The ability to work beyond territorial boundaries to achieve universal goals is a key feature 
of transnational NGOs; for example, because FOEI can claim that their representation does 
not belong to any particular nation or region the environmental issues they espouse carry 
universal weight, which contributes to their legitimacy claim from a different legitimacy 
perspective.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
2997(XXVII) provides implicit  legal basis for the participation of  NGOs in the UNEP. For a detailed 
discussion on various international organisations in relation  to legal status of NGOs:  Bossche P.V. (2007), 
Regulating Legitimacy of the Role of NGOs in Global Governance: legal status and accreditation in  NGO 
Involvement in International Governance and Policy: Sources and Legitimacy edited by Vedder A. et al, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp: 136-173 
936 Bossche P.V. (2007), Regulating Legitimacy of the Role of NGOs in Global Governance: legal status and 
accreditation in  NGO Involvement in International Governance and Policy: Sources and Legitimacy edited 
by Vedder A. et al, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp: 136-173 at pp:172-173 
937 Jepson P. (2005), Governance and Accountability of Environmental NGOs, Environmental Science and 
Policy, Volume 8, Issue 5, pp: 515-524 at p. 519, Jepson refers to Princen, T. and Finger, M. (1994), 
Environmental NGOs in World Politics, Routledge, London. P.36 – 37 
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Many transnational NGOs contribute to scientific research and bodies of expertise in a 
number of international environmental initiatives, hence their representation of important 
constituencies places them in a strong position to influence decision-making processes, 
which, ultimately, provides them with a legitimate base. It is important, therefore, to 
mention that the dominance of the traditional state-centric criteria of legitimacy, such as 
being democratically elected and having legal origins, require NGO networks to consider 
alternative ways of checking their legitimacy and making them transparent. Edwards and 
Hulme, in their observation that transparency in relation to the practical dimension of NGO 
activities, involves a statement of goals, transparency in decision making, relationships, 
honest reporting of resource utilisation, and achieved targets.938 However, they make it 
clear that the international governance system has not yet established a uniform method – 
i.e. a normative yardstick to evaluate the legitimacy of transnational NGO networks.939     
 
The interpretation of accountability criteria of NGO networks that this thesis proposes is 
the closest to that suggested by Backstrand. The three forms of accountability criteria she 
suggests, therefore, is worth explaining further. She emphasizes the need for “plural forms 
of accountability to evaluate the modern forms of non-traditional transnational network 
governance”.940 In focusing on a broad area of transnational climate networks that grow 
out of public and private partnerships, she proposes a “non-electoral accountability, such as 
peer, reputational, and market accountability” to provide the legitimacy base for 
transnational NGO networks.  “Peer accountability consists of mutual evaluation of 
                                                 
938
 Edward M. and Hulme D. (1996), Too close to Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental 
Organizations, World Development , Volume 24, pp: 961-973 
939 Edward M. and Hulme D. (1996), Too close to Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental 
Organizations, World Development , Volume 24, pp: 961-973, Collinwood V. (2006), Non-governmental 
Organisations, Power and Legitimacy in International Society, Review of International Studies, Volume 39, 
pp: 439-454 at p. 447 
940 Backstrand K. (2008), Accountability of Networked climate Governance: The Rise of Transnational 
Climate Partnerships, Global Environmental politics, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp. 74 -102 at p. 75 
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organizations by their counterparts.”941 As a consequence of the peer accountability 
method, a system of ‘checks and balance’ may be operated among members of the network 
as well as between other networks. Reputational accountability, which is closely connected 
with media and public reputation, is an important issue includes the availability of 
information to the public, open-access to the network’s decision–making processes, and 
transparency of the network’s agendas.942 The third form of accountability in Backstrand’s 
categories, which mainly covers the market partnership within climate networks, states that 
“market signals provide the base for reward and punishments for performance by investors, 
shareholders and ultimately consumers.”943 
 
 As has been shown, traditional forms of legitimacy and accountability criteria are no 
longer pertinent within a multilateral system of governance, where the complex 
collaboration of actors play several non-hierarchical roles. As Backstrand points out, 
participatory accountability, transparency and availability of monitoring mechanisms 
should be the measure for the legitimacy of transnational NGO networks.944 Consequently, 
this thesis argues that transnational NGO networks that represent Southern global 
environmental concerns need to apply legitimacy mechanisms to their own structures when 
they participate in international multidimensional governance systems.   
 
Another crucial element in the legitimacy claims of transnational NGO networks is 
whether their representation of the South invests them with legitimacy, since many of them 
                                                 
941 Ibid, p. 81 
942Ibid. 
943 Backstrand K. (2008), Accountability of Networked climate Governance: The Rise of Transnational 
Climate Partnerships, Global Environmental politics, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp. 74 -102 at p. 81 
944 Ibid.  p. 82 
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claim just that.945 Hudson observes that  “fewer than 10% of the NGOs examined claimed 
to be ‘speaking for’ the South or Southern NGOs, but many argued that they were 
representing, or more subtly, promoting the interests of, the South, or values that emerged 
from their work in the South”.946 He goes on to say that when transnational NGO networks 
represent the South it is important to specify which norms they will invoke, and on whose 
behalf; what information will be communicated, and to whom; how will political 
responsibility be assigned; and what resources will be distributed, and to whom?947 
Representation debate leads many issues and concerns with regard to NGOs voicing 
Southern concerns and the following section will analyse different dimensions of 
representation debate in relation to North-South dimension. 
 
The Debate on Representation 
 
 
The debate on representation may be divided into few key issues: The first is that NGO 
networks do not have democratically elected members – they are, in Rosenau’s terms, 
“sovereignty-free actors”948. Therefore, according to the traditional governance approach, 
they do not possess legitimacy simply by representation.  As has been shown earlier, then, 
in order to advance the NGO network legitimacy debate it is necessary to move away from 
the traditional criteria, since the constant comparison of state legitimacy with non-state 
legitimacy remains a barrier to progress.  Collinwood elaborates this as follows:  
 
                                                 
945 Holmen H. and Jirstrom M. (2009), Look Who’s Talking! Second Thoughts about NGOs as Representing 
Civil Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 44, Number 4, pp: 429-448, at pp: 434-437, 
Hudson A. (2001), NGOs’ transnational Advocacy Networks: from ‘legitimacy’ to ‘political responsibility’?, 
Global Networks, Volume 1, Number 4, pp:331-352 at pp: 337-339 
946 Hudson A. (2001), NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks: from ‘Legitimacy’ to ‘Political 
Responsibility’? Global Networks. Volume 1, Issue 4, pp:331-352 at 338 
947 De Mars W. (2005), NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics, Pluto Press at, pp: 
58-59 
948 Rosenau J. (1997) Along the Domestic – Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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The comparison underpinning many of the criticisms of transnational NGOs’ legitimacy, 
contrasting the legitimacy of ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors, is thus ultimately unconvincing. 
NGOs are frequently compared with idealised institutions that bear little relationship to the 
reality of modern governance, nor the extent to which distinctions between public and private 
power have become blurred under conditions of globalisation.  It is doubly ironic that in 
critiques of NGOs, the state is held up as a model of legitimate power precisely at a time 
when the integrity of the state as a ‘public’ body bound to act in the common interest has 
been eroded.
949   
 
It is, therefore, questionable that how accurately the NGO networks’ representation of the 
Southern voice can be justified, or judged, should use the traditional criteria.  Here, 
Collinwood emphasises the need for recognising novel ways that go beyond the traditional 
understanding of legitimacy:  
 
The argument that NGOs are not democratic because they are not formally representative, or 
do not allow direct participation by stakeholders in decision-making, displays, at best, a 
failure of political imagination, and at worst, a desire to misrepresent how transnational 
NGOs actually function.
950 
 
The development of different legitimacy bases for transnational NGO representation, 
which is both crucial and essential for contemporary multi-dimensional governance 
systems, leads to the second issue of the legitimacy claim based on representation – 
whether the transnational NGO networks represent the real issues of the South.  It is 
important to analyse whether the transnational NGO networks truly engage with, and 
                                                 
949 Collinwood V. (2006), Non-governmental Organisations, Power and Legitimacy in International Society, 
Review of International Studies, Volume 39, at p.453 
950 Ibid, p. 451 
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communicate to, the global forums and also, what influence do the networks have on 
Southern interests. In most instances, as the previous section on diversity revealed, many 
Southern states and NGO groups in the networks depend financially on major Northern 
NGOs and this largely impacts on North-South NGO group relationships. A common 
criticism is that such relationships adversely influence the ability of Southern groups to 
voice their own concerns, which challenges the notion that they legitimately represent the 
Southern voice, or whether they are simply transferring western concepts into the South. 
This thesis, as is explained in detail in Chapter 1 and 2, argues that this question constitutes 
a serious threat to the principles of equity, fairness and justice, which should be the core 
principles of all transnational networks.951  Unless the networks apply these principles 
within their own decision-making processes they will never be able to present a balanced 
Southern case.  
 
Another dimension of the representation of transnational NGO networks is that NGO 
groups in a network are not really aware of who they are accountable for.  According to 
some authors there is an absence of true purpose in the representation of Southern 
causes.952  Some NGO groups working in a network do not even know that they are 
representing Southern concerns that have been truly marginalised and unheard at a global 
level, and that they are accountable to those countries that they represent. Hudson 
recognises two types of accountability claims on representation of NGO networks.953 The 
first – ‘upward accountability’ – includes line-managers, donors, trustees and boards of 
governors. Hudson observed that fifty percent of  NGOs in his research declared that they 
                                                 
951 This issues is discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, pp: 54-59 and Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp:85-93 
952 Holmen H. and Jirstrom M. (2009), Look Who’s Talking! Second Thoughts about NGOs as Representing 
Civil Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 44, Number 4,pp:429-448 Hudson A. (2001), 
NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks: from ‘Legitimacy’ to ‘Political Responsibility’? Global 
Networks, Volume 1, Issue 4 
953 Hudson A. (2001), NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks: from ‘Legitimacy’ to ‘Political 
Responsibility’? Global Networks, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp:331-352 at 338  
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were accountable to the officials mentioned above and that this is his definition of upward 
accountability.954 The second is ‘downward accountability’, which is being answerable to 
those whose interests the networks claim to promote.955 It is central to the argument of this 
thesis that transnational NGO networks should be intensely aware of this category of 
accountability in their practice.   
 
When transnational NGO networks represent Southern concerns at global level they should 
truly be accountable to those who are being represented by them. Therefore, all networks 
should clearly understand the real aspirations that lie behind Southern environmental 
interests. Some scholars have pointed out instances where major transnational NGOs who 
are protesting on behalf of Southern environmental matters neglect the protest when they 
learn that the groups they are representing have developmental elements in their 
protests.956  For instance, Holmen and Jirstrom state that “on a number of occasions, large, 
strong and well-connected NGOs have been found to use this platform to pursue 
completely opposite agendas while still pretending to be the voice of the unheard.”957 They 
refer to the support of transnational major NGOs to the Chipko movement – a genuine 
grassroots protest against the development projects that destroy the environment and 
livelihood of an area in the Indian Himalayas. When the NGOs learned that Chipko 
movement was “not against the development but rather against not being part of it” they 
withdrew their representation.958  In such an instance, the NGO networks’ commitment to 
                                                 
954 Ibid 
955 Ibid 
956 Holmen H. and Jirstrom M. (2009), Look Who’s Talking! Second Thoughts about NGOs as Representing 
Civil Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 44, Number 4, pp: 429-448, at 436-437, 
Mallaby S. (2004), NGOs: fighting Poverty, Hurting the poor, Foreign Policy Volume 144, pp: 50-58, 
Chapin M. (2004), A challenge to conservationists, World Watch Magazine, November/December Issue, 
World Watch Institute, pp:17-31 
957 Holmen H. and Jirstrom M. (2009), Look Who’s Talking! Second Thoughts about NGOs as Representing 
Civil Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 44, Number 4, pp: 429-448, at p. 436 
958 Ibid. 
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represent Southern peripheral concerns lacked legitimacy. Holmen and Jirstrom quote 
Chapin in their paper to show the bitter side of NGO representation of the Southern voice:  
 
Chapin likewise shows how a number of big INGOs […] allegedly campaigning on behalf of 
poor, indigenous peoples and cultural diversity – betray their clients when these are found to 
prioritize development and economic well-being over preservation of natural resources. As 
one interviewed NGOs representative put it: ‘Quite frankly, I don’t care what the Indians 
want.  We have to work to conserve the biodiversity’.959  
 
One of the most significant challenges that the transnational NGO networks need to 
address is that Southern groups within the networks are supposed to be at centre-stage and 
not on the periphery.  The application of principles of equity, fairness and justice within 
the networks should overcome the barriers of limited capacity, resources and political 
power of diverse range of NGOs within the network.   
   
In discussing legitimacy and accountability claims on transnational NGO networks many 
issues were analysed in relation to legitimacy criteria.  Firstly, the argument of legitimacy 
that tends to be rooted in the traditional interstate or state-centric context limits the 
multidimensional approach of transnational network legitimacy.  Therefore, further 
research is needed to seek a practical approach into transnational network representation of 
Southern concerns at a global level. The representation of transnational NGO networks 
opens up another debate on legitimacy, which they should take seriously in order to 
improve their legitimate claims and to ensure principles of equity, fairness and justice in 
                                                 
959 Holmen H. and Jirstrom M. (2009), Look Who’s Talking! Second Thoughts about NGOs as Representing 
Civil Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 44, Number 4, pp: 429-448, at p. 437, Chapin 
M. (2004), A challenge to conservationists, World Watch Magazine, November/December Issue, World 
Watch Institute, pp:17-31 at p. 21 
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their approach to Southern concerns are adhered to.  This thesis argues, therefore, that the 
major transnational NGOs must pay more attention to Southern issues and concerns before 
actually representing them.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In developing much further the arguments established in Chapters 1, 2 and 4, this chapter 
has concluded that state-centred governance mechanisms have largely failed to do justice 
to the marginalised South.  The historical and political exploration of the North-South 
dimension in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 indicated the need for a more up-to-date approach in 
voicing Southern global concerns. This chapter has, therefore, argued that it is vital that the 
political, economic, research and technological capacities of transnational NGO networks 
be utilised in this regard, since they constitute a more effective framework that would 
move the peripheral Southern states into the centre-ground of decision-making in order to 
both enrich the global environmental discourse and further their own aims.   
 
Several issues have been identified as essential for the successful establishment of a new 
strategy within the proposed framework.  Recognition of the collective identity of a 
transnational NGO network plays a crucial role in achieving its common goals and 
complexities and diversities within their constituent NGOs should be strategically 
overcome.  In addition, the main criticism regarding transnational NGO networks revolves 
around their legitimacy and accountability. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, this 
criticism is aimed at traditional conceptions of legitimacy, therefore, it is crucial that a new 
approach to legitimacy claims within the modern multidimensional governance system be 
established. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the representation of Southern concerns by 
transnational NGO networks should stress the vital importance of applying the principles 
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of equity, fairness and justice within the governance process. In summary, therefore, it is 
the contention of this thesis that any aspiring transnational NGO network should be 
compelled to adopt these principles in order to emphasise its accountability to those whose 
interests it claimed to promote.   
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Conclusion 
 
The main argument of this thesis, which is based on the conflict between North and South 
and its impact on global environmental decision-making, was based on two key factors 
inherent in current global governance. Firstly, the North-South dimension, which impacts 
on the principles of equity, fairness and justice and which has resulted in the 
marginalisation of the South to the periphery of the international decision-making process. 
Secondly, the significant mitigating role played by NGOs in order to redress the 
inequalities suffered by the South in the area of global environmental governance.  
 
It is the contention of this thesis, however, that all states should be committed to the 
demands of global environmental governance, such as, in the case of global forests – 
particularly tropical forests – the prevention of deforestation and degradation resulting 
from major development projects, population growth and illegal logging. The same also 
applies to slowing down climate change by reducing the carbon emissions produced 
mainly by developmental activities, and to the protection of the ozone layer by eradicating 
the ozone-depleting substances primarily used in industrial manufacturing. It is the 
contention of this thesis that environmental commitments require certain levels of sacrifice 
from within the development targets of Southern states, which is where the North-South 
dimension enters the environmental debate.  The Southern states are being expected to 
slow down their development phases – an expectation that appears logical, since it is they, 
and not the Northern states, that are undergoing development. In return the South questions 
the current responsibilities and duties of the North for the environmental space they had 
once used for their own industrial development process. It is, therefore, crucial to establish 
a global governance system that is capable of balancing the conflict of interests and 
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agendas of both sides. Fundamentally, therefore, this thesis is guided by this aim, that is, to 
find more effective alternatives in order to mitigate participation inequalities in global 
environmental governance.  
 
The earlier chapters of the thesis explore the history and politics of the North-South 
dimension, and they expose and examine the contestation between the environmental 
priorities of the North and the developmental priorities of the South. The first two chapters 
also contain an analysis of the decision-making process of global governance and the need 
to find alternatives to the current inter-state methods of drawing Southern concerns more 
effectively into the decision-making process. The thesis refers throughout to the literature 
relating to the North-South dimension, which makes clear that the traditional means by 
which Southern concerns have been presented have not had sufficient impact on the 
processes and outcomes of global environmental governance. Chapter 3, which analyses 
the international legal decision-making structures, goes on to discuss the need for the 
traditional framework of governance be reconsidered and replaced by a structure whereby 
NGOs represent Southern concerns in order to face the challenges brought about by the 
rapid changes in globalisation.960  
 
In Chapter 4, the practical application of international governance, which was discussed in 
the first three chapters at a predominantly theoretical level, are scrutinised by way of a 
Case Study, based on forest negotiations. It further establishes the argument that inter-state 
efforts have largely failed to address North-South inequalities in forest governance.  
Chapter 4 is, therefore, presents an in-depth analysis of the North-South forests debate 
                                                 
960 Pearson Z. (2004), Non-Governmental Organisations and International Law, Australian Year Book of 
International Law, Volume 23, pp: 73-103 at p.93, Pearson  Z. (2006), Non-Governmental Organizations and 
the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law, Cornell International Law 
Journal, Volume 39, Number 2,pp:243-284 
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regarding the capacity of NGOs to negotiate on behalf of Southern states. Chapter 5 
considers the advantages brought by such NGO networks to the decision-making forums, 
such as their universality, their greater financial resources, their superior expertise, and 
their research and technological capacity, together with their skills in negotiation. Chapter 
5 also emphasises the need to maintain legitimacy and accountability criteria in 
transnational NGO networks’ representation of Southern issues. This thesis, therefore, 
argues that transnational NGOs could play a significant role in voicing Southern concerns 
and go a long way to avoid further marginalisation in decision-making forums.  
 
However, this thesis does not believe that simply introducing NGO networks as negotiators 
for the Southern states would necessarily be completely successful, and neither would it 
automatically confer “legitimacy” on the NGOs, since, as discussed in Chapter 5, the 
issues of legitimacy, accountability and representation will remain questionable regarding 
their own internal structures and policies.  Nevertheless, given the recent changes in 
multidimensional global governance frameworks, in comparison to the Southern states’ 
own attempts at negotiation and influencing the decision-making process, the transnational 
NGO networks’ voice would certainly prove more effective.   
 
A fundamental argument of this thesis, which is based on the history, economics and 
politics of the North-South dimension, is that Southern states have suffered enormously 
from the effects of the “poverty of influence” (as explained in Chapter 1) – i.e. the South’s 
right to have “sufficient environmental space”961 to achieve its developmental goals.962 
                                                 
961
 The right to have sufficient environmental space to achieve the Southern development goals was 
emphasised by the Report on Environment and Development: Towards a Common Strategy for the South in 
the UNCED Negotiations and Beyond published by the South Centre, the follow-up office of the South 
Commission in November, 1991 
962 Najam A. (2005), Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to 
Participation to Engagement, International Environmental Agreements, Volume 5, pp: 303-321 at p.305 
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When examining the institutional global law-making processes in general, and 
environmental governance in particular, it seems clear from their outcomes that Southern 
concerns have not been sufficiently recognised and that policy has deviated from the 
principle of “adequate environmental space” and of equity, fairness and justice.   
 
This thesis, it is hoped, will act as a guide for future empirical research into how 
international law may be further developed in terms of the involvement of transnational 
NGO networks.  Such research, I believe to be absolutely essential, since existing 
international laws have already been questioned on the basis of their applicability to non-
state actors.963 Also essential will be research into the development of a “legitimacy” base-
line to be applied by the NGO networks. However, in any such research, it will be 
necessary to develop appropriate yard-sticks for ensuring that the networks abide by the 
principles of legitimacy and accountability. Therefore, with the caveat that they meet 
acceptable standards of performance, transnational NGO networks could prove invaluable 
in mitigating the disadvantages faced by the South, which have been so apparent in its past 
participation in environmental governance.   
                                                 
963 Pearson Z. (2006), Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing 
Landscapes of International Law, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 39, Number 2, pp:243-284 
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ublications%20and%20Reports/founex%20report%201972.pdf  (last accessed on 
15.03.2011) 
The GEF Assembly Documents: The document available at  
http://www.thegef.org/gef/meetingdocs/360/38 (last accessed on 17.02.2011) 
The Joint Declaration of the seventy-seven developing countries made at the conclusion of 
the United Nation's Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva in 15 June 
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1964: The document available at 
http://www.g77.org/doc/Joint%20Declaration.html  (last accessed on 06.10.2010) 
The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development on 8th of June 
1987 available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/SMK/Vedlegg/Taler%20og%20artikler%20av%
20tidligere%20statsministre/Gro%20Harlem%20Brundtland/1987/Presentation_of
_Our_Common_Future_to_UNEP.pdf  (last accessed on 03.11.2010) 
UN GA A/58/683, Annex I to the letter dated 15 January 2004 from the Permanent 
Representative of morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, Article 3 of the Marrakech Declaration on South-South Cooperation: The 
document available at 
http://www.g77.org/doc/docs/Marrakech%20Final%20Docs%20(E).pdf  (last 
accessed on 12.04.2011) 
UN Human Development Report 2007/2008: The document available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics  (last visited on 04.004.2011) 
UNGA Res. 1803 (XVIII) of 14 December 1962: Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources: The document available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/resources.htm  (last accessed on 11.10.2010) 
UNGA Res. 3201, Sixth Spec. sess. GAOR, Suppl.1,UN Doc. A./559: Declaration on the 
Establishment of New International Economic Order 
UNGA Res. A/Res/3281(XXIX) of 12 December 1974: Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States:  The document available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdf?OpenEleme
nt  (last accessed on 19.04.2011) 
United Nations International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994, TD/Timber.2/16, United 
Nations International Tropical Timber Agreement, 2006, TD/Timber.3/12, The 
agreements are available: http://www.itto.int/itta/  (last accessed on 08.12.2010) 
World Bank (1996) Staff Appraisal Report: India.  Eco-development Project.  Report No. 
14914-IN, August 3  
WTO Constitution in 1946: The document available at 
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf   (last accessed on 
10.04.2010 ) 
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Websites 
British Broadcasting Company news on Monday, 7th September 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8243091.stm  (last accessed 
22.09.2011 )  
Climate Action Network: available at 
http://www.climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/CAN_Principles_of_Financial_
mechanism_september09.pdf   
Commonwealth Forestry Association Newsletter, Commonwealth Foundation: available at 
http://www.cfa-international.org/CFN.html    
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund: available at 
http://www.cepf.net/xp/cepf/about_cepf/index.xml  (last accessed on 11.01.2011) 
E/2009/INF/4, List of non governmental organizations in consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2009.  
http://esango.un.org/paperless/content/E2009INF4.pdf  (last accessed on 
13.09.2010) 
Friends of the Earth International: available at http://www.foei.org   
Greenpeace: available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf  (last 
accessed on 09.09.2010) 
http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/gmun/shared/documents/GA_regionalgrps_Web.pdf  
(last accessed on 04.04.2011) 
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/   [last accessed on 06.04.2009]  
http://www.unep.org/PDF/Natural_Allies_en/Natural_Allies_english_full.pdf   (last 
accessed on 29.04.2010) 
Rainforest Action Network: available at http://ran.org/content/our-mission-and-history     
Worldwildlife: available at http://www.worldwildlife.org/home.html  
 
Case Study 
Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand vs. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974 : available 
at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=317&code=nzf&p1=3&p2=3&case=59&k=6b&p3
=5 (last  accessed on 16.04.2011) 
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Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports, 1949: 
available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_I  (last accessed on 
09.09.2010) also available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/1835.pdf (last 
accessed on 21.04.2011)  
Trail Smelter Case (US, Canada), April 1938 and March 1941: available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf  (last accessed on 
04.11.2010) 
 
 
 
